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Turkey’s European Union (EU) membership aspirations form a critical junction on the 
road to further European integration. During the past decade, the role of 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as facilitators of the accession process has 
grown exponentially in relevance. In Turkey’s case, specific policies have emerged to 
support this element of the pre-accession process. By targeting NGOs, these policies 
aim to Europeanise and democratise Turkish civil society and in so doing prepare 
Turkey for eventual EU accession. This logic draws on the liberal democratic tradition 
that anticipates democratisation to be a key outcome of NGO support. The thesis 
questions the appropriateness of such assumptions, since Turkish NGOs respond to EU 
policy in a variety of locally meaningful ways that may circumvent the stated policy 
outcomes. The wider the gap between policy and reality, the more space there is for 
NGOs to exercise their agency, and more uncertain the Europeanisation processes 
become. 
The thesis starts out by juxtaposing the European and Turkish perspectives in 
turn. The EU approach suggests that NGOs behave similarly across different cultural 
contexts and can be called upon to perform a variety of roles deemed useful for the 
overall policy process. However, civil society in Turkey has developed along a 
different trajectory, fostering NGOs that are highly politicised in their activities and 
cultivating social debates that are essentialist rather than compromising in nature. The 
latter part of the thesis explores different aspects of this disconnect. The relationships 
NGOs construct with each other and with governmental bodies are politicised and lack 
the culture of cooperation expected by EU policy. NGOs exhibit different reactions to 
EU funding: some embrace it while others pursue it unsuccessfully and grow resentful, 
or even reject any external funding outright. These differences lead NGOs to generate 
a variety of survival strategies that minimise the impact of EU policy on changing 
NGO behaviour where the change is unwelcome by the NGO, or maximise the impact 
where NGO and EU interests are mutually advanced. The thesis examines how the 
Europeanisation of Turkish civil society unfolds through a policy process that both 
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Moving closer to EU membership requires both political will and 
citizens' support. Civil society organisations can help achieving this. […] 
The EU accession perspective should drive forward such reforms that 
help Turkey to transform itself into a more open and democratic society, 
with a strong commitment to the values shared by all Europeans. […] 
Turkey is a case in point how a strong civil society is both a prerequisite 
and a consequence of a successful EU accession process. Today, the [sic] 
civil society can play an invaluable role by calling for better dialogue and 
the spirit of compromise. […] It needs our support - and a vocal civil 




Civil society is an intrinsic part of the European Union (EU) enlargement process and 
Turkish civil society therefore is an important actor in Turkey’s pre-accession process 
for EU membership. For example, the official budget for Turkey’s pre-accession 
assistance in 2008 allocated a 20-30 percent share of the total amount to civil society 
related initiatives (European Commission 2008a). In the current phase, Turkey and the 
EU have engaged in a period of “harmonisation” where Turkey is committed to 
adopting the acquis2 of the European Union. In other words, Turkey is facing a 
momentous process of change as it executes the required policy reforms. The role 
envisaged for civil society has much to do with an increased engagement in the 
policymaking arena, and as such civil society initiatives have largely concentrated on 
nongovernmental organisations (NGOs).3 The underlying expectations suggest that 
NGOs can facilitate the reform process by offering an avenue for dialogue with the 
public, as well as an alternative party to be consulted during policymaking. 
Conceptually, this kind of behaviour by NGOs links up with notions of change that 
have been captured by the phrases “Europeanisation” and “democratisation”. 
                                                 
1
 Rehn, Olli (2008), EU Commissioner for Enlargement. Excerpt from a speech given at the Conference 
on Civil Society Development in Southeast Europe, Brussels, 17 April 2008.  
2
 This term refers to the total body of European law each member state is required to accept as a 
condition of EU membership 
3
 In this thesis the term NGO refers to a particular subset of civil society organisations that engages in 
advocacy activities. The term civil society organisations (CSOs) is in turn used to refer to the totality of 
organisational forms that exist in civil society. The purpose of this distinction is to draw a line between 
organisations that form the focus of the research (NGOs) and other organisations (CSOs). These 
definitions are further elaborated and clarified in section 1.4 of the Introduction. 
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 As the policy on civil society links to these motives of Europeanisation and 
democratisation, particular strategies have been adopted when engaging with NGOs. 
The thesis argues, on the one hand, that the EU policy process views NGOs 
instrumentally. In other words, NGOs are vehicles to be employed to reach certain 
aspirational goals that relate to Europeanisation and democratisation. On the other 
hand, the policy of the EU reflects a universal understanding of the concepts of civil 
society and NGOs. Hence, the European understanding of the meaning of civil society 
is transferred, through the policy process, to the Turkish context.  
 But how does such a vision relate to Turkish civil society that is both culturally 
and historically different from European civil societies? For some observers civil 
society in Turkey exists more in quantity than in quality (Şimşek 2004 p. 252; 
Kalaycıoğlu 2004), referring to the fact that even though numerically speaking Turkish 
civil society has developed tremendously, the behaviour of civil society actors has 
been such that the qualitative impact on the processes of democratisation and 
Europeanisation remains limited. At the same time civil society has been identified as 
a key arena where both of these processes are expected to unfold (Göle 1994; Keyman 
and Öniş 2007; cf. Keyman and Icduygu 2003 p. 270). It is the apparent disconnect 
between the importance attached to civil society in theoretical and policymaking terms 
as an engine of transformative processes and the practical limitations for civil society 
to effectively manage this role that is of concern here. Does civil society in Turkey 
generate the kind of response that the Europeanisation and democratisation policies 
expect? 
This thesis is an attempt to engage with such questions. The relationship 
between the EU and Turkish civil society is poised between two sets of interests that 
possess an air of incommensurability. For the EU, Turkish civil society is one of the 
means to exact change required by the EU accession process. This policy of 
Europeanisation, that aims at meeting accession conditions such as full compliance 
with EU acquis, is realised through a unidirectional set of requirements that reflects the 
bureaucratic demands of “EUization” and pays less attention to the reality of NGO 
existence on the ground (Diez et al. 2005 p. 2). Turkish NGOs, however, are not 
passive recipients of these policies. Domestic pressures and issues interleave with the 
opportunities brought about by EU funding. Precisely because a gap exists between the 
EU and NGO expectations, the latter are compelled to search for locally meaningful 
responses to the opportunities and challenges that EU funding poses. NGOs expect 
Introduction 
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their contribution to be taken seriously, in the sense of being more than mere vehicles 
that can be used to complete projects. They expect to be treated more as equal partners 
who bring something unique to the partnership and should have more influence in 
determining the “what” and “how” elements of projects. Their reactions are 
determined by these expectations together with the domestic political context. Whether 
NGOs deem these expectations to be met is at least partly determined by the capacity 
of the NGO to rise to the challenge of managing EU-funded projects.  
Under these circumstances, civil society actors generate a variety of reactions 
and responses. This point of view offers a different way of understanding 
Europeanisation as a local process where the EU-led practices are internalised by 
domestic actors in their modes of operation. In this way Europeanisation can unfold 
differently from “intended Europeanisation” (Ioakimidis 2001 p. 74), spawning 
unintentional consequences as local actors attach different meanings and 
understandings to the processes of change they are witnessing. 
 The study aims to contribute to an understanding of how these differences 
materialise and how they are negotiated. It does so through a series of interviews with 
civil society activists, EU bureaucrats and Turkish officials that have been involved in 
the EU funding processes, exploring how civil society actors behave and why certain 
practices occur. This research scrutinises the tension that inevitably exists between the 
need to design broad policy objectives and the everyday practices of the recipients of 
such policies. The new systems that are introduced by these policies – the system of 
EU civil society funding being the focus here – need to be (and are being) internalised 
and mediated before they acquire meaning at the local level. This understanding places 
certain conditions on and limitations to what can be achieved by an externally 
designed policy intervention. 
 It is in this context that the processes of change – Europeanisation and 
democratisation – need to be analysed. EU policy towards civil society contains an 
assumption suggesting that the role of civil society is an instrumental one. In other 
words, local NGOs are expected to act as engines of change. However, these 
organisations are embedded in their local environment, where the change processes are 
likely to acquire new meaning that has been mediated and reinterpreted by the NGOs. 
What a particular policy intervention, designed with democratisation and 
Europeanisation in mind, can achieve, is therefore limited by the local context and by 
the behaviour of the local actors. The notion of local context is further complicated by 
Introduction 
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the fact that it does not constitute a cohesive whole. Within the general context of 
Turkey, several sub-contexts can be identified that influence actors’ behaviour and 
induce NGOs to react in a colourful array of ways. As EU policy assumptions about 
civil society are not fully congruent with the Turkish experience of civil society, NGOs 
negotiate this incongruence by carving out new roles for themselves that are more 
locally relevant. These observations, then, highlight NGOs’ agency and autonomy vis-
à-vis the EU’s civil society policy. 
 
1.1 The broader literature 
These discussions bring together three broad themes of literature that form the 
backbone of this research project. One theme is that of donor-civil society relations. 
What is the donor (EU) rationale for funding NGOs, where does this come from and 
what impact does it have on the relationship with NGOs and civil society? A second 
theme relates to the EU accession process as Europeanisation. The accession 
negotiations are based on specific criteria that Turkey has agreed to abide by. What are 
the normative and practical conditions of entry, where do the priorities within this 
process lie for the EU and for the Turkish government, where is the room for 
manoeuvre for Turkish NGOs and how does this shape the experience of NGOs? The 
third theme is that of the Turkish context. What are the particularities of the Turkish 
case that are relevant to our understanding of how the accession process will unfold? 
This research project is situated in the intersection of these three sets of literature and 
the following section elaborates on the conceptual tools offered by each of these.  
 
Donors and civil society 
The relationship between the EU and Turkish civil society can be best described as a 
variant of the “donor-NGO relationship” that is widely discussed in the literature on 
civil society. The focus on NGOs forms a subfield within civil society studies, looking 
at particular types of formal organisations that operate within the civil societal space, 
whose work often resonates strongly with donor objectives.4 One defining element of 
these relationships is the existence of a facility for providing financial support. Quite 
often the growth of the NGO sector has been supply-driven, meaning that the 
organisations do not necessarily arise out of local needs and may not be the most 
                                                 
4
 For further clarification on these terms, see section 1.4 of this chapter. 
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suitable for the needs and requirements of the country in question (Ottaway and 
Carothers 2000 p. 299). Donor priorities shift frequently, forcing NGOs to realign their 
interests in order to compete for funding (Howell and Pearce 2001a). Yet, chasing the 
money trail may have a negative impact on the ability of advocacy NGOs to retain a 
reputation for independence, a quality that is considered a key ingredient in being able 
to influence a political process (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Hulme and Edwards 1997; 
Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Parks 2008; Bratton 1989). The supply-driven nature of 
donor funding leads one to question what exactly is being achieved with the help of 
these funds, and how this relates to the stated aims of donor-funded programs. 
Democratisation, often in connection with human rights initiatives, has become 
a critical part of the civil society funding rationale for international donor 
organisations. Within the conventional neo-Tocquevillean views of civil society (a 
theme Chapter Three elaborates on), greater civil society activism is likely to lead to 
more accountable governance, more effective policy implementation and to democratic 
reform (Mercer 2002). The existence of civil society in itself is therefore taken as a 
positive sign of democratic development (Diamond 1994; Putnam et al. 1994). It is 
labelled as “good” and becomes conceptually distinct from the “bad” state and market 
(Bebbington et al. 2008 p. 6). Carothers (1997) points to a duality of purpose behind 
democracy promotion by donors. On the one hand, democratisation is seen as an end in 
itself; it brings freedom and governmental accountability which will improve peoples 
lives. On the other hand, democracy is good for social and economic development and 
is therefore regarded as one component of a successful development programme. This 
latter purpose, Carothers suggests, has been more prevalent in donor programmes in 
Africa, where economic issues have taken priority (cf. Crawford 1997, 2001). Policies 
aiming for democratisation, therefore, tend to interlace with social and economic aims.  
The argument on the social and economic benefits of civil societal 
development is often framed around the impact civil society can have on government 
effectiveness. The CSOs contribute by assisting in the delivery of services (Robinson 
1997) or by supporting governmental policymaking processes (Giddens 1998). 
Governments need not rely only on the possibilities provided by the public and market 
options, as a third option exists that combines the logic of the first two (Etzioni 1973). 
Civil society can constitute a “third sector” which offers new solution where market 
and government have previously failed (Salamon 1987). The “logic of the third sector” 
is a frequently used concept that describes how the donor community operationalises 
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civil society through funding (Richter 2002; Henderson 2002; Hemment 2004; Cook 
and Vinogradova 2006). The third sector can be regarded as the professional realm of 
NGOs, where organisations serve a narrower function as market-like entrepreneurs, 
operating in a professional, business-like manner. Those groups that successfully 
engage in such programmes are engulfed by the professional and bureaucratic 
activities surrounding the grant programs, bringing them closer to the donors and 
distancing them from other civil society groups as well as from the rest of society 
(Richter 2002; Hemment 2004). Civil society actors, who ought to be embedded in the 
formal and informal institutions, are uprooted and re-planted among donors and third 
sector professionals. Here again a certain discrepancy between donor aims and local 
reality occurs. The view that civil society is “good” for social and economic 
development is one that resonates more with current policy trajectories in the 
developed, Western world, than with the reality of how civil society actors operate on 
the ground. 
These kinds of donor efforts to engage NGOs have been criticised for being 
estranged from the political realities of the local context and civil society. Local civil 
society is, after all, the domain within which the funded NGOs operate. Subsequent 
donor support instrumentalises civil society, making it the means to an end, not an end 
in itself. This erodes the political edge of civil society as it becomes a vehicle for 
delivering goals conceived by the donors (Howell and Pearce 2001b), and as 
Bebbington et al. observe, “NGOs are only NGOs in any politically meaningful sense 
of the term if they are offering alternatives to dominant models, practices and ideas 
about development” (2008 p. 3).What is more, the donor goals often assume an air of 
universality, purporting a particular package of moral values and organisational forms 
as the only one available. Civil society becomes confined within the western model of 
liberal individualism (Hann and Dunn 1996 p. 3), a context in which the ideas of 
NGOs and projects become reified as the vehicle through which change can be 
delivered (Howell and Pearce 2001a). Civil society has been “dusted off and 
deodorized to suit a variety of ideological, intellectual and practical needs” (White 
1994 p. 370). Has civil society, as Chandoke suggests, been a victim of its own 
success, where popularity has made it an overly consensual and flattened concept 
(2001), leading to overly superficial and generic donor strategies (Carothers 1997)? 
These questions and concerns highlight the need for a different approach. Mindful of 
this, others consider civil society as a site of “struggle, multivocality and paradox” 
Introduction 
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(Glasius et al. 2004 p. 10) and emphasise the need to pay careful attention to the 
informal and interpersonal practices present in civil society (Hann and Dunn 1996). 
It is in the slipstream of such arguments and observations that this thesis 
evolves. NGOs are not passive recipients of project funding and through the actions of 
NGOs projects take on local relevance. Following the actor-oriented perspective (Long 
2001), the thesis explores (particularly in Chapter Seven) how the discrepancies that 
exist between donors and NGOs are negotiated. Drawing on the work of Lewis and 
Mosse (2006) I describe NGOs as “brokers” and “translators”, and build on this 
framework by suggesting two additional roles (“navigators” and “antagonists”) that 
emerge in the Turkish context. The purpose of this fourfold characterisation of roles is 
to convey the colourful array of strategies that Turkish NGOs employ in their 
activities. In fact, the reasons why NGOs became such popular partner organisations 
for donors in the first place – possession of local knowledge, innovative practices, 
ability to function as intermediaries between locals and external donors – are still very 
much present in how NGOs operate. However, the way in which these characteristics 
manifest themselves may not be directly beneficial to the aims of donor projects. 
Rather, they are governed in the first instance by the domestic socio-cultural context. 
Therefore, the political and socio-cultural realities of the domestic context in Turkey 
ought to be at the forefront of any explanation put forward. 
 
Europeanisation 
As others have observed, Europeanisation is not a theory in itself. Rather it is a 
phenomenon, a puzzle that requires explanation (Graziano and Vink 2008; Radaelli 
2004). Thus, using the above arguments to make sense of EU-NGO relations in Turkey 
leads to a particular explanation of what is meant by Europeanisation. There are three 
broad perspectives. First, at its broadest, Europeanisation alludes to the relationship 
between norms, policies, rules and regulations that exist at the European level, and 
those that are present at the national level. This type of Europeanisation is often cited 
in the context of EU accession negotiations, referring to a top-down process where EU 
directives and policies are being adopted by nation states (Kazamias and Featherstone 
2001). Second, and alternatively, Europeanisation can be seen as a process of domestic 
pressures feeding into the decisions of national actors, which in turn may guide the 
forms of governance at the European level. These two sources of influence are likely 
to interact, working as a two-way process that determines the final form 
Introduction 
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Europeanisation takes (Kazamias and Featherstone 2001 p. 6). Third, Europeanisation 
can be seen as a purely domestic process, where local actors, local problems and local 
discourse engage with European variables, and where the outcomes feed directly back 
into the domestic environment (Radaelli 2004). The key point of difference here is that 
the domestic reactions are not purely reactions to European influences. What is 
common to all three perspectives, something inherent in the very word 
Europeanisation, is the underlying focus on change. Where they differ is in how 
change is perceived to manifest itself, and subsequently, how best to study it. The last 
of these three approaches adheres to a broader notion of impact that tries to capture the 
more nuanced processes of socialisation that are taking place, as EU policies are 
internalised by local actors, and as such it is the concept that resonates most closely 
with the approach adopted in this thesis.  
Each of these three perspectives, in their own way, retains some relevance to 
the case of EU civil society funding in Turkey.5 EU funding is anchored to the 
Copenhagen Criteria, which set forth the political, economic and policy requirements 
for all new member states and form the backbone of a top-down, technical process of 
Europeanisation. At the same time the NGOs that receive EU funding are embedded in 
and informed by the domestic political and cultural practices. The pressures and 
influences that derive from the local context feed into the decisions NGOs make within 
the funding framework. Finally, NGO behaviour spills over to areas that cannot be 
understood solely by reference to EU-imposed Europeanisation, or by NGO reactions 
to Europeanisation-related policies. NGOs are able to operate in a variety of ways, 
utilising EU funding and other normative forms of Europeanisation in their domestic 
activities, yet without outcomes that may be considered explicitly Europeanising.  
Given that the thesis is concerned primarily with the behaviour of the actors on 
the ground and their responses to Europeanisation processes in Turkey, the study 
aligns with “sociological institutionalism” (also called constructivist institutionalism). 
This is one of the three “new institutionalist” approaches that are frequently applied to 
the study of Europeanisation within European Studies (Kazamias and Featherstone 
                                                 
5
 Although the literature most often deals with Europeanisation within the EU’s borders, the dynamics 
in the enlargement context are principally the same and the literature has been adapted (Bulmer 2008; 
Radaelli 2000).  
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2001; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2008).6 
Sociological institutionalism emphasises the importance of the informal rules and 
norms that influence decision-making. When an institution influences the behaviour of 
actors, this is not simply down to a threat of sanctions or conditionalities that may have 
been imposed. These actors must internalise the responsibilities placed upon them by 
the institution. It is a question of socialisation, whereby actors internalise the new rules 
and norms. This in turn affects how they see their interests (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 
2006: 395). Similarly, Diez describes Europeanisation as an enabling concept, not as 
something that causes things directly. It energises actors to act by creating certain 
conditions, but it does not prescribe a certain way of behaving (1999). The decisions 
made by the actors involved ultimately determine the outcomes of Europeanisation. 
The structures of European integration and of Europeanisation are not rigid but vague.  
 Europeanisation relates to the change processes that are brought about by the 
EU and at the heart of this influence is the policy of conditionality. In other words, the 
reward of EU membership is contingent on the fulfilment of a long list of reforms. In 
comparison to the kind of donor-NGO relationship that is described in much of the 
literature (Mercer 2002; Howell and Pearce 2001b; Carothers 2004), the relationship in 
Turkey, given the broader context of Europeanisation and the EU accession, has 
processes attached that are not present elsewhere. Whilst the formal funding 
procedures are unidirectional (the EU determines project aims and decides on 
monitoring criteria), there are numerous opportunities for civil society actors to 
internalise and mediate the system of funding so that it gains meaning in the local 
context. In this way, the actor-oriented perspective offers interesting insights to the 
role played by civil society in this context. Furthermore, the impact of EU funding is 
not limited to those CSOs that receive funding. It also has an effect on the behaviour of 
civil society actors that are unable, or refuse to apply for funding. Given the existence 
                                                 
6
 The other two approaches are “rational choice institutionalism” and “historical institutionalism”. 
Rational choice institutionalism assumes that actors have fixed preferences and always employ 
strategies that aim to maximise self-interest. It emphasises the role of major EU institutions, such as the 
European Commission and European Parliament, as the structuring agents between other actors. 
Historical institutionalism considers the short-term and long-term impact of institutions. It agrees on the 
initial premise of rational choice institutionalism – that institutions and actors are bound in a strategic 
game of interest bargaining – but foresees the development of path dependencies in the long term. That 
is, institutional ways of behaving, or cultures, develop that constrict the strategic choices available to 
actors under rational choice institutionalism. This is not to say these approaches hold no explanatory 
power, yet they remain less relevant to the type of empirical task at hand here (Kazamias and 
Featherstone 2001 pp. 7-9). 
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of such conditioning factors, the funding operation ultimately has uncertain outcomes. 
A complex web of interactions and responses arise from these dynamics and pull in 
various directions, making the outcomes of Europeanisation unpredictable. 
 
The case of Turkey 
Since the latter years of the Ottoman Empire, and with renewed vigour since the 
formation of the Turkish republic in 1923, Westernisation has played in important role 
in defining the social and political course Turkey has taken. Located at the junction 
where East meets West, Westernisation referred to scientific and technological 
innovation leading to modernisation, to be juxtaposed by the desire to retain Islam as a 
key cultural reference point. More recently, the Westernisation thesis has taken on a 
different shape in light of the EU accession talks. Political reform, together with issues 
such as democratisation and transparency, has become a central element of the 
Westernisation process. This mood change is reflected in the changing terminology, as 
it is the democratisation aspect that distinguishes Europeanisation from the earlier 
meanings given to the concept of Westernisation (Grigoriadis 2008 p. 35).  
 Nevertheless, the fractured nature of the debate that has crystallised in recent 
years around the issue of Europeanisation in Turkey speaks to the complexities 
involved. Nicholas Sarkozy, the French premier, and the German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel are among those who advocate for a “privileged partnership” instead of a full-
fledged EU membership (Euractiv 2009a).7 On the other hand the former British 
Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, has called a change of heart on Turkey’s EU 
accession as “unconscionable” (Euractiv 2009b). These examples of the fractured 
discourse with regard to Turkey’s membership illustrate that the EU member states do 
not represent a single ideological vision about what it means to be European today 
(Keyman and Öniş 2007 p. 92). Nor is there agreement on what the future economic or 
political direction of Europe will be. What Europe, or the European Union means or 
represents is increasingly contested. 
                                                 
7
 The proponents of this approach point to the size of Turkey’s population, the danger this poses in 
terms of immigration, and the cultural differences Turkey poses as a Muslim country and argue that full 
integration of Turkey within the European institutions is undesirable if not impossible. In practice, this 
solution involves closing negotiations on 27-28 of the 35 chapters that completion of membership 
negotiations would consist of. It aims to preserve the special relationship between the EU and Turkey by 
finding a “third way” between membership and non-membership. For an assessment of this approach, 
see Icener (2007) and Hakura (2005). 
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Similar debates have taken place within Turkey as well, where the debate is 
divided between the “Eurosceptics” and the “Reformers”. Since the 2002 
parliamentary elections won by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi – AKP), the initiative for democratic reform shifted away from the 
republican/nationalist camp (which were at the forefront of previous Westernisation 
programmes), towards a political movement that has its roots in the traditional, 
religiously motivated politics (who previously were less enthusiastic about Turkey’s 
Westernising zeal). Thus today, whilst the AKP is at the cusp of the 
reformist/Europeanisation movement, the secular elite has found itself being sceptical 
of these reforms, on the grounds that they instigate unwanted divisions along religious-
secular lines (Müftüler-Baç 2005; Carkoğlu 2002). 
The impact of Europeanisation has indeed become an important explanatory 
factor in the recent analysis of Turkish society and politics. The potential of EU 
membership set out a favourable atmosphere within which the consolidation of 
Turkey’s democratic regime has been made possible (Öniş 1999). Thus it was only 
once Turkey’s candidacy status was confirmed by the European Council in December 
1999 that a rapid and far-reaching programme of reform was initiated in Turkey 
(Müftüler-Baç 2005; Smith 2003; Bretherton and Vogler 2006). Between 2001 and 
2004, nine separate constitutional reform packages were passed by the Turkish 
parliament addressing far-reaching legal reforms (developments that are discussed 
further in Chapter Two). On the other hand, Eralp has observed how a converse effect 
has been caused by the gradual downturn in the relationship since 2004.8 The 
institutional stalemate within Europe caused by the halted progress on the Lisbon 
Treaty and slow-down of the EU enlargement policy were met with increased hostility 
and scepticism in Turkey.9 The EU conditionalities were not balanced with appropriate 
incentives, leading to a situation where compliance with EU demands has increased 
political costs associated with EU reform, exacerbating the downturn in the 
relationship. Others, both within Turkey and the EU, have argued for the “Middle 
Easternisation” (as opposed to Europeanisation) of Turkey’s foreign policy, where a 
                                                 
8
 Eralp, Atila (2009) “Lost time in the Turkey-EU relationship”. Paper read at the Turkish 
Contemporary Studies Research Seminar Series, London School of Economics, London, 26 October 
2009. 
9
 The Treaty of Lisbon was offered as a softer alternative to the European constitution, which was 
rejected by the French and Dutch voters in referendums in 2005. This rejection reflected a desire to 
retain more decision-making powers at the national level, a sentiment that was in part fueled by the 
concern over Turkey’s potential membership.  
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shift away from the West has occurred in response to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 
and the more recent partial suspension of the EU accession talks (Oğuzlu 2008; 
Economist 2010). Since then, the rising political tensions with Israel following the 
death of nine Turkish citizens on international waters by Israeli soldiers in June 2010, 
together with concern over the potential effect of the Greek financial crisis on Turkey’s 
accession have created further political ripples for Turkey’s European aspirations. 
Nevertheless, politicians previously in support of Turkey’s membership, in countries 
such as the United Kingdom and Sweden, remain deeply committed to the cause 
(Turkish Daily News 2010). 
 
1.2 Identifying Research Questions 
 
The research questions addressed stem from a juxtaposition of the above three themes: 
donors and civil society, Europeanisation, and the Turkish context. The function of the 
questions is to investigate the disconnect between EU policy and the response of 
Turkish civil society actors to the EU policy processes. The main research question 
therefore is “Why, in the context of EU civil society funding in Turkey, are processes of 
Europeanisation unpredictable in their outcomes?” I am referring to both the formal 
bureaucratic processes and informal social processes of Europeanisation, as it is the 
entanglement of the formal and informal that is the focus of the thesis, and a root cause 
of the unpredictability. Every system, including that of EU funding to Turkish NGOs, 
needs to be internalised and mediated before it garners meaning. There are three salient 
parts to this puzzle that require explanation, each of which forms a research sub-
question for the thesis. 
The first question asks “What are the frameworks of support that are present in 
EU civil society assistance?” The term “framework” here refers to the assemblage of 
devices – policies, language, methods of distribution and monitoring – that the EU 
uses to deliver and justify NGO funding. Together these form the framework within 
which NGOs are formally expected to operate. 
The second question asks “How does the Turkish political context mediate the 
impact of EU funding on NGOs?” In other words, how appropriate is the EU funding 
strategy in this context, what are the differences and how do these differences affect 
the actions of the actors involved?  
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The final question, taking its lead from the previous, therefore asks “How do 
NGOs react when faced with choices about how to engage with EU funding policy?” 
This question explores the discrepancies between NGO interests and EU policy, and 
how NGOs navigate these discrepancies, with particular emphasis on the various 
processes through which EU policy is internalised, resisted or manoeuvred. Through 
these questions the research ultimately aims to understand how the unpredictability of 
EU policy outcomes in relation to civil society is shaped by NGO actors. An 
exploration of this two-way process between policy formulation and operationalisation 
of policy on the ground is helpful in understanding why Europeanisation has unfolded 
in the way it has. 
 
Hypotheses 
The research questions aim to account for the disconnect between Europeanisation 
efforts that are shrouded in instrumental and universal understandings of civil society, 
and how NGOs operate in reality. It is suggested that NGOs operate in ways that 
cannot be accounted for by this instrumental and universal conception of EU policy. 
Two hypotheses are employed in an effort to answer why the EU’s policy strategy 
does not unfold as expected. First of all, EU policy, by its nature, employs an external 
agenda for reform that rarely accommodates the domestic political environment. Thus 
a gap forms between the EU policy approach and the domestic politics, making any 
particular anticipated outcome uncertain. Second, NGOs are not absorbed passively 
into the EU policy process, but they are autonomous agents. NGOs have the freedom 
to operate in a number of roles in relation to EU policy, whether they are positioned 
inside or outside the formal EU policy process. This highlights the importance of 
informal rules and norms that define how actors internalise the external agenda 
introduced by EU policy. Where the policy intervention lacks the space for these 
processes of internalisation to unfold, the recipient actors are more likely to exhibit 
resistance and resentment in their actions. Whether NGOs interpret the EU agenda as a 
new, fresh approach to be embraced, or as an external agenda to be resisted, is 
contingent on a multitude of factors, such as NGO capacity to cope with the demands 
of project management, or the domestic political context in which the NGO finds 
itself. For example, an NGO with a negative view of the current pro-European 
government is likely to relate more suspiciously to EU projects. The variety of 
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responses NGOs generate in relation to EU policy are partly responsible for the 
unpredictability and uncertainty present in policy processes. 
 
1.3 Research Methods 
A key aim of my fieldwork, which took place between April 2007 and July 2008, was 
to unpack and learn more about the processes through which EU funding has been 
made available to NGOs, and how (if at all) NGOs have interacted in these processes. 
Through a series of interviews with NGO representatives I wanted to better understand 
the opinions and attitudes they held towards EU funding, and for what reasons.10 I 
conducted additional interviews with the other key actors involved, namely those 
working on behalf of the EU and the Turkish government. I interviewed individuals 
working for the EU delegation in Ankara and individuals working in the intermediary 
organisations that oversee the operationalisation of EU funding through projects, such 
as the Civil Society Development Centre (CSDC) and the Central Finance and 
Contracts Unit (CFCU). These interviews helped to illuminate the governmental and 
bureaucratic concerns that inform NGO support processes. 
Overall, 42 interviews were conducted where the methods for selecting the 
interviewees combined elements of purposive sampling and cascading. In purposive 
sampling the respondents are selected on the basis of how they fit a particular profile 
that is relevant to the research. Although such non-random methods may cause 
selection bias, the use of random sampling in small-n11 research is likely to generate 
more serious biases (King et al. 1994). In other words, when the number of interviews 
is too small to be statistically significant, the probability for chance outcomes is 
higher. In such circumstances it is advisable to establish a rationale for purposive 
sampling instead. Cascading refers to a method where interviewees offer suggestions 
for further interviews, and help with contacting such individuals. The interviewer, 
quite literally, cascades from one interview to the next. Such selection methods were 
useful in targeting key respondents whose contribution was going to be highly relevant 
to the research. 
                                                 
10
 A topic guide outlining the broad content of these interviews is included in the Appendix. 
11
 Small-n studies refer to research that is based on an in-depth study of relatively small number 
samples, such as case studies or in-depth interviews, where the data collected is not broad enough to 
lend itself to statistical analysis. It is the opposite of “large-n” studies where the sample sizes are 
sufficiently large for statistical analysis to be possible. 
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The methods of sampling employed traced the following path. First of all, the 
research required a broad exposure to NGOs that had experience of working with the 
EU, and for this reason I located my research in the three cities that have benefited 
most from EU funding: Istanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakir. In contacting NGOs I made 
use of online databases of Turkish NGOs as well as a directory of NGO contact details 
published by the History Foundation of Turkey (Tarih Vakfı) (2006). I limited these 
interviews largely to actors that had experience of working in advocacy NGOs, as an 
understanding of the Turkish advocacy environment was central to being able to 
address the appropriateness of the EU approach. In addition, the NGOs interviewed 
ranged widely in terms of their experience of EU funding, from veterans of EU project 
funding to those who had never even made an application for funds. In this way the 
research is able to say something about the early impact of pre-accession related 
funding also among those civil society actors that are not directly touched by the grants 
and the projects.  
I began the research with interviews that focused on women’s NGOs and youth 
NGOs. Environmental NGOs could have offered an alternative research focus within 
the advocacy community (Adaman and Arsel 2005), but given the prevalence of youth 
and women’s issues on the EU agenda in Turkey, such focus made it easier to identify 
NGOs with experience of EU funding. In addition, the research included interviews 
with government officials located in Ankara, as well as with intermediary 
organisations that operate in-between the EU and Turkish government, facilitating the 
funding process. As the research evolved I pursued different paths, interviewing five 
advocacy organisations working on broader human rights issues and on Gay, Lesbian, 
Bisexual and Transsexual (GLBT) rights, for example.12 In part the decision to 
broaden the approach was due to the fact that during the fieldwork it became 
increasingly clear that the aims of the research did not require a focus on any particular 
type of NGO; rather, the central aim was to cast a wider net to include different types 
of reactions and experiences that had emerged in relation to EU funding. Broadening 
the organisational focus helped also with my efforts to triangulate data. Where 
possible, I tried to ensure that each opinion expressed in this thesis originated from 
more than one respondent. In most cases the conclusions also draw on responses from 
                                                 
12
 See the table 1 for more detail on interviews.  
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more than one type of NGO, ensuring that the issues are not specific to, for example, 
youth NGOs alone. 
 The data for the thesis was collected and analysed in the following manner:  
The majority of the interviews were recorded, supplemented by notes that were taken 
during interviews. As soon as possible after the interview I would consolidate the notes 
with the recording, and type out a detailed account of the interview. For a handful of 
the interviews I decided not to use a recording device because in my experience in 
certain occasions it interfered with the interview process, as respondents were less 
forthcoming and less comfortable with the interview situation. Therefore, particularly 
during my visit to Diyarbakir, where NGO activity until recently has been under 
greater scrutiny by the state, I made the decision not to record the interviews. In these 
cases I made extensive notes during the interview, which I then typed out in full as 
soon as possible after the interview. Whilst a majority of the interviews were 
conducted in English, where this was not possible (such as during my stay in 
Diyarbakir) I hired a translator to help with the interviews. Following data collection, I 
entered all of the interview data into NVivo 8, a computer programme designed for 
processing qualitative data. Following a period of coding, I then generated reports that 
collected all interview material relevant for each code in one document. These 
documents were then used as the bases for data analysis in the empirical chapters. In 
total I conducted 42 semi-structured interviews. A majority of the interviews (34) 
focused on representatives of Turkish NGOs (where possible the interviewees were 
chief executives, or equivalent, and where this was not possible I interviewed 
programme directors with experience of managing projects, or other staff members). 
Other interviews focused on EU bureaucrats working at the EU delegation for Turkey 
and government officials working both for the Department of Association and for the 
Turkish parliament. Additionally, I interviewed members of intermediary organisations 
that operate between EU and Turkish government, and two smaller donor 





Type of Interview 
/ Location 
Istanbul Ankara Diyarbakir TOTAL 
Women 9 5 3 17 
Youth 6 5 - 11 
Human rights 1 - 1 2 
Gay rights 1 1 1 3 
Officials - 4 - 4 
Intermediaries - 3 - 3 
Other donors 1 1 - 2 
TOTAL 18 19 5 42 
Table 1: A table displaying all interviews conducted, categorised by type of interview (across, left-to-
right) and by interview location (top-down). 
 
Qualitative, semi-structured interviews seem well placed to enable access to the 
type of information required for solving the research puzzle presented here. In addition 
to factual information, semi-structured interviews can provide insights into the context 
within which the interaction and decision-making among the different actors takes 
place. Each respondent offers certain views, interpretations and understandings that are 
shaped by their position in the social context under investigation (Mason 2002). I 
decided to keep the interviews anonymous; early on some of the respondents requested 
this, and once I mentioned to other interviewees that I would keep the material 
anonymous, this seemed to relax the interview situation and increase the willingness of 
respondents to reveal information. These observations concur with findings elsewhere 
on the impact of anonymity on respondent’s willingness to reveal information 
(Aquilino 1994). Hence, in this thesis interviewees are not mentioned by name but by 
code. 
 
1.4 Definitions: civil society, CSO and NGO 
There are three interrelated terms in particular that require clarification. These are civil 
society, CSO and NGO. It is easy to use the three terms interchangeably, referring 
roughly to the same phenomenon. The nuances and differences between the terms, 
however are quite important in the context of this thesis. The term civil society refers 
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to the arena of collective action that is shaped by shared interests and values.13 This 
arena is populated by a variety of organisational forms, both formal and informal. 
These include registered associations and foundations, development organisations, 
human rights organisations, women’s organisations, faith-based organisations, trade 
unions, business associations, advocacy groups, community groups and hometown 
associations, to mention a few. Institutionally civil society is separate from the state, 
the market and the family, although in practice these boundaries remain fluid and 
porous. 
The definition put forward by the theorists Cohen and Arato, for example, 
exemplifies this fluidity by placing the family within the realm of civil society:  
 
[civil society is] a sphere of social interaction between economy and 
state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), 
the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social 
movements, and forms of public communication” (1992 p. 134). 
 
Whilst the inclusion of family within civil society may establish somewhat 
unconventional boundaries around the concept, this highlights the blurriness of the 
boundaries. For other theorists such as Ernest Gellner whose views are outlined in 
detail in Chapter Two, civil society comes to exist only once a society is able to forge 
associational links that surpass the family. In fact, Gellner argues that the 
predominance of primordial kinship and familial ties prevents the development of civil 
society in more traditional societies (1994, 1981). This logic is found also in the broad 
theoretical approach that links civil society with the emergence of capitalist 
industrialisation, whereby civil society is regarded as a modern category that moves 
beyond the family.14 However, as Jude Howell points out, the inclusion of the intimate 
sphere among the other spheres of social interaction helps us understand how “the 
family shapes the norms, practices, and behaviours in the public realm, that is, in state, 
civil society, and market institutions” (Howell 2007 p. 418; cf. Seckinelgin 2010). 
Even though the thesis does not investigate the relationship between family and civil 
society per se, Howell’s argument reflects a premise also found within this thesis: that 
locally constructed values and norms are an important influence in shaping the 
behaviour of NGOs, which in turn contributes to the unpredictability of NGO 
                                                 
13
 This interpretation draws heavily on the definition put forward by LSE’s Centre for Civil Society 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm  
14
 See, for example, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right 
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behaviour in the context of EU funding. Whilst conceptually it is possible to define 
civil society as a list of organisational types and place it outside the state and family, in 
practice the boundaries are heavily perforated.  
 The “third sector” (a term coined by Amitai Etzioni and later extensively 
developed by Lester Salamon) refers to a very similar, but somewhat more limited 
space in society when compared with civil society. The crucial difference being that 
within the use of third sector there are embedded certain expectations of the behaviour 
of these organisations. These expectations derive from a link that has been established 
between governmental operations and civil society. In other words, how can NGOs 
contribute to improved governmental conduct? Thus, there are more specific 
expectations of the role of civil society in terms of contributing, through activities, to 
the delivery of public policy (service delivery) or to the development of new policies 
(advocacy). As Chapter Three will show, the concept of the third sector is particularly 
relevant to how the EU understands civil society.  
Civil society organisations (CSOs) and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) 
are further denominations of this sphere of associational life. There are no universally 
agreed definitions, and in this thesis these terms are applied in the following way. 
Whilst CSOs refer to the totality of organisations and organisational forms that exist 
within civil society, the term NGO refers to a particular subset of organisations 
relevant to the study: the professional associations in Turkey that engage in advocacy 
work. The primary constituent of this group are organisations that work on rights-
based issues, such as human rights, women’s rights, youth rights and child rights, for 
example. The majority of the organisations researched in the context of this thesis have 
been advocacy NGOs, working on such rights-based issues. Organisations such as 
trade unions, churches, hometown associations, mosques and mosque-building 
associations would therefore be categorised as CSOs in the context of the thesis, not as 
NGOs.  
 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
The aims of this thesis are twofold. I seek to understand the appropriateness of EU 
policy in the Turkish context and the variety of ways in which actors engage in the 
processes that surround EU funding for NGOs. In the slipstream of the main research 
question, I argue that EU civil society funding leads to uncertain processes of 
Europeanisation because the interaction between EU policy and the Turkish context 
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generates a variety of reactions from the NGOs. Furthermore, these aims are pursued 
through the research sub-questions, which look at the role of frameworks of support 
offered by the EU, the Turkish political context, and the reactions of NGOs to EU 
funding policy. Following the introductory comments made in this chapter (Chapter 
One), the rest of the thesis unfolds as follows. 
Chapter Two visits the theories of civil society, outlining the main theoretical 
strands that help to explain not only the nature of civil society in Turkey, but also the 
current debates that form the basis of the logic behind EU policies towards civil 
society. The chapter seeks to determine whether Western theoretical frameworks 
remain relevant when explaining what is taking place in Turkey. This is an important 
part of the explanation because it sketches the theoretical outline for the EU policy 
intervention in Turkey. The two pieces of the puzzle – civil society in Turkey and EU 
civil society policy – arrive from different theoretical paths to understanding civil 
society, which leads to important questions regarding the efficacy of EU policy. In 
addition, the chapter discusses the possibility of bringing together Western civil 
society theory and existence of civil society in Muslim societies. The two are often 
deemed incompatible because in Muslim societies both the civil and the political are 
governed by religious ideas and this leaves little room for individuality, the 
cornerstone of Western thinking on civil society, to flourish. The chapter also reflects 
on the relevance of these theoretical thoughts on explaining the current Turkish 
context, and suggests that the way in which EU policy understands civil society differs 
from the reality on the ground in Turkey. 
In order to fully understand EU policy, Chapter Three delves deeper into the 
logic and motivations behind the EU’s interest in engaging with civil society actors in 
Turkey. The focus of the chapter is twofold, exploring both the way civil society is 
expected to contribute to the EU pre-accession process, and the reasons for these 
expectations to have emerged. By tracing through the chronology of policy documents 
that outline EU policy over the past 20 years, the chapter shows that the overall policy 
applied within the EU, in Turkey as well as in the broader Mediterranean stems from 
the same logic that reflects an instrumental understanding of the role of civil society 
(i.e. that it can be a vehicle for other policy goals), and a universal understanding of 
what is meant by civil society (i.e. that civil society is more or less the same despite 
the different cultural and historical context). Chapter Three also outlines the main 
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contours of the nature of the policy process through which NGO engagement is 
operationalised. 
Chapter Four is based on a brief historical analysis of the evolution of Turkish 
civil society and points to the unique and idiosyncratic elements that manifest 
themselves in the Turkish context. The historical linkage between civil society and the 
political project of secularisation led to a bifurcation between the secular civil society 
that functioned as bulwark for the Turkish state, and the rest of civil society 
(representing, for example, religious and minority interests) that did not fit as 
comfortably within the secular mould. Since the 1980s the role of the state in civil 
society has been reduced drastically, and the “official” civil society previously 
occupied by secular functionaries has become inhabited by a colourful array of voices. 
Yet, aspects of these divisions are sustained by the vociferous debate that continues 
between elements of civil society, debate that is carried out in essentialist terms, 
making it very difficult to negotiate a compromise between the different views. The 
absence of compromises, in turn, has an impact on the ability of civil society to 
function as a resource for reconciliation and democratisation. 
Chapter Five is the first of three empirical chapters that capture the findings of 
the field research for the thesis. This chapter delves deeper into the role of NGOs as 
policy advocates. The argument that NGOs can contribute to the processes of 
democratisation are largely premised on the ability of NGOs to effect changes in 
government policy. Additionally, by working together NGOs are able to build 
networks that persuade governments to amend their policies. A detailed look at NGO-
government and NGO-NGO relations reveals that there appears to be a distinct gap 
between the EU policy rhetoric and how these relationships play out in practice. The 
local interests and concerns that govern these relationships are different in the Turkish 
context, leading to different strategies being adopted by the actors involved.  
Chapter Six hones in on the nature of the funding environment in Turkish civil 
society. The chapter investigates the complementarity between the EU funding 
framework and the opportunities and shortcomings that actually exist within Turkish 
civil society. It also explores the kinds of funding choices NGOs make in this context. 
EU funding initiatives do address important areas of NGO work, such as advocacy, 
where domestic funding is rarely forthcoming. However, the complicated procedures 
that surround EU funding have meant that NGOs react in a number of different ways 
when faced with the opportunity to apply for EU funding. Some of these responses 
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clearly contest the assumptions EU policy makes about the nature of civil society and 
NGOs in Turkey. 
The tensions between EU policy and the behaviour of Turkish NGOs are 
explored further in Chapter Seven. The chapter looks at the unanticipated outcomes 
that are generated by the policy process, and identifies four NGO roles that relate to 
such outcomes: translators, brokers, navigators and antagonists. The rigidity of the 
EU’s project framework generates various different strategies among NGOs that 
contribute to the emergence of these roles. The main finding of this chapter relates to 
the unpredictability of social action, and the difficulties involved in setting out a 
programme of project activities that have particular outcomes attached to them.  
Chapter Eight concludes by summarising the theoretical observations and key 
empirical findings that are drawn from this thesis, also commenting on the lessons that 




2 Civil Society Theory – its Application and Relevance 
 
‘Civil society’ sounds good; it has a good feel to it; it has the look of a 
fine old wine, full of depth and complexity. Who could possibly object to 
it, who not wish for its fulfilment? (Kumar 1993 p. 376) 
 
Civil society remains essentially a Western concept. Our understanding of it has been 
greatly influenced by the historical path civil society has taken in Western Europe and 
North America. What relevance, then, can it have in the context of Turkey, a country 
with a Muslim population and a past steeped in Islamic traditions and history? The 
chapter argues that Western conceptions of civil society do carry relevance, yet at the 
same time it is important to recognise the limits of how far it is possible to stretch the 
parallels between Western and Turkish civil society development. The purpose of this 
chapter is to delineate some of the central strands of thought that characterise Western 
civil society theory, describe how civil society has been applied to donor policy, and to 
consider the relevance of the theoretical and practical approaches in the Turkish 
context. 
The chapter is structured in four parts. The first of these traces the ideas about 
civil society through the works of Adam Ferguson, Georg Hegel, Alexis de 
Tocqueville and Antonio Gramsci. The purpose here is to identify a historical parallel 
between the idea of civil society and the development of modern societies through 
industrialisation and democratisation. Next, the chapter turns to how these theoretical 
positions play out in the donor efforts to operationalise civil society development in 
programmes elsewhere. Donors’ tendency to simplify the economic and democratic 
arguments in favour of civil society is problematised, as such treatment interprets civil 
society as inherently positive and devoid of politics. In the third section the chapter 
shifts its attention to the debate on existence of civil society in non-Western contexts. 
Can a Muslim society, with its emphasis on the collective interest of the community at 
the expense of individual rights, ever sustain civil society premised on pluralism and 
individual liberty? The fourth section considers the case of Turkey, where all of the 
above debates intersect, and suggests some preliminary conclusions as to how 




2.1 Ideas about civil society: the fantastic four 
The way civil society is understood today begins its journey from the 18th century. Up 
until then the concept was regarded as coterminous with the state. As Kumar observes, 
whether Cicero’s societas civilis, Aristotle’s koinonia politike or Kant’s bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft, the essence of the term indicates a social development to a stage where 
society is “civilized” (Kumar 1993 p. 377). It was only later that state and civil society 
were considered as separate entities, beginning with Adam Ferguson in 1767 (Keane 
1988).  
This modern concept of civil society was largely a product of the era of 
industrialisation and the development of modern societies. A result of these economic 
times, civil society was part and parcel of a vision that emphasised a particular mix of 
pluralism and individualism as the key ingredients for modern civilization. Previously, 
the reign of absolute monarchies in Europe had ensured that power was heavily 
centralised. The emergence of modern commercial relations offered a new sense of 
independence from the state, where a constant tug-of-war between the general (public) 
and particular (private) interests generated a delicate balance between the individual 
and the communal, searching for a state where the two were able to coexist. 
Additionally this allowed the development of alternative sites of power to the 
European monarchies. Such ideas are presented in the writings of Adam Ferguson 
(1723-1816) and Georg Hegel (1770-1831), for example. Civil society that is 
independent of the state has also been viewed as a crucial building block of a 
democratic state. Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) in particular offered us such an 
insight from his observations on the characteristics of American society. This logic, 
however, despite its popularity among many present-day policymakers, may not offer 
access to any universal truths about the nature of society, but rather allude to the 
prevalence of a certain set of values and beliefs that have asserted their hegemony in 
Western societies. This alternate interpretation emerges from the writings of Antonio 




Two important points about the nature of civil society are raised in Adam Ferguson’s 
“Essay on the History of Civil Society” (1995). First, civil society is intricately 
intertwined with the institutions of modern commercial economy. Ferguson in fact 
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treats it as a by-product of modern division of labour. Second, civil society can protect 
modern society from the negative social consequences of these modern forms of 
production. Both of these observations are relevant to our thinking of civil society 
today. Written in 1767, nine years prior to the publication of Adam Smith’s “Wealth of 
Nations”, Ferguson’s thoughts are bound by similar ideas of a modern commercial 
economy and its impact on societal relations. Ferguson worries that the modern 
division of labour will cause a loss of public spirit. Through the division of labour, 
society begins to resemble a complex machine where each individual has an 
increasingly specialised role. In this context, individuals become detached from the 
communal spirit, blinkered by the narrow roles they are asked to fulfil. Public 
spiritedness is replaced with self-serving goals and by greed and avarice, leading to the 
corruption of societal values. Personal advancement becomes a priority, superseding 
the concern for others as well as for public spirit. Therefore, Ferguson claims that “the 
separation of professions, while it seems to promise improvement of skill…serves, in 
some measure, to break the bands of society” (1995 p. 12). As these bands are broken 
and communal interests wither away, the subsequent corruption of public life paves the 
way for political despotism. This is another of Ferguson’s main concerns (Keane 1988 
p. 42). The evolution of modern civil society, given its strong association with modern 
commercial relations can easily lead to public disregard for anything but self-interest, 
and thus prepare the ground for a despotic state to emerge. 
On the other hand, Ferguson speaks very highly of our ability to be public 
spirited. He in fact sees communal solidarity stemming from a “shared sense of 
sociability”, rather than from respect for individual rights (Hann and Dunn 1996 p. 4). 
As much as we are selfish, we are also highly social animals and flourish by 
maintaining active social relations: 
 
The disposition of men, and consequently their occupations, are 
commonly divided into two principal classes; the selfish, and the social. 
The first are indulged in solitude; and if they carry a reference to 
mankind, it is that of emulation, competition and enmity. The second 
incline us to live with our fellow-creatures, and to do them good; they 
tend to unite the members of society together (Ferguson 1995 p. 51). 
 
It is therefore in our nature to interact with others in society as much as it is to 
withdraw from public life as a consequence of the division of labour. These two 
tendencies coexist in a modern civil society. We are not governed by our selfish 
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interests alone, but by a more complex set of social interactions based on the ethical 
and moral values that bind us to a particular community. Ferguson calls for these 
social values to play a larger part in the conduct of our lives and in this way to curb the 
negative side effects of the division of labour: 
 
It should seem, therefore, to be the happiness of man, to make his social 
dispositions the ruling spring of his occupations; to state himself as the 
member of a community, for whose general good his heart may glow 
with an ardent zeal to the suppression of those personal cares which are 
the foundation of painful anxieties, fear, jealousy, envy (1995 p. 51). 
 
Ferguson’s essay reflects an effort to make sense of a changing society. It reflects a 
concern over the social impact of modern economic structures and makes a case for 
considering civil society as the “social glue” that can prevent the disintegration of 
society. Such concerns and observations echo not only among other theorists on the 




Hegel’s work on civil society links with Ferguson in its effort to reconcile the tension 
between public and private interests. His writings took a significant stride towards 
consolidating the idea of civil society as an entity separate from the state (this being 
the crucial difference from the ancient Greek understanding of the concept). Following 
in the footsteps of the Scottish enlightenment (he was born three years after Ferguson 
published his essay), Hegel applied the pioneering idea of a market that was 
independent of the state and treated the behaviour of individuals outside the market in 
similar fashion. Civil society, for Hegel, was thus a “set of social practices which are 
constituted by the logic of the market” (Chandhoke 1995 p. 117). 
 Consequently, Hegel argued that individuals’ particular needs and wants 
govern their behaviour in civil society. This was the first principle of civil society he 
put forward (Hegel 1952 § 182). Self-seeking individuals aiming to fulfil their private 
needs are the building blocks of civil society. However, if our primary instinct is to 
have our own needs fulfilled, with complete disregard for the needs of others, our 
society would not survive. ‘Particularity by itself…destroys itself’ (Hegel 1952 § 185). 
Thus, it is the second principle of civil society that aims to mediate this destructive 
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tendency. Universality represents the conventions and customs of a given society that 
form constraints on what is regarded as acceptable behaviour. The attainment of 
personal interest is mediated by the universal, and this process of mediation becomes 
the means to realise private interests. This is how the innate tendency of civil society to 
pursue self-seeking ends is being kept in check – through the interplay between 
particular and universal: 
 
[...] in the course of the actual attainment of selfish ends – an attainment 
conditioned in this way by universality – there is formed a system of 
complete interdependence, wherein the livelihood, happiness, and legal 
status of one man is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights 
of all. On this system, individual happiness, &co., depend, and only in 
this connected system are they actualized and secured. This system may 
be prima facie regarded as the external state, the state based on need 
(Hegel 1952 § 183). 
 
 Despite the structural similarities in their arguments, Hegel appears more 
cynical in his assessment than Ferguson. He does not believe that people are innately 
public-spirited, rather that we are coaxed to cooperate because this ensures that a 
broader set of our needs and interests will be met. There is a constant ebb and flow 
being played out between the particular/individual and the universal/public interests 
that needs somehow to be controlled. For Hegel, the state constitutes the highest form 
of ethical life, which is why public authorities have the responsibility of ensuring that 
universal needs are not overshadowed by the particular, self-seeking demands of 
individuals (Hegel 1952 § 188). In this sense Hegel considers these institutions as part 
of civil society because their primary role is to regulate the exchanges that take place 
within civil society (Chandhoke 1995 p. 126). By enforcing a set of laws, the 
administration of justice and the police can ensure that each person’s right to property 
is respected and recognised. This helps to mediate each individual’s innate 
predisposition to seek others’ property. 
In addition, the particularity of civil society is kept in check by the formation of 
corporations. The purpose of a corporation is to bring together members of the 
business class (Hegel 1952 § 250), who share a certain skill or trade and that 
constitutes “a second family for its members” ( § 252). Although corporations derive 
from the self-seeking motives of the individuals, they are structured around common 
interests that are shared by members. It thus forms a type of intermediate universality, 
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as particular individual interests become the shared interests of the corporation ( § 
251). Corporations are the organisational pillars of civil society that offer it structure. 
They juxtapose aspects of particularity and universality, generating a sense of 
solidarity that convinces “the individual that his salvation lies in associating with 
others” (Chandhoke 1995 p. 128). There is thus an organisational aspect to Hegel’s 
thinking about civil society, but this does not yet extend beyond commercially 
motivated organisations. 
Hegel’s writing on civil society also emphasises the vulnerability, fragility and 
contingent nature of civil society. As John Keane has pointed out, Hegel does not treat 
civil society as a naturally existing phenomenon, but rather as a product of a particular 
historical process (Keane 1998). For Hegel, civil society emerged from the 
idiosyncrasies of the modern commercial system as it evolved in Europe in the 18th 
century. How civil society evolves in another context is therefore contingent on the 
way the system of needs negotiates a balance between the different interest groups that 
exist. There is no blueprint, or at least the European experience offers no such thing. 
This leads to a second observation: civil society is transient and “wreckable” (Keane 
1998 p. 50; 1988 p. 50), for “civil society is the battlefield where everyone’s individual 
private interests meets everyone else’s” (Hegel 1952 § 289). The intentions of 
individuals that inhabit the civil societal space are not inherently good. The delicate 
character of civil society means that its development and growth is not in any way pre-
determined. 
 One is compelled to put forward one further argument: when taking stock of 
the notion of universality in Hegel’s writings on civil society, it is advisable not to 
attach any specific cultural, ethical or moral values to it. Universality should stand 
simply for an aggregate, a compromise of the totality of different interests that exist in 
society. If we were to consider the universal to refer to a particular ethical or moral 
worldview that has become synonymous with the dominant culture, this would be 
likely to push away a certain subset of particular interests. No group in society, 
including the mediating public authorities, should therefore claim hegemony over what 
is meant by universal; it should remain more abstract than this. Universality defined on 
the bases of dominant ethical or moral values would exclude certain individual 
interests not adhering to these values. It is likely that such individuals would either 
withdraw from public life or attempt to redefine universal values to correspond with 
their own set of values. To borrow from the earlier quotation from Hegel, society 
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would no longer strive for “complete interdependence” and the interests of one man 
would no longer be “the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all”, but merely for the 
interests of some.  
So far, in looking at Ferguson’s and Hegel’s ideas on civil society, much of the 
focus has been on the interplay of economic dynamics and civil society. Civil society 
brings together the self-interested, economic logic of citizens with their desire to 
remain social animals. Through the arrangements within civil society it is possible to 
find a balance between the self-centred market and our public-spiritedness. Both are 
thus concerned with how to ensure that the two tug-of-war teams are equally manned, 
leading to a draw. 
 
Alexis de Tocqueville 
More recently, it has become commonplace to treat civil society as a key ingredient of 
democracy. Whilst Ferguson and Hegel may not have offered many suggestions as to 
why this might be the case, de Tocqueville’s book Democracy in America, published 
in 1832, makes a persuasive case for civil society as a bulwark against despotism 
(1998). In so doing, de Tocqueville develops further the separation of state and civil 
society proposed by Hegel. High levels of associationalism provide citizens with a way 
to resist the power of the state and in so doing protect the democratic majority from the 
whims of the ruling minority. 
 De Tocqueville was particularly concerned with the consequences of equality 
of conditions (in terms of income), which, if left unattended would increase the threat 
of despotism. As the equality of social conditions becomes increasingly prevalent, he 
argued, the citizens will become less dependent on their community for support. They 
will be able to reach satisfactory educational standards and acquire sufficient material 
possessions to satisfy their own needs. Such citizens will have a reduced interest in the 
affairs of the community, becoming socially less active and withdrawing from a role in 
the administration of local affairs (de Tocqueville 1998 p. 206). The emerging gap in 
local administration will be filled by the central government. Over time the 
accumulation of power in the hands of the central government will lead to the 
development of a despotic state. It was as an answer to this dilemma of a despotic state 
by stealth that de Tocqueville introduced the role of local associations. These should 
be given responsibility over local affairs, which bear relevance to the everyday welfare 




…more may be done by entrusting to the citizens the administration of 
minor affairs […] interesting them in the public welfare and convincing 
them that they constantly stand on need of one another (de Tocqueville 
1998 p. 212). 
 
The enthusiasm for establishing local associations was one characteristic of the 
American society that struck a chord with de Tocqueville. He saw an added value in 
freely formed associations. These would not only protect against individualism and 
despotic government, but provided a way for citizens to take initiative and organise 
themselves around issues they felt were important. De Tocqueville noticed that it 
would be possible to exert considerable influence through such associations: 
 
As soon as several of the inhabitants of the United States have taken up 
an opinion or a feeling which they wish to promote in the world, they 
look out for mutual assistance; and as soon as they have found one 
another out, they combine. From that moment they are no longer isolated 
men, but a power seen from afar, whose actions serve for an example and 
whose language is listened to (de Tocqueville 1998 p. 218). 
 
These associational activities emerge organically from the actions of citizens and serve 
to influence government decision-making, leading de Tocqueville to consider this kind 
of proactive self-organisation as a sign of a civilised nation (de Tocqueville 1998 p. 
219). Associations have the ability to remedy the individualistic tendencies that the 
increased equality of conditions brings about. In order to protect democracy, therefore, 
the number of associations should increase in parallel with rising equality.  
 De Tocqueville’s observations make two structural comments about civil 
society that continue to have relevance. He first draws a line between state and civil 
society; the latter has not been designed purely to serve the former. Civil society forms 
from the local interests and opinions that collective organisations then communicate to 
the relevant state institutions. Second, in order for civil society to successfully 
counterbalance the state, the local interests need to be channelled into collective forms 
of organisation. This can be seen as extending the role of Hegel’s corporations located 
in the economic realm to the realm of politics in the form of citizen organisations. 
These ideas in particular have been of interest to the neo-Tocquevillean school of 






Although Gramsci’s starting point for explaining the relationship between state and 
civil society is not too dissimilar from de Tocqueville’s, his conclusions are starkly 
different. In fact, Gramsci has been called the “Marxist de Tocqueville”, for his 
analysis also begins from the structural separation of state and civil society (Kumar 
1993 p. 377). For Gramsci, however, the separation of state and civil society was not 
quite so clear-cut as for de Tocqueville, and thus civil society was not necessarily 
pictured as a counterpoint to the state. As civil society could protect society from the 
state it could also be an accomplice in retaining the hegemony and power of a 
tyrannical state. There is no inherent relationship between the size of civil society and 
the health of democracy.  
The motivation for Gramsci’s work on civil society came largely from a desire 
to understand why the Communists in the 1920s and 1930s in Italy failed to execute 
the revolution. His conclusion was that they had made a mistake in focusing their 
efforts on capturing the state because this would not capture power (Simon 1991; 
Jones 2006). Instead, Gramsci argued, they should have focused on capturing people’s 
minds and gain their consent through civil society, and thus create a counterhegemony 
that can truly challenge the hegemony of the state. In constructing his theory, Gramsci 
therefore saw an intricate web of relations existing between civil society and the state. 
 
In the East the State was everything, civil society was primordial and 
gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and 
civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil 
society was at once revealed (1995 p. 238). 
 
The role of civil society was not, as de Tocqueville depicted it, to protect society from 
a despotic state. It was rather the opposite: to protect the state from society. As 
Gramsci explains: 
 
What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural “levels”; 
the one that can be called “civil society”, that is the ensemble of organisms 
commonly called “private”, and that of “political society” or “the State”. These 
two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of “hegemony” which 
the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that 
of “direct domination” or command exercised through the State and “juridical” 




It was the interplay between civil society and political society that formed the tentacles 
of power in society. In describing the dynamics of this relationship Gramsci spoke of a 
“war of position”, using the metaphor of civil society as the trenches of warfare.  
These would help the enemy to resist the attack launched on it: “the attack seemed to 
have destroyed the enemy’s entire defensive system, whereas in fact it has only 
destroyed the outer perimeter” (Gramsci 2006 p. 74). Here Gramsci was referring to 
the ineffectiveness of an attack aimed at the state alone because the trenches of civil 
society would still ensure that the defensive line would hold. 
Even though for Gramsci the main concern was how to launch a successful 
revolution against the capitalist state, his analysis of state and civil society yields some 
useful insights beyond the revolutionary context. According to Gramsci, civil society 
is neither a sphere of freedom nor a source of democracy, but instead a sphere of 
hegemony. This is the avenue that the ruling classes use to exert and retain their power 
through nonviolent means. By controlling the production of ideas within civil society, 
the state elite with the support of the bourgeoisie was able to manufacture consent for 
the current state of affairs. Gramsci’s answer was a counterhegemonic struggle through 
civil society that would problematise the dominant ideas and offer new ideas in their 
stead, and by so doing capture the minds and consent of the people. Gramsci’s work 
questions the extent to which civil society remains an enabling concept. 
Where Gramsci’s view of civil society is distinctly different from Hegel and de 
Tocqueville is in the concept of hegemony; whilst state and civil society remain 
structurally apart, at the level of ideology they are intricately connected. Whereas 
Hegel saw the state as the ultimate arbiter, protecting universalism and regulating 
individual, conflicting interests, Gramsci understood the state as being politically 
interested rather than neutral. De Tocqueville feared the tyranny of the state whilst 
Gramsci saw the state in class terms, as a method of control. 
 
Sub-conclusion 
The idea of civil society pursued here traced two central developments in political 
thought since the 18th century that crystallise how state-civil society relations are 
understood today. The first was the development of a modern market economy and a 
diverse commercial society that established its independence from the state. Out of this 
grew civil society, as, through the division of labour society was re-organised in 
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smaller subunits, such as Hegel’s corporations. Civil society had an additional benefit 
as it was perceived to be a key remedy to the ailments of greed and self-interest that 
came part and parcel of economic progress, which were deemed potentially 
detrimental to social stability and cohesion by Ferguson, Hegel and de Tocqueville. 
 The second development, which features most distinctly in the works of de 
Tocqueville and Gramsci, relates to the structural separation of state and civil society. 
For Ferguson and Hegel this distinction was more blurred – evident, for example, in 
how Hegel failed to make a distinction between civil society and the public authorities 
that were to be in control of it. For de Tocqueville the key feature of civil society was 
its ability to hold the state to account. By offering a way for different groups to voice 
their concerns, whether against or in support of government policy, his ideas paved the 
way for seeing civil society as an integral part of democracy and democratisation. 
Whilst Gramsci identified the structural relationship between state and civil society in 
a similar manner, he went on to draw rather different conclusions. His observations 
highlighted the tendency for state and civil society to collude in establishing an 
ideological hegemony. The structural separation was overshadowed by the ideological 
connection, and any real change would therefore be dependent on the support of civil 
society. 
 After Gramsci the concept of civil society fell gradually into disuse both in the 
academic world as well as in politics. In the late 1980s East European dissident activist 
revitalised the concept, looking at the historical roots of civil society and refashioning 
these in their contemporary, counterhegemonic political discourse. This intellectual 
pursuit was joined by Western academics who fleshed out the theoretical 
underpinnings for a modern-day reformulation of civil society.15 This debate remains 
contested and continues to be appropriated for different ideological purposes, 
particular by actors on left and right of the political spectrum. The liberal democratic 
model of civil society, which emphasises the separation of civil society from the state 
and the links between civil society and democratisation, predominates the political, 
policy and academic discourse on the subject. These views are contrasted by the more 
critical perspectives drawing on Gramsci and contemporary anthropological 
perspectives that highlight civil society as a site of hegemony and struggle, or as a 
highly contextual site of associationalism. 
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 See, for example, the contributions found in Keane (1988) 
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 What implications does the above discussion have in the context of EU funding 
for NGOs in Turkey? The view that civil society is a consequence of economic 
modernisation processes, together with a belief in the democratising effect of active 
civil society resonate strongly with the liberal democratic model of development. The 
writings on civil society described above stem from thinking about social change – 
civil society has been described both as a consequence of change and in itself an agent 
of change. Both views paint an image where an intervention that aims for social 
change is likely to affect civil society, either as the recipient or the means of change. 
Furthermore, as the following section aims to demonstrate, the current thinking about 
civil society among Western donors tends to make a conceptual leap from theories of 
civil society that originate from particular Western historical experiences, to 
considering them universally applicable. This is problematic because the Western 
experience of civil society, as it has been expounded by the authors discussed here, 
ends up being understood as the right, or even only way of doing things, when in fact it 
is merely one among many ways. 
 
2.2 Donors and civil society 
The role of civil society has become reflected in donor policies, which now consider 
civil society as an important constituent of both democratic and economic 
development. Whilst these two considerations are relevant to international donors all 
over the world, the particular narrative of civil society as a third sector is highly 
relevant to how civil society is viewed in the context of EU enlargement policy. The 
work of Robert Putnam, a neo-Tocquevillean scholar par excellence, paves the way to 
explaining how the economic and democratic arguments in favour of civil societal 
development have been made by donor institutions like the EU. 
 
Democratic development 
Putnam makes a persuasive case for considering civil society organisations as an 
integral part of democracy. CSOs have an external impact on democracy through the 
demands they make on government by advocating for a particular cause. Internally, 
within civil society this type of activity fosters “habits of cooperation and public-
spiritedness” that develop the civil skills required for participation in public life and 
“inculcates democratic habits” (Putnam 2000 p. 212). Social capital is a key ingredient 
in the development of such democratic habits. Putnam’s work continues the 
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Tocquevillean tradition of connecting a vibrant civil society with a well-functioning 
democracy. In this view, civil society is taken as a given good, and it is taken for 
granted that a civil society under the auspices of the state forms the best social and 
political framework available. From the point of view of international donor agencies, 
directing support to civil society organisations has become an integral part of any 
democracy building strategy. The core strategy has had three components: support for 
elections, state institutions and civil society. This support has aspired towards an ideal 
type of civil society that entails not only broader citizen involvement, but an ability to 
articulate the interests of citizens so as to hold the government accountable (Carothers 
1999 p. 86; Mitlin 2004 p. 4). In practice, this type of organisational support has 
largely focused on “NGO building” – supporting NGOs that work on public interest 
advocacy, human rights and women’s rights in particular. 
Western donor agencies have thus actively engaged with civil society 
strengthening programmes in the belief that there is an integral relationship between 
civil society and democracy. Drawing on the conclusion of the neo-Tocquevillean 
school, donors felt that by offering technical and financial assistance to NGOs, it 
would be possible to build democracy (Ishkanian 2008 p. 5). Civil society was 
romanticised, and particularly in the American policy circles regarded as the 
quintessential element of democracy promotion, a view which in the post-September 
11th world has become increasingly influential (Ishkanian 2008 p. 6). The dominance 
of the American view on the relationship between civil society and democracy in the 
donor circles has led to what has been termed the “Americanization of the debate” 
(Carothers 1999; Howell and Pearce 2001b). The role of CSOs as it is understood in 
the Western context and from a neo-Tocquevillean point of view has dominated the 
way in which donors have opted to engage in civil society development in third 
countries. 
The case of the Middle East offers a useful example of how economic and 
democratic motivations behind civil society initiatives link seamlessly. Both American 
and European efforts of promoting democracy were incorporated in the broader 
context of the war on terrorism (Carothers 2004 p. 7). Thomas Carothers has described 
the American donor strategy which has unfolded as threefold in nature, focusing on 
economic reform as well as indirect and direct democracy promotion (2004 pp. 241-7). 
The economics-first approach believes in the transformative power of economic 
development, where an independent and pluralist private sector will help the growth of 
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an independent middle class. This will in turn bolster support for and independence of 
civil society. Indirect support for democracy in turn focuses on promoting good 
governance and strengthening civil society. The aim is not to tackle the deeper political 
issues, but to provide a framework within which the political context that prevents 
democratisation from taking place could be resolved. In order to improve governance, 
these programmes have focused on judicial reform, anticorruption and decentralisation 
giving more power to local governments. Civil society has been strengthened by 
channelling support to advocacy groups working on human rights, women’s rights, 
environment and anticorruption initiatives. Direct promotion of democracy focuses on 
the political party system and elections, ensuring a pluralist party base, free and fair 
elections and educating citizens about the process of democratic elections. These 
examples illustrate the liberal democratic ideas that form the basis of Western donor 
policy. 
 
Civil society as a third sector 
In the domestic context of USA and Europe, a strong case has been made for 
encouraging greater civil society participation in the policymaking process and service 
delivery as a means to improve government effectiveness. Putnam, in his book Making 
Democracy Work puts forth an argument that associational networks have a direct 
effect on government performance (Putnam et al. 1994). In this study of Italy’s 
regions, identical regional governments displayed higher levels of effectiveness where 
civic engagement was stronger. Voter turnout, newspaper readership, membership in 
choral societies and football clubs were among indicators of civic engagement 
(Putnam et al. 1994; Putnam 1995). It is the quality of this civic community that 
determines the quality of democracy, Putnam argues. 
 In the early 1970s, Amitai Etzioni discussed his vision for a third sector in a 
seminal article on the subject. He argued that a third alternative had been added to the 
traditional debate over how to serve our needs. In addition to public and private 
options, the third sector could offer a new alternative (but not replace the already 
existing options). Thus, a “method must be developed to combine the ‘best of both 
worlds’ – efficiency and expertise from the business world with public interest, 
accountability and broader planning from government” (Etzioni 1973 p. 315). In 
similar fashion, Lester Salamon in the 1980s pushed welfare state theory to move 
beyond explanations that were limited by the “market failure-government failure” 
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theory. Focusing on the case of the United States, he called for a much more serious 
consideration of the role the voluntary sector already played in the provision of 
government services and how the voluntary sector was proving to be a great help in the 
development of government policy. Salamon termed this “third party government” 
(Salamon 1981, 1987). 
It is this role envisaged for civil society today, interweaving with government 
policy and service delivery, that is captured by the term third sector. Like civil society, 
the term third sector is used to describe the space outside of the state and the market. It 
has an intermediary role between the public and private sectors, balancing the political 
interests of the public sector with the economic interests of the private (Anheier and 
Seibel 1989 p. 9). From a policy point of view, the benefit of greater civil society – or 
third sector – involvement in policy implementation is in finding a happy medium 
between social and political integration and economic development (1989 p.10). 
 For example, in the United Kingdom the third way rhetoric of former Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and the New Labour party stems from a similar intellectual base. 
Anthony Giddens’ book The Third Way is an attempt to capture the policy implications 
of this rhetoric and to put some theoretical flesh around the skeleton of policymaking 
that began to emerge (1998). According to Giddens, the absolute faith in the free 
market represented by the conservative political leadership in Britain was unwise; 
what was needed instead was a system that combines the best of the public and private 
sectors. The role of the state here is to coordinate, or steer the individual and 
communal efforts to pursue a better quality of life. The third way attempts to fuse 
individual liberty with social justice. The choice that is presented to citizens is not a 
simple one between a state managed economy and a free market because a multitude 
of intermediary agencies located in civil society (individuals, social groups, voluntary 
sector) are envisaged to work in partnership with public and private sectors. The third 
way is committed to both individual responsibility and the development of a 
community. The debate on civil society and the third sector was grafted onto the third 
way rhetoric through earlier experiences in the realm of international development. In 
the run-up to the national elections in the UK in 2010, the concept of the third sector 
has taken on an important role in the political debate in both of the leading parties, the 
Conservatives and the Labour Party. “Small government, big society” was the recently 
evoked new slogan by the Conservative leader and current Prime Minister, David 
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Cameron, conjured up in response to the increasing importance of civil society and 
third sector in British politics.16 
 The role of civil society is not viewed purely as potential service-deliverers. 
Civil society is believed to have a political role to play as well. This two-pronged 
approach is evident in the actions of the previous UK government, as it on the one 
hand established the “Office of the Third Sector”17 to explore the service-delivery 
potential of civil society, whilst on the other hand devising a policy on “Community 
Partnerships” that aimed to give greater decision-making powers to local civil society 
groups over issues concerning local communities (Communities and Local 
Government 2008). Civil society, therefore, has a both a policy role and a political role 
to play. The ideas that inform third way thinking have also had an important impact on 
the approach the EU together with other European governments take in their 
relationship with civil society. The EU policy approach presented next demonstrates a 
similarly nuanced understanding of the third sector. 
 
The European Union and civil society 
The European vision of how to strengthen civil society combines these two strategies 
that encourage the role of civil society in the development of democracy and as a third 
sector. The debate among international donor agencies on civil society has been 
largely Americanised, and civil society-related activities are most often motivated by 
its perceived impact on democratisation. At the same time the EU policy framework 
sees CSOs as useful partners in ensuring that policies are effective: they can be 
consulted on best practices, and they can also become helpful partners at the delivery 
end of services. This is particularly relevant to EU enlargement policy and how civil 
society is engaged in this context. The discussion here is intended as a preamble to the 
next chapter where EU policy objectives on civil society are described in greater 
length. 
 This kind of incorporation of civil society-related activities within broader 
policy frameworks is not entirely unproblematic, however. Stephen Hurt, in a 
discussion on civil society and EU development policy problematises the EU vision 
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 Speech by David Cameron “Our Big Society Plan”, presented at a Conference on the Big Society, 
London, March 31, 2010. 
17
 Interestingly, in the aftermath of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat election victory in June 2010, the 
Office of the Third Sector has been renamed as the ‘Office for Civil Society’. It is, however, too soon to 
discuss any policy changes that this renaming may reflect.  
Chapter 2 
 46 
from a neo-Gramscian point of view (Hurt 2003). We should remain more critical of 
civil society because the current policy is guided by specific ideas about what civil 
society should look like in the recipient countries. The consensus that has been reached 
represents a hegemony of the donor ideas, as the values espoused by EU development 
policy are regarded as the baseline, or common sense position. Hurt argues that EU 
actions are quietly transforming civil society in third countries to reflect its own image. 
If the EU were to support civil society uncritically, they would also encourage voices 
that are critical of the values and opinions the EU represents. In order to make sure that 
the strengthened civil society complements rather than contradicts the EU approach, 
the support for civil society has to be limited and strategic. To this end, since partner 
organisations are selected on the basis of their compatibility with the EU mission, they 
are likely to serve to legitimise the EU idea of what civil society ought to be like.  
 These arguments echo similar observations elsewhere that have been made 
with regard to other international donor agencies. Several observers have argued that 
donor discourses, in their apparent neutrality, disguise ideological hegemonies and 
values (Howell and Pearce 2001b; Ottaway and Carothers 2000; Carothers 1997; 
Mercer 2003). Donors, reflecting on their understanding of civil society as an actor in 
the three-way partnership with the state and the market, select CSOs that are able to 
manage such relationships. The subsequent tendency to define civil society as a list of 
organisations tends to hide away the ruggedness of civil societal relations that exists in 
reality (Howell and Pearce 2001b). The desire by the EU to view civil society as a 
third sector over-emphasises the role of those organisations in civil society that can 
participate in third sector-like activities. The conflictual relationships between CSOs 
are swept under the carpet, placing this darker side of civil society out of sight. 
 There is a prevailing tendency to depoliticise civil society in donor policies on 
the subject (Howell and Pearce 2001b; cf. Ferguson 1990). The entire concept of the 
third sector is a reflection of an effort to tidy up the concept of civil society as 
something that slots in neatly within policy frameworks, and that performs a neutral 
role as a partner in government-led policy processes. Civil society becomes sanitised 
and drained of political content. The further away we move from the European 
context, the less realistic such a scenario becomes, and the gap between policy 
aspirations and reality on the ground grows. The concerns raised by Hurt and other 
critics of donor policy are in part accurate, as it is highly plausible that were such a gap 
to exist it would be donor policy that would prevail over local context. The central 
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argument of this thesis, however, suggests that a much more complex equation is 
required, that offers a more nuanced appreciation of the way local agents react in the 
face of external policy frameworks. Processes of Europeanisation are not smooth, as 
suggested by Hurt, but rugged, reflecting the reality of civil society.  
 
Sub-conclusion 
The strategies for engaging with civil society point towards a liberal understanding of 
how society is organised. The engagement is motivated by a desire to expand the 
ability of individuals to make independent decisions about their lives, both in 
economic and political terms. Civil society offers the means to do this. 
The underlying tendency is to view civil society as always making a positive 
contribution; the more groups there are the better. The way in which donors conceive 
of civil society either as contributing towards policy effectiveness or democratisation 
has meant that often only a narrow band of NGOs registers on the donors’ radar. This 
approach ignores not only the diversity of organisations in civil society but also the 
myriad of other motivations for CSOs to do their work. These organisations can 
represent different political ideologies and struggle against each other as well as 
against the state. The donor approach will create winners and losers among the local 
CSOs and bring up new sources of contention and competition, particularly where the 
culture represented by the donor agencies is strikingly different. The next two sections 
consider further the importance of context, where the discussion shifts to reflect on the 
challenges that the Turkish case presents in light of the theoretical positions on civil 
society presented thus far. 
 
2.3 Muslim civil society 
 
The placement of moral and ethical values within the realm of government is possibly 
the most important characteristic of Islam that make many regard it unable to 
accommodate democracy. The liberal democratic point of view would not allow for 
the government to impose a particular set of values (moral, religious) upon its citizens 
because this would infringe on their rights as individuals. Hegel, agreeing with the 
liberal democratic perspective, saw the state as a source of neutral rationality that 
enabled it to arbitrate between different particular interests in society. Gramsci in 
contrast viewed the state through a Marxist lens, and pointed to the façade of neutrality 
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that the capitalist state was able to maintain, with the support of civil society. Is it, 
therefore, possible to say that such an approach to governance and political life, which 
emphasises liberal individualistic values instead, is universally applicable? Or should 
government, as Michael Sandel has argued, remain neutral and resist the temptation to 
support any specific interpretation of good life, and refrain from legislating morality 
(1996)?  
 On one side of the debate lies an argument that criticises liberal individualism 
for its degenerative impact on social solidarity and for its lack of relevance in societies 
where social identity is derived from a particular cultural or communal source. It is 
more appropriate, therefore, to see individuals as embedded in particular communities 
recognise differences and support the interdependence of groups (Young 1993). On the 
other side of the debate we find an argument that criticises Islam for its tendency to 
smother individualism, for prioritising group rights at the expense of individual rights. 
Because of this, Muslim societies are deemed unable to sustain a genuine civil society, 
or democracy. 
 
Why does civil society not exist in Muslim countries? 
 
Islam is the blueprint of a social order. It holds that a set of rules exist, 
external, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men, which 
defines the proper ordering of society (Gellner 1981 p. 1). 
 
These opening lines of Ernest Gellner’s Muslim Society allude to what is at the core of 
the debate over the existence of Muslim civil society. Gellner argues that in Islam both 
the civil and the political are governed by religious tenets leaving no room for 
individuality to flourish. Christianity, in contrast, relinquished aspirations for political 
power from the outset, and in particular since the Protestant Reformation (1517-1579) 
and the gradual secularisation of European societies that followed. The separation of 
religion and politics in this way has significantly contributed to the emergence of the 
secular state in the Christian world. This is much more difficult to achieve in Islam 
because religious law remains the guiding principle for both politics and society. The 
umma, the overarching community of all Muslims, prevails over the individual. The 
focus remains on group rights, not on individual rights (Kazemi 2002 p. 232). 
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The benefits of the existence of these individual structures in society are 
spelled out in more detail by Gellner’s idea of a “modular man”. According to Gellner, 
a modular man is one who: 
 
[...] can combine into specific-purpose, ad hoc, limited associations, 
without binding himself by some blood ritual. He can leave an 
association when he comes to disagree with its policy without being open 
to the charge of treason. […] This is civil society: the forging of links 
which are effective even though they are flexible, specific, instrumental 
(Gellner 1994 p. 42). 
 
The conditions within a Muslim society make the emergence of a modular man 
difficult and unlikely. Islam, argues Gellner, favours the traditional communal bonds at 
the expense of fostering the individualism of a modular man. Instead of opting for 
moving along with modernity and becoming modular, the tendency in Muslim 
countries has been to remain communalist and resist bonds that exist outside kinship 
and religion. It is not by choice that Muslims associate with others; rather, their 
community or religion prescribes it. This kind of associationalism lacks the 
“flexibility, specificity and instrumentality” that emerge in a modern, secular and 
pluralist civil society (Gellner 1995 pp. 98-102). 
Şerif Mardin, a Turkish scholar, also argues that Muslim countries are 
inherently different, making emergence of civil society unlikely. He has famously 
described civil society as a “Western dream, a historical aspiration”, which has become 
focused on human agency, on the “ability to dream the dream” (Mardin 1995 p. 278). 
The Muslim dream, on the other hand aspired for a “social equilibrium created under 
the aegis of a just prince” (1995 p. 285). This dream remains focused on social justice, 
and draws on a historical experiences in Muslim culture that continue to provide a 
blueprint for a civilized form of social life. This is the crucial difference Mardin sees 
between East and West. Whilst the notion of civility – the ethical (how individuals 
should behave) and moral (notions of right and wrong) tenets – translates into Islamic 
terms, civil society with its inferences to individualism, agency and freedom does not. 
Although Muslim states are gradually modernising and acquiring Western institutional 
characteristics, the dream remains different. It remains the business of the state to 
ensure that citizens adhere to the moral and ethical teachings of Islam (Moussali 1994).  
 At issue is the extent to which tolerance of the other is ingrained in the idea of 
civility. Farhad Kazemi notes, for example, that norms of exclusion tend to be more 
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frequent in Islam than in other religions. He cites women, religious minorities and lay 
intellectuals as examples of groups that tend to enjoy reduced citizenship rights or 
whose access to the public space is compromised. Despite the prevalence of civility, 
the concept of inclusion remains a potentially problematic area in Islam, he concludes 
(Kazemi 2002 p. 324). For some scholars, it is precisely in this area of tolerance that 
civil society can make a contribution in Muslim context. Civil society emerges as a 
potential proponent of social solidarity and as the pulse of an ethical life. 
 
Muslim civil society as “society with ethics” 
Perhaps the most elaborate and substantial critique of the universal claims behind the 
liberal democratic perspective comes from within the communitarian movement of 
political thought. It offers an alternative framework which places emphasis on local 
communal values, making the argument that ethical and moral beliefs found in a 
particular context must be the bases of any functioning political system (Walzer 1983; 
Sandel 1996; Etzioni 1973). Although the communitarian movement makes no specific 
reference to Islam, scholars exploring the nature of civil society in the Muslim world 
have found much common ground in these ideas. 
The role of ethical and moral beliefs in society is a critical point of contention 
between the liberal view on civil society and an Islamic interpretation (Sajoo 2004). 
The liberal view wishes to push any role for moral and ethical concerns strictly to the 
private sphere. This position is based on a conviction that any restrictions on citizens’ 
freedom should be premised on upholding negative liberty (the absence of constraints 
that limit individual’s range of possible actions) and in so doing augment the plurality 
of goals that citizens are able to pursue. This stands in contrast to the role ethics and 
morals play in an Islamic public sphere. Ethics and morality should bear upon the 
types of goals that citizens and communities wish to pursue. The principles of social 
ethics ought to be discussed in, and by civil society. Barricading these away from the 
public sphere would contradict an Islamic worldview. 
The members of the “communitarian movement” have been critical of the 
liberal point of view, aiming their arrows at the impact liberal individualism is having 
on social solidarity and active citizenship. Their concern is with the lack of traditional 
moral values, which ought to form the backbone of any vibrant civil society (Rawls 
1972; Sandel 1996), critiquing the emphasis placed on economics and free market 
individualism by others (Hayek 1960; Nozick 1974). In response, there is a call for 
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heightened values of social trust and community building in order to rebuild social 
solidarity in the Western societies (Sajoo 2004 pp. 218-9). 
As Iris Marion Young has argued, the ideal of liberal individualism tends to 
promote an assimilationist model that is unlikely to reflect people’s experiences. 
Liberal individualism challenges the notion of difference that arises from group 
identity, and any discrimination that is based on group privileges. According to liberal 
individualism, therefore, citizens should be viewed only as individuals, not as 
members of groups (Young 1993). The trouble with such interpretation, observes 
Young, is that it ignores other more legitimate reasons for preserving group identities. 
As long as groups are not linked to oppression or exclusion of other groups, group 
identity can be an important element of how individual identity becomes embedded in 
the broader society. It is more sensible to consider individuals as part of a particular 
social context, defined by the community within which they live. Interdependence 
between groups is the means through which it is possible to create social cohesion, 
argues Young. 
It is along the lines of the communitarian observers that the proponents of 
Muslim civil society perceive of the argument. Society with an ethical compass is seen 
as broadly beneficial in the Muslim context, particularly where properly functioning 
democratic institutions are lacking. In the absence of democracy, the incivility that 
may follow is ameliorated by the existence of ethical tenets that govern individuals’ 
conduct in the public. For Sajoo, the content of such tenets does not have to differ 
between Islam and the West. The principles of “social solidarity, self-help and 
integrity” are recognised social values in both secular and Muslim public domains 
(2004 p. 234). Kamali has also pointed to the importance of social solidarity as a key 
condition for civil society to exist, arguing that it is not possible to reduce the theory of 
civil society to a simple political relationship between people and the state. Social 
solidarity offers a sense of belonging to a society (2001 p. 460). Seen this way, civil 
society in the Muslim context can offer the means to establish tenets of ethical life that 
are relevant to that context, and at the same time have many commonalities with 
Western values. 
Others take a more simplified approach, arguing that there is nothing 
particularly special about the Muslim world. It operates much like the West, but with a 
time lag. Many of the Muslim countries are only now in the throes of modernisation, 
adapting to the modern socio-economic formations that are taking shape. This process 
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will create its own CSOs that will push for participatory forms of governance (Ibrahim 
1998 p. 30). Through the process of modernisation and industrialisation Ibrahim 
identifies four factors that have contributed to the growth of civil society: growing 
unmet needs, growth in educated citizenry; growing individual financial resources and 
increased margins of freedom (1998 pp. 39-40). Ibrahim adopts a similar approach as 
Ferguson and Hegel have done, taking the commercial and social changes instigated 
by industrialisation as the starting point. Under these conditions CSOs are very likely 
to emerge, facing one of two possible outcomes. The autocratic regimes and Islamic 
activists may try to squeeze civil society out of the public arena altogether. 
Alternatively, the regime and the religious activists may attempt to appropriate or to 
win over civil society to their own cause (1998 p.51). It is this last scenario that for 
Ibrahim holds the greatest promise for civil societal development because it contains at 
least as much promise for further democratic development as there is against it.  
Consequences of modernisation are often beyond the control of states and offer 
an example of how social and economic change can lead to various outcomes that 
question the uncompromising nature of Islamic political philosophy. Under the waves 
of modernisation, many choose to escape rural poverty, leave their traditional bonds of 
kinship and tribal loyalties behind, and move into cities, often congregating in shanty 
towns. In Iran, Islamist groups have given a voice to shanty dwellers and mobilised 
them in their cause (Kamali 2001 p. 471). Although in this case the activism that 
emerged reinforced existing, religious social norms, it offers evidence of the new 
windows of opportunity that modernisation creates for mobilising social forces in civil 
societal activity. Another consequence of modernisation is the emergence of the 
“moderate fundamentalist”, an Islamic activist with a vision to compromise. The 
moderate fundamentalist is open to dialogue, compromise and to the values of 
universal rights, freedom and civil society. The call for social justice found in a 
religious society is replaced by a demand for pluralism and tolerance of difference 
(Moussali 1994 p. 118). These kinds of developments question the immutability of 
Muslim society suggested by Gellner, and argue against treating Muslim societies as 
one homogenous group. There is much variation between Muslim societies across 
country contexts, an example of which is the different paths taken towards 





Can civil society exist in a Muslim context? There is no simple answer to this question, 
but it seems that those arguing on opposite sides take a different view on what civil 
society means. Islam is not only a religion but also a political theory that provides the 
legitimate basis of political power. Thus, it is not possible to locate Islam purely in the 
public realm, for it will remain an energetic political force. The Western tradition of 
treating state and civil society as entirely separate, antagonistic entities does not seem 
appropriate. If this structural separation is at the heart of what is meant by civil society, 
then it will be more difficult to accept the existence of civil society in the Muslim 
context. However, if the search for civil society is focused on the values and modes of 
behaviour that civil society upholds – civility, social solidarity, social justice and 
public ethics as well as morals – then we may well conclude that there are good 
grounds for civil society to exist in the Muslim context. The rise of fascism in the 
West, for example, showed that the existence of a public space independent of the state 
is in itself no guarantee of democracy and tolerance. The nature of the values that civil 
society chooses to uphold is an equally important part of the equation for democracy. 
To this end, there are no reasons set in stone as to why Muslim societies could not 
open up to the values that support and encourage associationalism along lines that are 
both pluralist and tolerant. 
 These observations correspond awkwardly with the donor policies aiming at 
democratisation through civil society funding. It may be unhelpful, even 
counterproductive to promote external funding as developing civil society as a 
counterpoint to the state, when there is still a much stronger link between the two. The 
liberal individualistic logic that informs such policy is likely to gain less traction in a 
society where strong cultural group affinities continue to define individual identities as 
embedded in particular communities. 
 
2.4 The relevance of civil society debates in the Turkish context 
The case of Turkey brings together the various strands of the above debate.18 The 
donor ideas about civil society remain highly relevant because they explain how civil 
society is understood in the European context, a context to which Turkey is intricately 
                                                 
18
 The analysis offered here is intended as a preamble to Chapter Four which is focused entirely on 
elaborating on the case of Turkey. 
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connected to by the EU pre-accession process. At the same time the debates on 
Muslim civil society resonate strongly with the ongoing debates over the role of 
religion in Turkish society. The juxtaposition of these various political and cultural 
elements leaves Turkey outside the stereotypes on either side. Given the unique 
context of Turkey, it is then important to consider the appropriateness of EU civil 
society policy that is grounded in visions of civil society as a third sector and in liberal 
democratic ideals about how civil society is expected to contribute to Europeanisation 
and democratisation processes. This continues as a common theme throughout the 
thesis, and the assessment begins here by considering the salient features of Turkey’s 
political developments against the backdrop of EU actions as a donor organisation with 
a particular view of civil society. 
 Whilst Western ideas about civil society continue to remain acutely relevant to 
the Turkish case, it is important to consider how these may relate to the development 
of civil society in Turkey. Through its application for EU membership, Turkey has 
made its Western aspirations clear, and Western understanding of civil society is a 
relevant part of this commitment. The Turkish republic was founded, in 1923, on a 
series of Westernising reforms that have become a defining feature of its character. 
Creating a modern Turkish state from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire involved a 
break with the past, at least in terms of rhetoric. However, Turkish society had already 
been gripped by the question of how to synthesise Western and Eastern values in the 
Ottoman/Turkish melting pot (Parla 1985). These attempts at synthesis have in part 
taken place in civil society, and in so doing left their imprint on the character of 
Turkish civil society today. The values of a modern Western civilization that were 
adopted were imposed from above – as Kadioğlu poignantly describes it, the question 
was not one of “who are the Turks”, but rather “who are the Turks going to be” 
(Kadioğlu 1996 p. 177). Returning for a moment to Hegel’s ideas of the interplay 
between the particular and universal - where the particular needs of individuals govern 
their actions, to be limited only by the rules that govern universality. In Turkey’s case, 
the particular view of the reformers expanded into a new definition of universality that 
was based on a Turkish nationalist-republican vision of modernity (Seufert 2000). 
What was going to be regarded as appropriate behaviour in society was re-interpreted 
on the basis of the modernisers’ agenda. The public authority in Turkey became a 
defender of a particular interpretation of what was meant by universal. The function of 
civil society, to evoke a Gramscian image, was to dig the protective trenches around 
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the state and to ensure the hegemony of the ideology of the elite. As the processes of 
state-building that preceded this did not resolve the underlying and competing private 
needs, the reforms merely brushed away a fire that, out of sight, continued to 
smoulder. As such, the adoption of Western values was selective and limited, and for 
decades civil society was smothered by the republican assimilationist ideas of 
Turkishness, allowed only to flourish in support of the state. 
 Gradually from the early 1980s onwards a much broader array of civil societal 
actors was allowed increasing scope to operate. In the aftermath of the 1980 military 
coup the military leadership looked to Islamic organisations in particular as potential 
allies in ensuring that support for Marxist and Fascist movements responsible for the 
significant social unrest that had led to the coup was going to be contained in future. 
Islamic groups, the green movement and the women’s movement all began to gain 
greater freedom to operate. However, through these developments the smouldering, 
competing sets of interests that had been contained by a strong state saw the light of 
day. The groups representing these competing points of view found it difficult to 
tolerate each other and to engage in a rational debate (Keyman 1995). What has 
emerged from the increasingly autonomous civil society does not, therefore, resonate 
well with the de Tocquevillean reflection of civil society as a counterpoint of 
despotism. The various organisations are in competition with each other, and the 
nature of this competition is more a reflection of the Gramscian hegemonic versus 
counter-hegemonic struggles. The lack of tolerance can be at least partly explained by 
the unresolved nature of important social debates, such as the terms under which 
secularism and Islam can comfortably coexist in Turkey. 
A key development in all of this has been the rise of the Islamic dimension of 
Turkish society since 1980. The normative, Western view of what makes civil society 
is based on the Western experience of modernisation and nation-building, and this 
does not comfortably align with the realities of a Muslim society. The neo-liberal 
values do not only clash with the values of a Muslim society, but also with the values 
of a communitarian understanding of the Western society that prioritises social 
solidarity and active citizenship. The arguments that challenge the existence of Muslim 
civil society are based on a neo-liberal understanding of civil society, and the universal 
relevance of this approach is contested both by Turkish context and by the 
communitarian point of view. By widening the scope of our understanding of civil 
society to include concepts such as social trust, social solidarity and community 
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building, it is possible to begin to see significant overlaps between Islamic and 
Western values. Both consist of individuals that join together as members of a society 
upholding certain universal ethical standards. The case of Turkey, a secular country 
with a Muslim population, therefore cuts straight to the heart of this debate 
surrounding the cultural relativity of civil society. Is it possible for Turkey to find a 
middle way among the overlaps that exist between secular and Islamic views of 
society with ethics? 
 
2.5 Western concepts in non-Western contexts 
In reflecting on the usefulness of civil society as a concept in non-Western contexts, 
the distinctions drawn by David Lewis offer a helpful starting point (2001). First, there 
are many who advocate for a Western understanding of civil society to be universally 
accepted as the only idea of civil society that there is. This view is difficult to dismiss 
and will always remain relevant, if for no other reason than for the economic power it 
holds in the form of offering a premise for donor funding of civil society initiatives. In 
Turkey’s case this relevance is compounded by the EU accession-related 
Europeanisation processes. The second point of view argues that civil society 
originates from a particular political and cultural pathway traversed in Europe, and has 
little meaning outside this context. The third view takes an adaptive approach, arguing 
that civil society does remain relevant, but it takes on different local meanings and it is 
therefore unhelpful it we try to conceptualise it too rigidly. Finally, Lewis offers the 
view that the whole question is “a wrong one to ask”; whether or not officially 
recognised, civil society has in fact been implicated in the local history of non-Western 
contexts for a long time. The relevance of civil society as a concept in a non-Western 
context is likely to hinge not on one, but on all four viewpoints. For example, in 
Turkey, the impact of a universal conception through donor funding and EU 
involvement is undeniable. Yet, it seems likely that aspects of the European 
understanding of civil society as a third sector bear less relevance to the case of present 
day Turkey, and similarly, there are aspects to Turkish civil society that exist only in 
that context. These different viewpoints remind us to push for a multidimensional 
understanding. In so doing, it suggests a strategy for how to understand the existence 
of civil society in non-Western contexts – as a hybrid where both domestic and 
external influences conflate in a new, locally relevant variant. The aim here is to 
Chapter 2 
 57 
explore how a particular hybrid that has been influenced by the EU accession context, 
comes to being in Turkey. 
 It is therefore important to study how civil society gets translated in different 
political and cultural contexts. The dominant, universal notions of what civil society 
means are undoubtedly exported by donor practices, but exactly what kind of social 
and political impact this will have is undetermined. The usefulness of civil society as a 
concept depends less on abstract definitions than on ensuring that ideas are grounded 
in actual experiences (Glasius et al. 2004). Particular cultural ideas interact with the 
reputed universal relevance of civil society and influence how the concept is 
“manifested in practice, in everyday social behaviour” (Hann and Dunn 1996).  
 
Strategies for exploring civil society on the ground 
To link the above observations that emphasise the importance of understanding the 
impact of local context and highlight the agency of local actors with European 
integration studies, the thesis takes “sociological institutionalism” as its starting point. 
This approach draws attention to the importance of actors’ subjective values that draw 
on sources such as norms, identity and culture (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006 p. 395). 
Such an approach is particularly relevant to the study of NGOs, as common values are 
an important bonding agent between organisational actors. The decisions NGOs make 
in terms of organisational change, for example, are not necessarily utility-maximising, 
rational calculations based on effectiveness. Instead, such decisions are reflective of 
broader questions. Taylor and Hall for instance argue that organisational change comes 
about when it “enhances the social legitimacy of the organization or its participants” 
(Hall and Taylor 1996 p. 949). In this way organisations are deeply embedded in their 
social context. The way for us to explain policy outcomes is therefore contingent on 
the informal rules and norms that shape the interests of actors involved. A central piece 
of the puzzle, then, is the socialisation of EU policy; how the local actors internalise 
the EU rules and norms, and how the outcomes of this process in turn influence actors’ 
self-perceptions and interests (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006 p. 395). The lens of 
sociological institutionalism therefore opens the window for an analysis of EU policy 
that is more sensitive of the local context. This makes it a useful conceptual tool for 
understanding the interaction between donor policy and NGOs. 
 Sociological institutionalism has received some pertinent criticism from the 
more sociologically attuned observers. In EU studies, rational choice theories and 
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sociological theories of institutionalism have been artificially kept apart by attaching 
strategic interests to the former and normative behaviour to the latter (Jenson and 
Merand 2010 pp. 83-84). Insistence on this distinction is less likely to correspond with 
reality, for “rational and normative behaviour are two sides of the same coin: 
rationality is socially constructed in the same way that norms have to be strategically 
deployed” (Jenson and Merand 2010 p. 84). 
In order to address the interaction between norms and strategies, the thesis 
draws on actor-oriented perspectives by way of emphasising the scope for strategic 
action by local actors. The actor-oriented approach takes diversity and heterogeneity of 
possible actions as its starting point. It takes particular interest in situations where there 
exist “discrepancies of social interest [and] cultural interpretation” and is concerned 
with how these differences are mediated or transformed (Long 2001 p. 49). This is a 
useful consideration in the context of Turkey’s Europeanisation processes, as it offers 
insights to how such process may be negotiated by local actors. As such, actor-oriented 
methods form an approach that highlights the relevance of local cultural norms, 
together with an appreciation of the ability of local actors to make strategic decisions. 
It offers an insight to the messy and uncontrollable processes of socialisation that take 
place among Turkish NGOs in terms of internalising the rules and norms introduced 
by EU civil society policy.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The debate over whether civil society can exist in a Muslim context illustrates the 
multidimensionality behind the concept. Thus, any application of civil society theory 
that pushes beyond the geographical boundaries of the West should remain sensitive to 
the diversity of ways in which civil society action may manifest itself. The chapter 
highlights the importance of moving beyond the categories of civil society action that 
are drawn from the Western/European experience. 
This chapter has anchored the discussion of civil society to the ideas that 
emerged during the social transformations of the 18th and 19th centuries, and to the 
centrality of a particular Western experience of industrialisation and modernisation to 
the development of theories about civil society. Ferguson, Hegel and de Tocqueville 
are all examples of theorists whose work addressed the social changes that were 
brought about by rapid economic development. Their work highlighted the impact of 
the market and division of labour on the emergence of civil society, and it also showed 
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civil society as something which could ameliorate the negative side effects of 
economic development. De Tocqueville also argued that in the United States the 
impact of civil society reached beyond the social order and to the realm of political 
order by helping to hold the state accountable to its citizens. These thoughts continue 
to shine through the European and donor understandings of what is meant by civil 
society.  
It is the apparent efficacy of civil society in bringing about economic and 
democratic development that makes policies aimed at advancement of civil society so 
attractive for policymakers. Thus, at least in terms of policy rhetoric, the contribution 
of civil society is viewed in wholly positive terms – the participation of civil society 
actors adds something positive to the existing policies and improves them. Such 
assumptions should be further problematised.  
The latter part of the chapter focused on a more contextually sensitive 
treatment of civil society that has drawn out salient aspects of Muslim societies and of 
Turkish society. These kinds of observations ought to inform how we view civil 
society in non-Western contexts. Furthermore, such treatment of the concept pays 
attention to the gap that exists between how donors understand civil society to 
manifest itself, and what actually happens in contexts that are detached from donor 
reality. By drawing on sociological institutionalism and actor-oriented perspectives, 
the argument here suggests that where such gaps exist between policy and reality, local 
actors are key to understanding how the various interests are negotiated. What such a 
viewpoint highlights in the case of Turkey’s Europeanisation, is the potential gaps 
between the EU policy framework and reality on the ground, and how as a 
consequence of this, the values and norms introduced by the EU policy framework 
become internalised in a particular way at the local level. The Europeanisation process 
unfolds in an uncertain and unpredictable way.  
It is with such thoughts in mind that Chapter Three begins to explore the 




3 EU Policy, the Pre-accession Process and Civil Society 
 
This chapter outlines and explains the rationale behind EU policy towards civil society 
in Turkey. Currently, this rationale is rooted in motives that see Europeanisation as a 
central process within Turkey’s accession phase. The role given to civil society within 
the policy framework is dictated by these motives, leading to strategies that see civil 
society as a vehicle of Europeanisation. The chapter makes two observations about 
these policy motives. First, NGOs serve as an instrument to the overall cause. They 
help to fill the gap between an aspirational goal of Europeanisation and the current 
state of affairs. Second, the vision that the EU has of civil society is based on a 
universal idea of the concept. The notion of civil society, as understood in the 
European context, is assumed to be readily transferable to contexts that are culturally 
and historically different. To what extent, then, has EU civil society policy been 
tailored to fit the Turkish reality? 
The first part of this chapter provides a framework for understanding the 
formulation of policy and highlights the significance of policy language. The second 
part offers an overview of the main contours of EU civil society policy, as it has 
developed within the EU. The third section traces the characteristics of EU 
Mediterranean policy, and compares the EU approach within and outside its borders. 
The final section looks at EU civil society policy in Turkey and draw conclusions 
about the nature of this policy. The assessment demonstrates the “universality of 
instrumentality” by showing how civil society, in different contexts, is seen to shape 
into a similar instrument of change and reform, and questions the appropriateness of 
this strategy given the reality of civil society activity in the Turkish context. 
 
3.1 Approaches to EU policy 
Recent EU policy towards Turkey, as Chapter One pointed out, has been largely 
dictated by the requirements of the enlargement process. That is to say, EU-Turkey 
relations have been dominated by the unidirectional adaptation of EU policy in order 
for Turkey to comply with EU acquis (Diez et al. 2005). Although this is an inevitable 
part of the accession process, and the content of what Turkey has to adapt in terms of 
policy cannot be compromised, it remains important to inquire how this process 
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operates. The nature of the process affects how individuals view the prospect of 
accession and determines what kind of inter-subjective meaning gets attached to the 
idea of EU membership (Risse-Kappen 2001). In other words, what kind of “societal 
Europeanisation” takes place (Diez et al. 2005 pp. 5-6)? How are meanings of 
Europeanisation internalised and made meaningful to local actors? 
The three forms of “New Institutionalism” offer a useful framework 
conceptualising the processes. Rational choice institutionalism supposes that actors’ 
behaviour is driven by a “strategic calculus” (Hall and Taylor 1996). With a focus on 
formal institutions and the actions of member states, this strand of thinking suggests 
that individual actors form their preferences through a rational calculation. Another 
angle examines agenda-setting power as a source of influence (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 
2006 p. 195). For example, when investigating the effectiveness of EU conditionality, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier found that when comparing the effectiveness of the 
two types of conditionality applied by the EU, democratic conditionality and acquis 
conditionality, the latter was more effective in bringing about change (2008). The 
political costs of adopting democratic and human rights norms as a result of EU 
conditionality were too high for incumbent governments. Highly nationalistic 
governments in particular remained resistant to the EU efforts to initiate democratic 
reform. It was also of relevance that acquis conditionality enters on stage only once 
formal accession negotiations have begun. Thus, for Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
the key explanatory variables were the domestic costs for governments that came with 
adopting EU rules, and the credibility of the promises of eventual EU accession that 
surround the conditionalities (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2008; cf. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; cf. Schimmelfennig 2008). 
Historical institutionalism, on the other hand, can be seen to build on the 
rational choice approach by adding a temporal dimension to the analysis. Therefore, 
how actors behave is determined partly by the rational choices they make, yet these are 
conditioned by past decisions (Hall and Taylor 1996 pp. 8-9; Kazamias and 
Featherstone 2001). The historical context creates certain path dependencies that make 
certain actions more likely in one country, and less likely in another. In this sense, the 
various policy documents reviewed in this chapter are dependent on the existing policy 
documents, forming a chain of decisions each influencing the range of possible actions 
available to the EU going forward. The assumptions that inform EU policy resonate 
with rational institutional approaches, and historical institutionalism can help explain 
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why certain policy trajectories have developed as policy builds on already existing 
policy. As such, these two conceptual lenses help explain how EU policy on civil 
society has come to take its current shape. It is against this backdrop that the role of 
local actors will be considered in detail in the chapters that follow. 
When we discuss Europeanisation in the Turkish context, the following 
conceptual map of the different meanings attached to the concept is useful. Diez, 
Agnantopoulos and Kaliber break Europeanisation down to its policy, political, 
societal and discursive elements (2005). Policy Europeanisation refers to the impact of 
European integration on policymaking, focusing primarily on the “goodness of fit” 
between what is required by the next step of integration and what already exists within 
the country in question, followed by domestic adjustments where appropriate (Risse et 
al. 2001). Political Europeanisation focuses on the impact of European integration on 
political institutions and on their ability to deliver the reforms requested. In addition, 
this field of study concerns itself with the impact of European integration on a variety 
of political actors, such as political parties and interest groups. Different political 
agents are affected in different ways, as each agent may be hindered or empowered by 
certain consequences of the integration process. Societal Europeanisation, on the other 
hand focuses on questions of how social norms and identity formation may be pegged 
onto perceptions of European integration. Finally, discursive Europeanisation pertains 
to the study of how public discourses reference the EU – whether, and to what extent 
the language of “Europe” enters the domestic public discourse. 
The policy process can be approached as rational and objective process. In such 
a case, policy is regarded as an instrument to be employed to pursue a predefined end 
result. Such policy is generally paired with an assumption that it is based on an 
objective criteria that applies equally; it has an air of universality (Dryzek 1990). 
Policy is seen as a technical, controlled exercise. On the other hand, it is possible to 
see policy as an inherently political activity, where various interests are constantly 
entering the process and policy is the outcome of a constantly evolving bargaining 
process (Gordon et al. 1977). Although policy as a rational, technical process has been 
widely critiqued for depoliticising a naturally political process (Ferguson 1990) and for 
placing emphasis on the institutions instead of the individual actors involved (Long 
2001), such approaches remain largely favoured among policymakers.19 
                                                 
19
 Chapter Seven considers the critique offered by Ferguson, Long and others in detail.  
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Even where policymakers recognise the shortcomings of a rational approach, it 
is not easy to depart from it. Many would agree with Herbert Simon’s seminal 
recommendation that the formulation of policy should follow a rational logic and 
attempt to consider political realities whilst satisficing (satisfying the minimum 
requirements for achieving a goal) in terms of the goals it aims for (Simon 1947 p. 
159; Hill 1997). Bringing politics into policy, or designing policy from the point of 
view of individual actors on the ground may be the ideal approach, but may not seem 
like a realistic possibility. 
In the 1980s the tendency to gravitate towards the rational approach to 
policymaking was reinforced by the increasing prevalence of “New Public 
Management” (NPM) as the dominant mode of policymaking (Hood 1995). The term 
encapsulates a shift in how Western societies perceived of the welfare state. The state 
and the public sector lacked the efficiency that was required in the post-industrial era. 
The diversification of economic production in the face of reduced industrial output 
meant that a one-size-fits-all welfare state was no longer adequate. Among the changes 
brought about by the NPM approach were: a reduced public sector role in delivering 
public services; competitive contracting out of public services to civil society and 
private sector; and an emphasis on measurable outcomes that can be used to assess 
performance (Hood 1991, 1995; Ferlie et al. 2001). The introduction of a certain 
private sector logic to public sector affairs thus aided the popularity of rational 
approaches to policymaking. 
Civil society was incorporated in the broader strategies for policymaking and 
policy implementation that stemmed from NPM. The idea of civil society as third 
sector, as an alternative provider of public services, had already begun to take shape in 
the 1970s (Etzioni 1973). This sectoral conceptualisation divides society into the 
sectors of state, market and the charitable sector. In this logic, the meaning of civil 
society is understood through the categories of state and market. The third sector, 
therefore, is taken to refer to the realm of professional non-profit organisations that are 
able to interact both with state and market actors (Richter 2002). These are highly 
developed organisations that are able to provide quality services consistently and 
efficiently, to eloquently articulate their demands to government and to hold 
government accountable. Both the American and the European understanding of the 
meaning of third sector organisations includes a variety of service providers, such as 
private schools and hospitals, and therefore extends beyond the realm of NGOs 
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(Salamon and Anheier 1997). Their role at the higher echelons of the state makes third 
sector organisations an invaluable resource for governmental decision-making and 
service delivery. However, given the emphasis on the formal structures that are found 
within civil society at the expense of the more informal, third sector organisations are 
less likely than grassroots organisations to reach individual citizens and enable them to 
exercise their democratic voice. 
Despite the similarities between the American and European usage of the 
concept of the third sector, it is important to point to the nuanced differences between 
them, particularly as these differences play an important part in clarifying the EU 
approach to engaging civil society within its policy processes. The European 
understanding has increasingly relied on the third way approach, where the aims that 
underlie the engagement of civil society reveal an intention to build a democratic 
community as well as to utilise civil society in a more technical service delivery 
function. As section 3.2 will illustrate in detail, there has been a gradual shift in EU 
policy language, from “interest groups” in 1992 to “voluntary organisations” in 1997, 
and finally to “NGOs” in 2000. While EU civil society policy has become more 
defined and thoughtful, it has also become more purposeful in marrying together the 
aims of democratisation and service delivery. Contrastingly in the US, the term third 
sector refers in a more apolitical way to the technical service delivery role that has 
been placed on professional organisations, be they NGOs, hospitals, clinics or schools. 
These are the key points regarding the nature of policy formulation that feed 
into the discussion on EU civil society policy later in this chapter. The approach 
originates in NPM-styled ideas, where the role of CSOs is perceived as partners in 
delivering services, and the conceptualisation of policy expresses a preference towards 
a rational, technical process that offers an objective standard platform for 
policymaking in various contexts. 
 
The role of policy language 
As the sections that follow are focused on the content of policy, it is important to 
highlight the language of civil society as it manifests itself in the EU policy 
documents. These documents provide the starting point for a process, which shapes the 
way in which local actors conceive of civil society and the way EU bureaucrats on the 
ground approach local civil societies. This transformative process is possible due to the 
power relationship between the EU as a donor and the NGO as a recipient of donor 
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funds. Civil society-related projects may shape what local civil society actors perceive 
as being appropriate behaviour. 
 The language of civil society has been described as a proxy for a particular 
understanding of western political values (Seckinelgin 2002). Seckinelgin argues that 
the language of civil society found in policy documents acts as a “metaphor for 
western liberalism”. This metaphor is a tool that “maps an experience from a source 
domain to some target domain” (e.g. from Western domain to a non-Western domain). 
A speaker selects a metaphor because it satisfactorily maps the experience of a new 
culture onto an already existing cultural understanding. Metaphor, therefore, is an 
“intuition” that enables the combination of two dissimilar experiences together 
(Seckinelgin 2002 pp. 357-360). These thoughts iterate observations made by Edward 
Said in his work on Orientalism. For Said, the language of the Orient that is utilised by 
any writer on the subject is based on a precedent of what the Orient means. The writer 
then uses this as a heuristic device to make sense of how the Orient ought to be 
understood (Said 1995). Thus, the metaphor – or a proxy – does not make the 
assumptions (the source domain) on which it is based, explicit. A particular 
understanding of civil society takes on the cloak of universality, justifies its use, and 
protects it from further questions regarding its applicability. Understanding the 
approaches of international donor agencies in terms of a metaphor therefore allows us 
to problematise the universal usage of the civil society rhetoric (Seckinelgin 2002 p. 
361).  
 Policy language is deemed transformative, for it imports a set of external rules 
that shape people’s understanding of the role they are to play. Policy language is able 
to differentiate people into groups of deserving and undeserving, and it is the deserving 
that are much more likely to engage in the desired behaviour (Crowley et al. 2008). 
The benefits of such engagement – largely financial in the case of EU project funding 
in Turkey – are likely to strengthen the role of such behaviour in the local context, 
making it an increasingly hegemonic practice. Ultimately it is the unequal power 
relation between the policymakers and the policy recipients that gives policy language 
a potentially transformative effect. For example, by providing a particular content to 
civil society, the policy language is likely to block out that which does not fit, even 
where the discarded may be a part of the local reality of civil society (Seckinelgin 
2008). There are, however, limits to how far such a transformative effect is realised in 
practice. EU policy is unlikely to have such an effect beyond those NGOs that actively 
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engage with EU policy through funded projects. Furthermore, as Chapter Seven in 
particular illustrates, even those NGOs that do partake in EU projects demonstrate a 
variety of intentions that deviate from the EU’s stated policy objectives. 
 The work on policy language is not the only area where such an asymmetrical 
relationship has been identified. David Mosse, for example, argues in a similar fashion 
to the above that donor practice has been internationalised, referring to the tendency of 
donors to emphasise the universal over the contextual. Policy is based on universal 
principles, such as agreed international standards and financial guidelines. Such 
practices lead to the selection of a particular group of local partners that are able to 
meet donor expectations. It is this “hegemony of style” that allows donors to 
marginalise certain local actors and to secure local compliance with the international 
policy objectives (Lewis and Mosse 2005; Howell and Pearce 2001b). 
When we conceive of donor assistance for civil society not merely as a 
technical process of delivering aid, but also as a way of exporting a set of socio-
political processes and structures from the Western to the non-Western contexts, the 
implications of such policy become much more far-reaching. Donors, such as the EU, 
are much more likely to work with organisations that understand the metaphor – 
professional advocacy groups staffed with foreign educated employees, based in the 
capital city (Maina 1998). This exploration of how policy language has the potential to 
play out serves as an avenue to understanding the kinds of pitfalls a bureaucratic and 
technical approach to policy can have. This is particularly relevant in cases where 
policy frameworks cross cultural contexts. Ironically this is also the time when policy 
blueprints are often utilised. The above section has provided a background to the origin 
and nature of these blueprints, as well as clarified the role policy language plays. The 
remainder of this chapter unravels the language of the blueprints that are utilised in EU 
policy formulation. 
 
3.2 Chronology of EU policy towards civil society 
This section focuses on how EU policy documents reflect on civil society, and aims to 
describe the nature of, and justifications for engaging with civil society at the 
European level. I review four documents in chronological order from 1992 to 2003. 
These dates are not arbitrary. The year 1992 marked the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty, which led to an increasingly critical debate on the democratic deficit that 
existed within the EU and the potential role of civil society in remedying this 
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deficiency. By 2003 the policy discussions on the role of civil society had shifted away 
from a domestic debate to the realm of enlargement, and the document trace is picked 
up from here in the following sections. 
The analysis of this chapter is based largely on the content of policy 
documents, which are the outcome of a process where the diversity of views that exist 
within the EU on the issue of civil society have already been reconciled. In this sense 
what is presented may gloss over a diversity of views that exist at the national level. 
For example, in communist Poland before 1989, the Catholic church was the only 
institution that remained independent from the organs of the state, making the 14,000 
churches a crucial hub of civil societal activity. This legacy continues to inform Polish 
views of what is meant by civil society and how it is to be fostered through policy 
interventions (Buchowski 1996). In Sweden, even in the pre-democratic Sweden of the 
late 19th century, the state was never particularly hostile to the demands made by civil 
society and the early labour movement. The Swedish state is at the same time central 
and open, bureaucratised but not authoritarian that enables a series of trustful and close 
collaboration to take place between the state and CSOs (Trägårdh 2007). It can 
therefore be expected that Swedish and Polish views on what the role of civil society 
ought to be may differ from other countries, given the particular circumstances in 
which civil society has evolved. The different histories that accompany each European 
nation in terms of the development of civil society and its relationship with the state 
suggest that there exist a variety of meanings for civil society that may get overlooked 
when the analysis focuses on policy documents. Thus, the apparent consensus 
presented by the following policy documents  in terms of what is meant by civil 
society and how it is expected to operate, is likely to paper over these differences and 
give a somewhat false impression of a unitary vision of civil society in Europe. 
 The documents reviewed in this chapter have been selected to illustrate the 
gradual evolution of EU policy on civil society since 1992. The discussion therefore 
focuses on a particular set of documents that help to illustrate the developing 
complexity of EU policy on civil society, with later sections focusing in on the cases of 
the Mediterranean and Turkey. The documents are not therefore representative of the 
total range available, but rather serve as an illustration of the nature of the approach the 
EU opted for within each evolutionary phase. The story told by these documents not 
only clarifies the origins of EU civil society policy, but also explains how certain 
themes have become prevalent within the EU civil society discourse. The policy 
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documents push forward two distinct roles for civil society. CSOs make a contribution 
to government policy either by delivering services that governments would provide 
otherwise, or by contributing to the decision-making process as policy is being 
devised. The state-civil society partnership is thus reinforcing a particular vision of 
state-civil society relations. 
In a 1992 document, An open and structured dialogue between the Commission 
and special interest groups the European Commission began to explore its relationship 
with interest groups, both nonprofit and profit making organisations. The document 
followed on from the Galle Report which had raised concerns that the democratic 
process was being hijacked by the “obtrusive” behaviour of some lobbyists within the 
EU institutions (McLaughlin and Greenwood 1995). The Galle Report called for better 
regulation of interest representation in order to prevent abuses, greater transparency 
and improved access for nonprofit groups to the EU policymaking process. This report, 
as well as the policy document by the Commission that followed, were written at the 
same time as the negotiations for the Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht 
Treaty) were taking place in 1991-2. An underlining goal of the Treaty of EU was to 
develop a more open community that would benefit from a more informed public 
debate, and this document reflects the thought processes that tried to operationalise this 
aim. 
The purpose of the 1992 communication from the Commission was therefore to 
spark a long-term discussion on the role of civil society actors in the workings of the 
EU, soliciting input from academics and professionals familiar with these issues. It 
recognised the value of special interest groups as a “channel to provide specific 
technical expertise” (European Commission 1992 p. 1). Describing the dialogue with 
these groups as “valuable”, the communication set out to further formalise the 
relationship and in so doing make the engagement process more transparent. Increased 
transparency in EU operations, the document argued, would ensure a more informed 
public debate on its activities. It recalls the Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht 
Treaty) that had been recently signed, and which states that “transparency of the 
decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the 
public’s confidence in the administration” (European Commission 1992). Even at this 
early stage the value of civil society engagement is articulated in terms of 
contributions made to policy effectiveness and democratisation.  
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The second document, entitled Communication from the Commission on 
promoting the role of voluntary organisations and foundations in Europe, and 
published in 1997, develops the argumentation further and pursues the idea of civil 
dialogue as a means to achieve greater social solidarity and citizenship (European 
Commission 1997; Smismans 2003; Finke 2007). This communication is similar to the 
one discussed above in that its publication coincided with the ratification of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam in 1997, which set out the principles of liberal democracy that the EU 
would adhere to: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, rule of law and 
liberty (Greenwood 2007). The document therefore offers a strong indication of how 
this broad debate on democratic principles was to be interpreted as far as policy 
towards civil society was concerned.  
Here civil society is for the first time considered separately from profit-making 
organisations that have a similar relationship with EU institutions. The document also 
recognises the role of civil society in creating jobs, demonstrating active citizenship 
and exercising democracy. These actions make a contribution to European integration, 
as the communication argues: 
 
[CSOs are] engaged in the training and retraining of the unemployed, as 
well as providing services for less favoured people […] For many people, 
membership of, or volunteering for, voluntary organisations and 
foundations, provides a vital means through which they can express their 
sense of citizenship, and demonstrate an active concern for their fellows 
and for society at large […] foster a sense of solidarity and of citizenship, 
and provide the essential underpinnings of our democracy […] providing 
citizens with the means with which they may critically examine 
government actions or proposals (European Commission 1997 pp. 4-7).  
 
The document suggests that there are linkages between certain civil societal 
activities and the development of social solidarity, citizenship and democracy. 
By providing adequate means for civil society to participate in governmental 
decision-making processes, it is possible to foster such behaviour, the document 
contends, and in so doing enhance the democratic character of European society. 
The democratic value of civil society is therefore linked to certain behaviour by 
civil society. In these policy documents, the idea of civil society becomes subsumed 
under a category of particular activities and outcomes. The activities related to 
consultation are linked with certain outcomes such as a better sense of solidarity, 
increased participation in democratic processes and improved policy effectiveness. 
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Citizen participation in shaping government policy is seen as a way of expressing a 
democratic voice. The motivations to pursue a greater relationship with civil society 
are based on improved policy efficacy and enhanced democratic processes.  
 In 1998, the EU began to prepare for the eventual enlargement to Eastern 
European countries, by gradually opening the accession negotiations with the 10 new 
member states who would join in May 2004. As the following two documents point 
out, the impending enlargement generates an additional focus for EU’s civil society 
policy. The first document, from the year 2000, illustrates a new, more carefully 
thought out list of activities for cooperating with NGOs, which reflect the new-found 
challenges of enlargement and integration. The second document, a white paper from 
2001, demonstrates how the development of civil society is deemed an integral part of 
the accession process for the Eastern European candidate countries.  
 A methodical and detailed consideration of the EU-civil society relationship 
appeared in the year 2000, in the form of a Commission discussion paper The 
Commission and non-governmental organisations: Building a stronger partnership 
(European Commission 2000). The document recognises the ever-increasing number 
of NGOs operating within and outside of Europe and acknowledges the need to 
develop a more structured framework for managing the relationships between NGOs 
and EU institutions. It offers a five-point rationale for cooperating with NGOs, which 
includes “fostering participatory democracy”, “contributing to policymaking” and 
“contributing to European integration” (European Commission 2000 pp. 3-4). 
Although much of the document is dedicated to technical, managerial and budgetary 
details of how EU grants to NGOs should operate, one section, entitled “Dialogue and 
Consultation” discusses how the broader strategy that the Commission envisions will 
be taken forward: 
 
Dialogue and consultation between NGOs and the Commission have to 
be seen in the framework of the democratic decision-making process of 
the European institutions […] dialogue between the European 
Commission and NGOs is an important complement to the institutional 
process of policy-shaping (European Commission 2000 p. 7). 
 
These comments reiterate the policy logic outlined earlier, and the backbone of the EU 
logic to civil society engagement is beginning to crystallise. It is based on policy 
effectiveness and the democracy-enhancing characteristics of NGOs. Greenwood 
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describes these two sides of the policy coin as “input and output legitimacy” 
(Greenwood 2007; cf. Scharpf 1999). Input legitimacy draws on the genuine 
preferences of citizens, whilst output legitimacy is based on results and policy 
outcomes. The central point is that part of the rationale for the EU’s engagement with 
civil society views NGOs as a useful vehicle in generating input and output legitimacy. 
NGOs are thus a useful instrument that will help with broader dilemmas of governance 
that the EU faces. 
 In 2001, the White Paper on European Governance is published, a milestone 
document as far as relations with civil society are concerned (Greenwood 2007; Finke 
2007). This document is concerned with the lack of public confidence in the European 
institutions – such as the EU parliament, the EU commission, and Council of Ministers 
– because they are complex and poorly understood. To tackle this concern, the paper 
posits the idea of “good governance” consisting of openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence (European Commission 2001). By opening 
up the policymaking process, the document argues, the European institutions can 
regain the confidence of the public. Civil society plays a central role in this: 
 
Civil society plays an important role in giving voice to the concerns of 
citizens and delivering services that meet people’s needs […] The 
organisations which make up civil society mobilise people and support, 
for instance, those suffering from exclusion or discrimination. The Union 
has encouraged the development of civil society in the applicant 
countries, as part of their preparation for membership (European 
Commission 2001). 
 
The document presents two reasons to engage with civil society actors. First, civil 
society makes a real contribution to the delivery of social services. This is seen to be a 
good thing and one that should be supported. Second, they can amplify the democratic 
noise at the EU level, by mobilising citizens, and by giving a voice to people who 
would otherwise be unable to make their opinions heard. By listening to civil society, 
it may be possible to alleviate some of the concerns people have about a democratic 
deficit at the level of EU governance. Hence more civil society means both better 
services and better democracy. The document reflects a genuine interest in the 
potential contribution civil society can make to improved governance. Bottom up 
involvement and consulting civil society were also the two areas that drew most 
positive interests from the public, according to a follow-up report commissioned on 
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European governance (European Commission 2003a p. 8). The above quotation is also 
interesting for the reference it makes to EU candidate countries. There is an effortless 
shift from the internal EU context to issues that exist outside of these borders. In other 
words, there is an expectation that civil society in a candidate country operates – or 
ought to operate – in a similar fashion to how it does within the EU. This prescribes a 
particular type as the correct form of civil society, and this is what should be aspired to 
in applicant countries. It paves the way for Europeanisation processes to unfold in 
ways congruent with this view of what civil society means. 
 The four documents selected for this section reflect the different points in the 
gradual evolution of EU policy, and illustrate the evolving complexity of EU civil 
society policy. The policy documents demonstrate how civil society is seen to attend to 
a variety of issues, such as transparency, democratisation and further EU integration, 
for example. An interesting detail revealed by the documents relates to the gradual 
shift in the language used to describe policy towards civil society. In 1992 the focus 
was on interests groups, and the document published in 1997 refers to voluntary 
organisations. By 2000 the terminology has again shifted, now citing NGOs as the 
focus of EU policy within civil society. It would seem that through this shift in 
language, from interest groups to NGOs, EU policy is aligning itself with the kinds of 
approaches to civil society development that have already been adopted among the 
donor circles of international development. Moreover, an approach focusing on NGOs 
could also be seen as more suited to the needs of the EU enlargement process, as the 
accession negotiations with the Eastern European candidate countries were well under 
way by the year 2000.  
 
Policy characteristics 
Moving now on from looking at reasons for civil society engagement to investigating 
how it is engaged. What kind of policies emerge from the above rationale? At the EU 
level, the motivation for involving CSOs originates largely from a desire to improve its 
own decision-making and policymaking capacities. The policy measures circulate 
around two keywords: consultation and dialogue. Already in 1997, the communication 
on Voluntary Organisations and Foundations suggested that “strong civil dialogue” 
should be the “future policy objective” for dealing with civil society (European 
Commission 1997 p. 7). The White Paper on European Governance pushes forward 
these ideas and calls for a “reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue” in future 
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EU engagements with civil society (European Commission 2001 p. 16). The benefits 
of increased consultation are argued in terms of the improvements this would bring to 
policy design and in terms of the enhanced efficiencies that would result from this. 
Dialogue, on the other hand, is perceived primarily to facilitate a two-way 
dissemination of information. Through this dialogue information travels both 
downstream, through CSOs to European citizens, as well as upstream, ensuring that 
grassroots experiences are taken into account. It reflects concern for both input and 
output legitimacy.  
 These roles resonate with the concept of the third sector. As was discussed in 
Chapter Two, the thinking behind third sector aims to combine the best of two worlds 
– the efficiency of the private sector and the accountability of government (Etzioni 
1973; Salamon 1981, 1987). Third sector logic stems also from ideas behind New 
Public Management that concern the diversity of service delivery. Bringing CSOs into 
the mix offers a more diverse set of service providers as well as new points of view at 
the policy table. The concepts of consultation and dialogue, as these have been framed 
in the policy documents discussed here, are products of a third way logic. The 
language of consultation expects CSOs to meet on a level playing field either at 
national or European level, and to have the capacity to communicate their ideas 
effectively at this level. It is only a large professional organisation that is able to 
undertake such a role. In addition, the language of dialogue suggests a close bond, 
even like-mindedness, between those that are working together. The notion of dialogue 
assumes that the parties in dialogue are not in total disagreement, as it is the resolution 
of differences that is the expected end result of a dialogue. All in all, the policy 
characteristics offer opportunities to a narrow field of actors who are already operating 
near the firmament of civil society. 
 
Sub-conclusion 
Within its own borders, the EU has two main objectives behind its motivation to 
engage with civil society. These are first, to improve its own policy efficacy – either 
by enjoying the support of civil society in delivering services outlined by policy, or by 
consulting civil society to improve the content of policy; and second, to improve the 
EU’s democratic credentials by utilising CSOs as channels for citizens to make their 
concerns heard at the European level. These motivations have crystallised in two broad 
policy developments. One is to increase consultation with CSOs when developing new 
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policies; the other is to improve the dialogue between EU institutions and CSOs. Both 
of these objectives suggest a particular understanding of what is understood by the 
term CSO. This understanding resonates strongly with the logic of the third sector, and 
with identifying a close relationship between the state, the market and civil society. 
CSOs play a complementary role to the state and the market. This logic, when looking 
for partners in civil society either to consult on policy reform or to deliver services, 
emphasises the role of the large, professional CSOs that already have capacity, 
connections and the know-how of working at the European level. The subsequent 
sections consider the parallels between the experiences of engaging civil society actors 
within the EU, and outside its borders. 
 
3.3 EU civil society policy in the Mediterranean context 
In the last two decades the Mediterranean region has become an increasingly important 
partner in the EU’s external policy (Crawford 1998). Figures summarising aid flows 
confer this: between 1984 and 2004 aid to Middle East and North Africa (regions 
covered by EU’s Mediterranean policy) increased from 7.3 per cent to 18.5 per cent. 
During the same time period aid to Sub-Saharan Africa decreased from 65.5 per cent 
to 43.4 per cent. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam was ratified, making democracy 
and human rights a central objective of EU external policy and contributing to this 
shift in the direction of funding (Brandtner and Rosas 1998). This is also the context in 
which EU policy has employed the idea of civil society in external context. The 
current section will address this question from the point of view of wider EU policy 
towards civil society in the Mediterranean region. In the years preceding Turkey’s 
accession negotiations, EU civil society development projects in Turkey were operated 
from within the MEDA20 programme, which was designed to help the Mediterranean 
non-member countries to reform their economic and social structures.  
 Democratic reform is at the heart of EU’s more recent policy towards the 
Mediterranean region21, although the suitability of this approach has come under 
questioning. In a recent assessment, for example, Roderick Pace has argued that there 
are benefits to reforms that set up free market economies as they create irresistible 
                                                 
20
 MEDA stands for mesure d’ajustement and is the “legal framework for the bulk of EU aid to 
Mediterranean Partner Countries across a wide range of sectors” (Stetter 2003) 
21
 The countries considered under EU’s Mediterranean policy are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey (on certain occasions, 
unless a country specific policy exists as part of the pre-accession process) 
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pressures to establish democratic political institutions. However, most countries in the 
region accept the reforms advocating economic liberalism, but resist democratic 
reforms. This resistance is a pragmatic response by a political elite clinging to power, 
not evidence of a fundamental clash between different cultural principles (Islamic) and 
liberal democracy. Pace does not suggest, therefore, that EU policy is doomed to fail 
regardless of the form its policies take, but rather, that in its current form the policy 
misunderstands the regional context by assuming a causal relationship between liberal 
economic policies and democratisation. This is not a universally applicable formula. 
The growth of civil society in this context, Pace argues, should be seen merely as a 
function of an autocratic rulers’ strategy of controlled liberalisation (Pace 2007). In an 
assessment of EU aid policy in the context of Morocco, Patrick Holden has argued that 
EU policy, together with accompanying economic reforms are likely to fall short of 
developing democracy. Instead the more likely end result is hybridisation, where an 
authoritarian state adopts certain liberal modes of governance. Holden further argues 
that realistically, hybridisation should be viewed as the strategic end goal for EU aid 
policy (Holden 2005). Both pieces of research raise question about the efficacy of 
inducing democratic reform in the Mediterranean region by external means. 
 Nor has EU policy been particularly consistent. In comparing the application of 
the democracy rhetoric between EU efforts to promote civil society in Africa and the 
Middle East, Gordon Crawford has noted significant differences in its application. The 
EU has been much more forgiving with Middle Eastern countries’ resistance to 
democratic reform. This, he argues, has to do with the instrumental (as opposed to 
normative) approach to democracy that is pursued by EU policy. Political stability is 
regarded as more important than full-fledged democratisation (Crawford 2007 p. 183). 
The pragmatic aim of EU policy is, he argues, to create a slimmer bureaucracy, leaving 
the authoritarian political elite in its place. 
 Others, however, argue that it is necessary to move beyond considerations of 
how external actors can influence democratisation processes, and to focus on the 
possible contributions of domestic actors (Pace et al. 2009). Capturing the debates 
about EU policy and the particular visions of democracy embedded within it are 
important, but are only able to offer a limited explanation of how these policies are 
captured and implemented by local actors. The relationships are not unidirectional and 




The Barcelona Process 
EU policy towards the Mediterranean region has become crystallised in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, commonly known as the Barcelona Process. Established in 
the slipstream of the Barcelona Declaration in 1995, the Barcelona Process has focused 
on improving relations with the non-EU member states of the Mediterranean 
(European Commission 2008b). The documents detailing this process also outline the 
key contours of EU policy. One of the stated key goals relevant here is “the creation of 
an area of peace and stability based on fundamental principles, including respect for 
human rights and democracy” (European Commission 2008b p. 2). The ability to act 
freely within civil society is a fundamental part of this goal and something that is 
reinforced on several occasions in the document. The Barcelona Process is 
conceptualised under three pillars: “Political and Security Dialogue”, “Economic and 
Financial Partnership”, and “Social, Cultural and Human partnership”. The role of civil 
society is considered under this last pillar, which focuses on: 
 
[…] facilitating a dialogue between cultures [working with] people on the 
ground […] in order to build their capacity and promote principles such 
as modernization, participation, equality, human rights, democracy and 
good governance (European Commission 2007a p. 58). 
 
 More recently, the democracy and human rights aspect of the partnership has 
augmented in importance, at the same time making civil society more central to the 
process. In 2003 the European Commission issued a Communication entitled 
Reinvigorating EU Actions on Human Rights and Democratisation with 
Mediterranean Partners – Strategic Guidelines (European Commission 2003b). As the 
title suggests, the document identifies a need to find ways to breathe new life into EU’s 
democracy-building efforts in the region. It calls for democratisation and human rights 
promotion to be prioritised within EU external policy and for a proactive approach to 
be adopted (European Commission 2003b). Furthermore, according to the document, 
democracy and human rights should constitute the core objectives of EU’s external 
policy – after all, these are the same principles upon which the EU itself has been 
founded. Hence, the experience of democracy from within the EU is informing the 




The traditional EU approach of constructive advocacy and supporting 
civil society activists has not always been supported by local 
governments [in the Mediterranean region]. More must be done to 
promote respect for universal human rights (European Commission 
2003b p. 4). 
 
The role of civil society has become increasingly central to the implementation and 
monitoring of EU human rights and democratisation policies in the region. The value 
of NGOs is in their “effectiveness in identifying problems and lobbying for 
improvements” (p. 13). The problems in the Mediterranean region are particularly 
acute for NGOs that practice advocacy or work in the field of human rights as they 
“face legal and administrative constraints, are frequently marginalised and sometimes 
repressed” (p. 4). Furthermore, other NGOs working more broadly in the civil and 
political spheres are also identified as restricted in what they are allowed to do and 
refrained from networking internationally. In an answer to these issues, the 
Communication proposes that future National Action Plans consider the following 
actions in support of NGOs: to identify modifications to the legal or administrative 
frameworks; strengthen NGO capacity through training; and promote networking 
between local NGOs, European NGOs and international networks (p. 15). Regular 
contact between Commission Delegations and civil society are also recommended (p. 
19). 
 
Three programmes that engage civil society 
The Barcelona process has initiated three programmes that aim directly towards civil 
societal development, each of which funds several projects.22 The first of these 
programmes to be discussed, “TRESMED – Civil Society Dialogue” is a project that 
aims to provide a framework for dialogue in an effort to support civil society, good 
governance and democratisation. In particular the project aims to strengthen the 
consultative role of civil society, encouraging participation in political decision-
making processes (European Commission 2007a p. 72). The programme activities 
consist of NGO training, study visits, seminars and networking. By giving social and 
economic actors a voice, the objective of the programme is to support civil society, 
good governance and democratisation. Interestingly, Turkey does not participate in this 
                                                 
22
 See “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Regional Co-operation – An overview of programmes and 
projects” (2007) for more detail 
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programme, despite its inclusion in most other activities. It is likely that Turkey’s own 
Civil Society Dialogue programme was too similar to justify inclusion in the 
Mediterranean project as well (a discussion of this will follow in the next section). 
 The second programme, entitled “Med-Pact – Local Authorities”, aims to 
encourage dialogue and cooperation between cities and civil societies, and in so doing 
to push for a greater “cultural and social rapprochement between the EU and the 
Mediterranean partners”. The programme looks to strengthen municipalities by 
enhancing their networks and thus their access to information on issues of urban 
development. The programme regards civil society as an important element of such 
networks, and the potential for NGOs to gain capacity from such partnerships is 
recognised as a possible positive outcome (Med-Pact 2009). 
 The third programme, the “EuroMed Civil Forum”, aspires to create a platform 
through which to “strengthen the role of civil society organisations in the region” by 
being able to “network, discuss their role, and make recommendations to 
governments” (European Commission 2007a p. 70). The Forum has met annually at 
the same time as the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers. In 2003, in 
response to criticisms of the Forum’s ineffectiveness, the Euro-Mediterranean Non-
Governmental Platform was launched to reform the EuroMed Civil Forum. 
Unhappiness with the lack of political impact and failure to fulfil its role as a platform 
for policy recommendations was cited among the reasons for this change (The Non-
Governmental Platform 2003). Strengthening the role of civil society in the region is 




In the context of the Barcelona Process, EU policy has embraced civil society. It has 
done so in pursuing improved standards of human rights and democracy, dialogue 
between societal actors as well as between cultures, and in building human capacity on 
the ground. Civil society-related projects have reflected these aims. The broader EU 
strategy for the Mediterranean has focused increasingly on prioritising human rights 
and democracy. This is a clear shift in emphasis from the way in which the EU 
engages civil society domestically, although the benefit of democratisation is raised in 
both contexts. The policy in the Mediterranean context is explicitly calling for 
improvements in the constraints that CSOs face on their activities. CSOs are valued for 
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their work in lobbying governments for improvements as well as for implementing and 
monitoring democratisation and human rights policies. The language explaining the 
policy shift describes it as a way to better align EU external policy with EU’s internal 
values of democracy and human rights. 
 On the other hand, dialogue in particular has played a significant role in 
shaping the types of projects where civil society actors have been engaged in. Much 
emphasis was placed on communications and networking between CSOs in addition to 
training in skills required by a successful dialogue (e.g. Tresmed – civil society 
dialogue). Elsewhere, projects on relations between civil society and local authorities 
focused on increased access to information (e.g. Med-Pact – local Authorities). 
Consultation of civil society was an explicit aim of the EuroMed Civil Forum, to the 
extent that in 2003 a new platform was launched to remedy the shortcomings of the 
EuroMed Forum in order to enhance its consultative impact. 
 It is not surprising to see that civil society is expected to contribute to 
democratisation, improved standards of human rights and to increased social dialogue 
on the basis of the European playbook. As the previous section illustrated, within 
Europe the democratic value of civil society arises from its role in policy consultation 
with governments, and the projects in the Mediterranean region aspire to this also. 
However, there is an additional interest in the Mediterranean policy to deal explicitly 
with concerns over human rights, and to address limitations on the freedom of 
association. Within the EU civil society is seen as the hub for two-way dissemination 
of information between citizens and the government. A similar role emerges also from 
the policies directed at the Mediterranean.  
 Thus, across the two contexts there is considerable overlap between the 
underlying premise of what civil society is there to do. On the one hand greater civil 
society involvement can improve the efficacy of other EU policies in the region. On 
the other hand civil society can promote democracy by channelling the concerns of 
citizens to the higher echelons. Is the EU, therefore exporting a particular style of civil 
society activism that has more resonance with the European vision of civil society as 
third sector, where CSOs play the dual role of providing services and deepening 





3.4 EU civil society policy in the Turkish context 
This section looks more closely at the justifications given for EU involvement in civil 
society activity in Turkey. The documentation continues to iterate the democratising 
force of civil society, and advocates for policies that engage civil society in a dialogue. 
Two key streams for civil society funding emerge that are discussed here. One is the 
support for initiatives that aim to strengthen democracy in Turkey by funding CSOs. 
The second one is a package of initiatives delivered in support of a process entitled 
Civil Society Dialogue. There are many similarities between the policy language found 
in documents concerning policy towards civil society within the EU and those that 
describe the support for Turkish civil society. This is expected, given that the policy 
aims are closely related to the broader aim of Turkey’s eventual EU accession. I pick 
up the document trail on internal policy from section 3.2, where documents published 
in 2001 and 2003 were beginning to pay increasing attention to issues relating to the 
EU accession countries. As the start of the accession negotiations in 2004 approached, 
policy towards Turkey gets reformulated to reflect the shift from an external partner to 
a candidate country and is therefore regarded as part of the internal policy framework. 
Although the chapter points to similarities in EU civil society policy in a variety of 
contexts, in the case of Turkey EU policy makes a conscious effort to address the state-
centred nature of Turkish politics and policymaking (the related political 
characteristics of Turkey are discussed in detail in Chapter Four). 
 In October 2004, the European Commission published a document which 
contained the broad framework for Turkey’s accession process. The document, entitled 
“Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession”, highlights two policy areas where civil society is given a prominent role. 
First, civil society has an important role in reinforcing and supporting the political 
reform process that is taking place in Turkey. Second, the document identified a need 
to strengthen the dialogue between Turkey and the EU on a number of issues, 
including the differences of cultures, religion, issues relating to migration, concerns on 
minority rights and terrorism. The document further opined that “civil society should 
play the most important role in this dialogue” (European Commission 2004 p. 8). This 
document laid the ground for the two-pronged approach to civil society engagement 
that the EU has adopted in conjunction with Turkey’s accession process. The 






Policy stream 1: Democracy 
 
The European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law 
(European Union 1997). 
 
To join the EU, a new Member State must [achieve] stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities (European Union 2009). 
 
The democratic guidelines included in the accession criteria are possibly the most 
important theme for reform that the Turkish government is faced with, as far as EU 
membership is concerned. The centrality of democratic development to the EU 
accession process is laid out by the first of three pillars that together make up the 
Copenhagen Criteria: the conditions of entry for all candidate countries since 1999. 
This pillar outlines stable democratic institutions, rule of law, human rights and 
protection of minorities as prerequisites for accession. The second pillar expects 
Turkey to develop and maintain a functioning market economy with the capacity to 
cope with market forces within the EU. The third pillar requires Turkey to comply 
with Community acquis (the total body of EU law). Within this three-pronged 
approach, the role of civil society in the accession process is largely framed around the 
first pillar, around the issues of democracy and human rights. The EU regards civil 
society as a fundamental constituent of democracy. A look at the rationales that 
accompany EU projects shows how they are often justified on the bases of their 
contribution to democratisation. Three such project rationales will be analysed with the 
intention of explicating what the EU visualises the contribution of civil society to be.  
The first example is from a project on “Improving co-operation between the 
NGOs and the public sector and strengthening the NGOs democratic participation 
level”. The dual objective set out by the project title fits neatly within the process of 
aligning Turkey’s domestic institutional framework with those of the EU. In order to 
achieve these aims, the project aims to create and implement an “action plan on the 
public sector – civil society cooperation”. The emphasis will be on achieving 
cooperation through a structured dialogue between NGOs and the public sector, as an 
improved relationship between the two is seen as a required outcome of the pre-
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accession phase (European Commission 2003c pp. 1-2). Indeed, the project objectives 
are consciously and consistently aligned with the aims of the accession process:  
 
A well-developed and functioning civil society is an essential element of 
a democratic system and efficient NGOs have a key role to play in 
expressing the demands of citizens by encouraging their active 
participation as well as raising their awareness. Furthermore, many 
elements of the acquis communautaire are based on the existence of 
operational NGOs operating within the related policy area (European 
Commission 2003c p. 2). 
 
The two reasons that are given for why this project is necessary can be summarised as 
“it is good for democracy” and “it is required by the accession process”. Structured 
dialogue between NGOs and the public sector is desirable because it increases the 
democratic participation levels of NGOs and because this dialogue improves ties 
between civil society and the public sector. Elements of the EU law (acquis) anticipate 
the existence of NGOs that act in a certain way, and contribute to the policy process in 
a certain way. If Turkey is to successfully comply with the accession criteria, it needs 
to have NGOs fulfilling these roles. The project documentation in fact admits that 
certain types of NGO relationships and activities are encouraged because this is the 
way in which things are done within in the EU. 
The second example is a project entitled “Strengthening Freedom of 
Association for Further Development of Civil Society”. The overall objective is stated 
as “enhanced participatory democracy through strengthened NGOs”. This is to be 
achieved by increasing NGO capacity for “networking, voluntary work, national and 
international dialogue in Turkey” (European Commission 2004 p. 1). The justification 
for the project is based on the requirements of the first pillar of the Copenhagen 
Criteria. The document recognises that several steps have already been taken in order 
to carry out reforms that lead to the fulfilment of the said criteria, however:  
 
Despite these reforms aiming at a more favourable environment for the 
operations of the NGOs, the participation level of the NGOs in all sectors 
of the democratic life has remained limited (European Commission 2004 
p. 3) 
 
The activities perceived by the project are broken down to three components. The first 
component includes capacity-building for NGOs through a “comprehensive training 
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[…] covering different aspects of organisations’ management and the needs of the civil 
society sector”. The second component is comprised of raising awareness of civil 
society among NGOs, media, public authorities and general public by establishing a 
communication centre and by promoting the NGO sector through seminars, 
conferences and publications. The third component offers micro-grants to NGOs in 
order to facilitate dialogue and communication with their counterparts in the EU 
(European Commission 2004 p. 5).  
The third sample project is called “Strengthening civil society in the pre-
accession process”, which aims to “contribute to the consolidation and broadening of 
political reforms and EU alignment efforts through strengthening the civil society in 
Turkey in the pre-accession process” (European Commission 2005). The first 
component of the project offers grants to various rights-based pursuits in the areas of 
women’s rights, disability rights, consumer rights, child rights and environmental 
activism. The second component provides funds to activities that consolidate human 
rights and democracy, combat violence against women or contribute to the engagement 
of the Turkish public in the accession process (European Commission 2005). In each 
of these areas the document goes on to provide further justification for civil society 
funding by outlining the current weaknesses in civil society activity in each area, and 
expressing a desire to develop this further. This is desirable because it helps to 
consolidate the ongoing reforms, and to consolidate the currently underdeveloped role 
of civil society in each of the aforementioned areas. Through these developments 
Turkey will move a step closer to EU membership, the document suggests (European 
Commission 2005 p. 28). 
 During the years leading up to the start of the accession process (2004), 
efforts at democratisation were at the heart of EU civil society building efforts in 
Turkey. Project funding supporting rights-based initiatives, encouraging 
networking between NGOs by way of strengthening their common voice, and 
improving relations between NGOs and the public sector were some of the areas 
where democratisation was being pursued by the above projects. From 2004 






Policy stream 2: Dialogue 
 
Parallel to accession negotiations, the Union will engage with every 
candidate state in an intensive political and cultural dialogue. With the 
aim of enhancing mutual understanding by bringing people together, this 
inclusive dialogue also will involve civil society (European Commission 
2009).  
 
As the democracy building initiatives were being carried out through project funding, 
the next phase of the EU-civil society relationship was also being developed. This 
came in the form of a programme on civil society dialogue, which, in the context of the 
accession process has gradually taken over from democratisation as the central theme 
of civil society funding (although the two remain interlinked). Drawing on the rational 
choice framework, a new kind of rational calculus entered the EU-Turkey relationship 
with the advent of the membership negotiations. Funding for civil society shifted away 
from addressing Turkey’s democratic and political shortcomings directly and focused 
primarily on facilitating the accession process. 
 The idea of civil society dialogue was first proposed in October 2004 by the 
European Commission and endorsed by the European Council in December 2004 
(European Commission 2004a). Incidentally, parallel to this, on December 17th 2004 
European Union agreed to initiate the accession negotiations with Turkey. Then in 
June 2005 – four months before the first six chapters of the acquis are opened for 
negotiations in October – a communication entitled Civil Society Dialogue between the 
EU and Candidate Countries was published by the European Commission that spells 
out the nature of the policy shift this innovation brings along with it. The document 
claims to draw on the lessons learnt from previous rounds of enlargement and, as the 
timeline suggests, was allegedly written with Turkey’s accession negotiations 
specifically in mind.23 The emergence of civil society dialogue represents an important 
policy shift that further centralises the role of civil society in the accession process. For 
example, the communication earmarks as much as eight to ten per cent of Turkey’s 
total annual financial assistance to civil society related activities (European Union 
2005 p. 14). The document states that: 
 
                                                 
23
 Interview with a senior civil servant, EU delegation to Turkey, Ankara, 03 April 2008. [B5] 
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[…] any future enlargement of the EU needs to be supported by a strong, 
deep and sustained dialogue […] this would help to bridge the 
information gap, achieve better mutual knowledge and bring citizens and 
different cultures, political and economic systems closer together, thus 
ensuring a stronger awareness of the opportunities as well as challenges 
of future accessions […] civil society should play the most important role 
in this dialogue (European Union 2005 p. 2). 
 
The aim of this dialogue is to make sure that both Turkish and EU citizens are 
sufficiently informed about the other prior to accession. The more efforts there are at 
exchanging ideas across the EU-Turkey borders, the more ideological cleavages can be 
bridged, and differences of opinion ironed out. NGOs are seen as key agents within 
this process of dialogue, asked to facilitate the accession process by way of 
establishing a channel of communication between the two sides in the negotiations. 
The document goes on to outline further aims as well. This dialogue, by way of 
increasing the participation of civil society in political, cultural and economic 
development, is seen to develop: 
 
[…] a lively and vibrant civil society in candidate countries, which is key 
to the consolidation of human rights and democracy, in line with the 
political criteria for accession (European Union 2005 p. 4). 
 
Although civil society dialogue digresses away from the democratisation rhetoric 
of earlier projects, this element has not been entirely lost in the new policy 
framework. By partaking in civil society dialogue, NGOs still contribute to the 
building of a more vibrant civil society, which in turn consolidates democracy 
(European Commission 2005 p. 3). This new policy therefore continues the 
effort by the EU to balance the strong state in Turkey with a more active society 
in Turkey.  
 A recent two-year long project involving Turkish and European trade 
unions illustrates how civil society dialogue has been operationalised in practice. 
Carried out between August 2007 and September 2009, a project entitled “Civil 
Society Dialogue – Bringing together workers from Turkey and European Union 
through a ‘shared culture of work’” aimed to “strengthen contacts and mutual 
exchange of experience between the trade unions of Turkey and trade unions of 
EU member states” (European Commission 2006c pp. 2-3). The activities were 
based on ideas such as awareness visits and communication networks. In 
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addition, the project set out to develop information brochures on various subjects 
the explored the different histories of trade union movements, social rights, and 
the role of civil society in each of the participating countries. A total of 300,000 
copies of each brochure published in Turkey and 8,000 copies in each of the EU 
member states was planned to be published. The project was jointly managed by 
the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and its four member 
confederations from Turkey).24 This €3,5 million project offers some insight into 
the kinds of activities that the idea of civil society dialogue in Turkey refers to. 
The most extensive and comprehensive commitment to increased civil 
society dialogue, however, has come in the form of a broad, new grant 
programme. “Promotion of the Civil Society Dialogue between Turkey and the 
European Union”, which ran from 2006 to December 2009 and committed to 
awarding grants amounting to €19,3 million in total. The grants divided across 
four separate schemes: Towns and Municipalities (€5 million), Professional 
Organisations (€3 million), Universities (€9,3 million) and Youth Initiatives for 
Dialogue (€2 million). In total, 119 projects have been awarded grants, and in 
each case a Turkish organisation has partnered with an organisation from an EU 
member state or another candidate country (Civil Society Dialogue Project 
2009). 
The programme aims to strengthen contacts and the exchange of experiences 
between civil society in the EU and Turkey, and to ensure better understanding on both 
sides of the history, culture and values of the other (European Commission 2006b p. 
1). The development of civil society dialogue with Turkey is underlined by an 
expectation that this will contribute to a better informed public opinion, encourage 
discussion on culture and values, and facilitate the sharing of experiences across the 
EU-Turkey border. These outcomes are expected to increase civil society participation 
in the political, cultural and economic development of Turkey, and to aid in the 
“development of a lively and vibrant civil society, which is key to the consolidation of 
democracy” (European Commission 2006b pp. 4-5). There seems to an instrumental 
undertone to these projects, seeing NGOs as vehicles that aim to deliver rather specific 
outcomes. 
                                                 
24
 http://www.etuc.org/a/82 accessed 27 May 2010. The four Turkish unions that are members are: 
TÜRK-ĐŞ, HAK-ĐŞ, DĐSK and KESK. The role of Turkish trade unions is covered in more detail in 
Chapter Four, section 4.1 and in Chapter Six. 
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The following section considers one of these four grant schemes in closer 
detail, namely the Youth Initiatives for Dialogue scheme. The objectives for this 
scheme follow the broader programme aims outlined above. The two central aims of 
the grant are the following: 
 
1) to promote mutually beneficial and sustainable relationships between 
youth initiatives in Turkey and in EU Member States and candidate 
countries and promote dialogue between the Turkish and EU counterparts 
by addressing the opportunities and challenges of enlargement; 
 
2) to encourage exchange of knowledge and best practices on planning 
and implementation of EU policies (EUSG 2009). 
 
These objectives utilise civil society as an instrument in the accession process. The 
participating youth groups are expected, through their involvement in the project, to 
address issues concerning EU enlargement. There is an expectation that the funding 
will facilitate a learning process that directly helps the accession process. This, when 
compared with the earlier funding framework that concentrated on democratisation, 
represents a clear shift in EU civil society policy. 
 The funding is granted for projects that are between €30,000 and €100,000 in 
value, and this leads to further consequences for participating NGOs. At most, 90 per 
cent of the total costs of the project are covered by the grant. In other words, in order 
to qualify for a grant the recipient must have at least €3,000 in cash or to have secured 
funding from another non-EU source (EUSG 2009). Together, these requirements limit 
potential applicants. Given the relatively high value of the grants, it is likely that any 
successful applicant will have had previous experience of managing a funded project. 
The requirement for alternate sources of funding acts as a similar limitation; a 
successful candidate is required to have the additional capacity to look for two sources 
of funding at the same time. These requirements will channel the funding towards 
large, established entities that are able to manage the process successfully. 
Finally, all projects are required to incorporate two kinds of compulsory 
activities. First, to organise information campaigns and events, such as seminars 
and conferences, and to engage wider community groups with these activities. 
Second, projects are required to include actions and events that promote the 
project and ensure the visibility of EU support and the concept of civil society 
dialogue (EUSG 2009). In effect, the participating NGOs are treated as an 
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extension of a marketing campaign for EU enlargement. Civil society is here 
seen as a partner that has been asked to deliver specific outcomes that suit EU 
needs in terms of Turkey’s broader accession process. 
Although one could argue that the requirements EU projects make are in 
fact reasonable, given that the funding comes from taxpayers who expect the 
money to be spent effectively, it is also important to consider the extent to which 
this style of funding complements the end goals of the funding, such as 
democratisation and dialogue between NGOs. As Chapter Six illustrates, this 
type of funding is contributing to the development of a two-tier civil society 
between those that are able to gain access to funding, and those that are not. 
Moreover, Chapter Seven highlights the issue of NGOs gaining access to EU 
funding with the help of consultancy firms that write the applications, whilst the 
NGOs may in fact lack the capacity to deliver the projects competently. It is 
therefore important to investigate the relationship between stated aims and actual 
outcomes of EU civil society policy. 
 
Sub-conclusion 
In light of the above, a third sector-based understanding of civil society remains 
relevant to an analysis of the way projects have taken shape under civil society 
dialogue. In other words, civil society is seen to contribute to the efficacy of EU policy 
and to offer a channel for two-way communication of messages between government 
and its citizens. As such, the role of NGOs is viewed in terms of delivering a service or 
in some other way aiding the government to achieve their aims. By imposing a set of 
compulsory activities on all projects supported by this facility, the EU has made a 
conscious effort to shape the contribution of NGOs. In particular, it is important to see 
how the EU envisions civil society to contribute to the accession process as a partner 
that can be relied on delivering certain outcomes. The large monetary size of the 
individual grants favour professional entities that are able to manage large projects. 
Their way of operating is likely to already resonate strongly with third sector logic. 
Thus the pledge made for civil society dialogue to contribute to democratisation is 
realised in the indirect manner that an understanding of civil society as a third sector 
provides: through the delivery of services and by participating in the delivery and 
development of policy. It remains to be seen whether Turkish civil society is likely to 
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operate in the manner outlined by these policies, and this is a question that is returned 
to later in the empirical chapters of the thesis. 
 Both of these policy streams challenge the tradition of a strong central state that 
isolates society from political decision making from society. Thus, EU civil society 
policy can be seen as an attempt to address such shortcomings by providing new 
avenues – in particular in the case of civil society dialogue – for NGOs and the public 
sector to work together and for NGOs to possess the wherewithal for making a 
constructive contribution to policy. It is hoped that this may lead to a more inclusive 
relationship between state and civil society. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In exploring the evolution of EU policies towards civil society in section 3.2 two broad 
conclusions were made. First, working with CSOs was justified because they were able 
to deliver important services to society and thus support governments in serving their 
citizens. Second, CSOs were deemed valuable because they were able to enhance the 
democratic qualities of a society by providing an avenue through which citizens could 
make their voices heard. Moreover, the very act of delivering services through CSOs 
was seen as democracy enhancing. This thinking crystallised around two policy 
objectives. The first objective was to consult CSOs during the policymaking process in 
order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of policies. The second objective 
aimed to start a dialogue that leads to a two-way dissemination of information.  
 These policy aspirations have much in common with the theoretical premise 
introduced by Ferguson, Hegel and de Tocqueville in the previous chapter. Civil 
society is seen as a useful facilitator between the market economy and the state, whilst 
at the same time retaining independence from the two. Shadowing de Tocqueville’s 
argument about the democratic value of civil society, the independence also makes 
civil society a useful ally in democratisation efforts, as it enables civil society actors to 
question the state and to ensure it remains accountable to its citizens. Such qualities 
make civil society a key component of a successful modern system of governance. 
Policies aspiring to fulfil these objectives could be identified in each of the 
three contexts reviewed: domestic (within EU), Mediterranean and Turkish. Policies 
consistently linked the active presence of civil society to democratisation and greater 
policy effectiveness. Although EU democracy promotion policies in the Mediterranean 
and in Turkey have focused less on engaging CSOs in consultations on government 
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decision-making, it seems that by supporting groups (such as rights-based NGOs) who 
make their critique of government policy heard through more informal means, the EU 
has a similar end goal in mind. As has been outlined in the sections of this chapter, 
these policies are underlined by a desire to see democratic development in the recipient 
countries. The policy of civil society dialogue has been readily transferred to external 
contexts. The similarities in the policies, and in the language supporting these policies, 
indicate that the EU regards the application of the concept in universal fashion across 
different contexts as unproblematic. It is a neutral, technical policy exercise in how to 
engage civil society in a constructive manner. For the EU, civil society is an 
instrument that can aid in realising their policy goals as well as a structure that is 
believed to function in a sufficiently similar manner across various cultural contexts. 
How useful is it to have this kind of uniformity in policymaking? Some would 
advocate that we should continue to see policy as a rational and technical process, and 
formulate policy goals on the basis that it satisfies certain minimum requirements. 
Others argue that we ought to pursue a more individualistic understanding of the 
consequence of policy, and consider more carefully the politics of the policy process. 
In the case of the EU and Turkey, these policies can be conceived of as aiming for 
Europeanisation, that is, processes broadly defined as political, policy, societal or 
discursive change towards the European mainstream. 
The lens of historical institutionalism offers one way of explaining the 
uniformity in policy. Since the early 1990s, the EU has incrementally set out a strategy 
for engaging with civil society where each policy document built on the logic of the 
one preceding it. With each policy document, the selected policy approach gathers 
greater mass and reduces the space for alternative approaches to develop. In a sense, 
what the chronology of policy documents in this chapter charts is the gradual increase 
in institutional inertia, making alternative approaches less likely. This policy trajectory 
then forms the framework within which processes of policy Europeanisation take place 
during Turkey’s accession negotiations also.  
Additionally, the lens of rational choice institutionalism can help to explain the 
emergence of civil society dialogue as the new funding strategy, replacing the earlier 
policy of supporting rights-based NGOs directly. Although the stated aims of civil 
society dialogue – democratisation and building of vibrant civil society – have not 
completely changed from what they were previously, the manner in which this is to be 
achieved has. The assumption that actors’ behaviour is governed by a “strategic 
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calculus” (Hall and Taylor 1996) would suggest that the policy shift towards civil 
society dialogue would incur lower political costs for incumbent governments and 
would therefore achieve improved compliance from governments. The policy on civil 
society dialogue has been framed differently from previous frameworks in that it is 
less confrontational. NGO actions, as far as the project domain is concerned, have been 
tamed by projects that fund the less confrontational activities  
However, the subsequent chapters in this thesis question the extent to which the 
above understanding of how Europeanisation processes unfold is in fact supported by 
evidence. NGO funding has been increasingly engulfed by Europeanisation, and what 
follows investigates how NGO actors have experienced the effect of these processes 
and how they have reacted in response. The issues covered range from the nature of 
short-term project funding and complexity of accounting procedures to the 
introduction of domestic governmental actors as the new gatekeepers of EU civil 
society funds. The discrepancies between the content and implementation of EU civil 
society policy and the everyday experiences and practices of NGOs generate tension 
and dissatisfaction among the NGO community. However, as the final empirical 
chapter (Chapter Seven) demonstrates, these discrepancies also generate space for 
NGOs to develop coping strategies and opportunities for “benign manipulation” of 




4 Civil Society in Turkey 
 
This chapter provides a contextual background on the development of civil society in 
Turkey, and in so doing facilitates a transition from the theoretical and policy debates 
to the empirical discussion that will follow in the subsequent chapters. It endeavours to 
highlight the relevance of historical context in explaining how certain idiosyncrasies 
regarding the development of civil society have arisen. In particular, the chapter 
explores the historical bifurcation of civil society into “official” (secular, nationalist 
voices) and “informal” (non-secular, minority voices) sectors, and its consequences on 
the development of civil society in Turkey. Although somewhat crude as a distinction, 
this division remains a useful heuristic device to describe the outcomes of the radical 
modernisation and Westernisation processes instigated in the early years of the Turkish 
republic. The last three decades have seen tremendous growth in the size and role of 
civil society in Turkey, as well as in the variety of organisational forms. Yet, the 
attitudes underlying the earlier bifurcation still resonate in present day relationships 
within civil society, particularly within the critical debates on issues such as the role of 
religion in Turkish politics and society. Civil society in Turkey today is both 
heterogeneous and fragmented. These mixed dynamics, between the old black-and-
white divisions and the new, increasingly multifarious character of civil society place 
Turkey into an unknown territory, where the opportunities offered by democratisation 
and EU accession are being dampened by the shortcomings that arise from the social 
divisions that still continue to exist in Turkish civil society. These political dynamics 
contribute to the unpredictable and uncertain nature of Europeanisation in Turkey. 
 The chapter therefore emphasises the importance of the particular path that 
civil society development has taken in Turkey. The recent history, as well as the 
broader social and political debates within which the idea of civil society is embedded, 
and where civil society operates, form the backdrop for the account of NGO behaviour 
that will outlined in detail in the later chapters. This line of argumentation does not 
mean to suggest that the behaviour of NGOs in Turkey is per se unique, but rather to 
point out that there is a particular explanation for this behaviour that originates from 
the Turkish experience. NGOs in the older EU member states (Salgado) and in the 
more recent accession countries (Korkut 2002; Kuti 2006; Mendelson and Glenn 2002) 
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indeed exhibit similar behaviour in their approach to EU funding, and even the cases 
of Russia and the post-Soviet states offer several points of comparison (Cook and 
Vinogradova 2006; Crotty 2003; Hemment 2004; Henderson 2002; Ishkanian 2008; 
Richter 2002). The similarities stem from a similar relationship between the external 
environment that informs EU and the local, internal environment where NGOs operate. 
Faced with a new situation where the EU is asking NGOs to move beyond existing 
capacities and outside their comfort zones, NGOs respond by employing similar 
survival strategies that enable them to circumvent the anticipated policy outcomes. 
However, as chapters Five, Six and Seven illustrate, these resistance strategies 
interweave with various domestic ideological and political discourses to form local 
hybrid strategies. Therefore, whilst there are similarities in the character of the donor-
NGO relationships that emerge in different contexts, the exact shape of the NGO 
response can be explained only by referring to the local socio-political context.  
The chapter consists of four sections. The first part turns the clock back to a 
time when the ideas of the modern Turkish nation were first being formulated. The 
principles behind the modern republic and Turkish nation state-building created certain 
challenges on the way of civil societal development. The dual focus on eastern 
civilization and western culture contributed, in particular, to the bifurcation of the 
religious and secular elements in society. The situation, however, has undergone some 
far-reaching changes since the 1980s, and the impact of this transposition is the focus 
of the second section. In this period new, autonomous civil societal voices of all 
colours began to emerge, representing a break with the bifurcated divisions of the past. 
In particular, the state became gradually less vigorous in controlling the content of the 
official civil society. Yet, these new voices tended to retain some of the earlier 
uncompromising rhetoric. Thus, whilst the landscape of civil society has become 
increasingly colourful and varied, strong ideological divisions remain a salient 
characteristic of Turkish civil society. 
Section three considers the impact of the EU accession process on the 
development of civil society. Efforts at Europeanisation underpin this section, as it 
looks at how domestic politics have responded to the opportunities and challenges 
delivered by the Europeanising forces that have been in play since the late 1980s. I 
argue that these developments have had, broadly speaking, an enabling effect on civil 
society. The EU has provided an external anchor for the claims NGOs have made, and 
by taking NGO activity seriously, the EU has legitimised their actions in the eyes of 
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the public. The final section explores the actors and recent events in Turkish civil 
society in more detail, beginning with an outline of how secular and Islamic camps 
have elected to position themselves in the currents of Europeanisation. It then looks at 
how the debates play out in the particular domain of the women’s movement because 
the debates surrounding women’s rights and women’s role in society offer an entry-
point to understanding how the debates on secularism and religion unfold in practice. 
The chapter finishes with a comment on the interplay between political culture and 
civil society. 
 
4.1 The Turkish Paradox 
The Turkish Republic that emerged in the 1920s continued the gargantuan task of 
turning the remnants of the Ottoman Empire into a modern, Westernised nation state. 
The emergent republic searched for a compromise between the Ottoman traditions that 
drew on Islamic history and culture and the far-reaching secular reforms that 
drastically broke away from this. The solution was to pursue the modernisation agenda 
in areas such as politics, law and governance, whilst in the spiritual, cultural and 
ethical domains Islamic traditions continued to flourish (as long as this did not 
interfere with the processes of modernisation). What emerged, then, was a public-
private divide where politics, law and governance were within the public realm and 
religion was pushed out of the public and into the private realm. Many observers refer 
to this compromise as an apparent paradox in the development logic of the Turkish 
republic because the aim behind these measures – to contain religion as a political 
force – remained alien to large swathes of the population (Kadioğlu 1996; Keyman 
1995; Parla 1985; Yavuz 2003; Yilmaz 2007; Kubicek 1999). From this emerge the 
later political tensions that continue to shape Turkish politics even today. Civil society 
was employed in managing this paradox, leading to a bifurcated, two-tier civil society 
where a relatively narrow band of organisations that were secular-minded or 
nationalist in their outlook was given scope to grow. This left other civil society actors 
to fend for themselves without state support (and often facing active state 
interference).  
 
“Turkish-Islamist-Westernist Modernism” as a formula for reform 
The ideas of Ziya Gökalp mark a starting point for an outline of the journey that 
Turkish civil society has taken since the formation of the Turkish Republic. Gökalp 
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(1876-1924) was a political philosopher from the Ottoman era who was among the 
early advocates of Turkish nationalism. In the post-Ottoman era his ideas became 
influential among the new elite as it was reconceptualising the path a modern Turkish 
Republic ought to take in the post-First World War setting where nationalist 
movements flourished across Europe, a time period Eric Hobsbawm describes as the 
“apogee of nationalism” (1990 p. 131). His unique contribution was a synthesis of a 
number of theoretical strands that together possessed a powerful resonance with the 
future direction of Turkey. His theory, entitled “Turkist-Islamist-Westernist 
Modernism”, gave each of these notions a role in society: “We are of the Turkish 
nation (millet), of the Islamic religious community (ümmet), of Western civilization 
(medeniyet)” (Parla 1985). 
 It seemed highly paradoxical to attempt to synthesise the Western and Islamic 
traditions in this way. The scientific and technological innovation of the West was 
somehow to be balanced with the spirituality of the East (Kadioğlu 1996 p. 719; Parla 
1985). To reconcile the irreconcilable, and to resolve the paradox, he went on to make 
a distinction between culture and civilization. Culture, Gökalp argued, should remain 
intrinsic to Turkey and retain a domestic origin, whilst the ingredients for civilization 
could be borrowed from outside. In so doing it would be possible to utilise the 
technical and scientific innovation of the Western world as well as to protect the 
independence of the Turkish way of life. In this way, it was deemed possible to adopt 
Western institutions, values and norms so far as they were necessary for acquiring a 
modern, civilized society, whilst concurrently protecting traditional, national values 
from an outside influence (Parla 1985; Kubicek 1999). In practice, however, the 
synthesis has led to an unstable compromise where tensions periodically mount 
between the modernising reformists (secular) and traditionalists who resist change 
(Islamist).  
Importantly, Gökalp’s ideas were a significant source of inspiration for the 
founder of the modern Turkish Republic, and its first president, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk. Atatürk pursued an energetic reform agenda that adopted many of the 
Western values and norms on the one hand, whilst establishing the groundwork for a 
homogeneous, Turkish national identity on the other. In pursuit of civilizational 
reforms, the Turkish Republic adopted the Latin script; the fez was banned in favour of 
a European style headgear; the Sharia law was replaced by a legal code modelled on 
European examples; and as early as 1930 women were given the right to vote in 
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municipal elections, a right that was extended to national elections in 1934 (Poulton 
1997). 25 The mould used to establish a modern Turkish civilization was clearly a 
European one. Above all, the process of secularisation was what defined the paradigm 
shift that was taking place. The highest political authority in Sunni Islam that 
functioned as a united voice for the Muslim Ummah, the Caliphate, was abolished. 
These powers were transferred to the newly established parliament, the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey (Dodd 1992). Not only were relations between religion and state 
severed, but Islam was etatised by way of establishing the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs (Diyanet Đşleri Başkanlığı), a state institution which to this day retains a 
regulatory oversight over all Muslim religious activities in Turkey (Yilmaz 2007). 
These reforms imported secular measures that seemed to bode well for the further 
development of civil society. It would be less likely that public issues, such as 
women’s rights, would be curtailed on the grounds that they belonged to the domain of 
religion and were therefore not open to public debate. However, the extent to which 
the social fabric of Turkey was being ripped apart by the reforms meant the politicians 
and policymakers behind the programme had to be in total control in order to ensure 
the reforms were carried out. This in turn limited the possibilities for certain parts of 
civil society to grow. 
 Such elite domination of the reform process can also be found in Gökalp’s 
writings on the subject. For him the nation had to be the prime mover in realising the 
Turkish-Islamist-Westernist balance, not individual reason. His ideas were greatly 
influenced by Durkheim, particularly by Durkheimian understanding of positivism and 
the belief that social processes can be studied (and controlled) through rational and 
scientific means. Gökalp also supported a solidaristic interpretation of social relations, 
where individuals would first and foremost serve the interests of the general will (Parla 
1985). Gökalp’s influence on the early Republican elite led to policies whereby the 
transformation of popular consciousness was going to be achieved through an elitist 
project conceived from above. Thus the question asked was not “who are the Turks” 
but rather “who are the Turks going to be” (Kadioğlu 1996 p. 179). The reforms were 
not an expression of an existing national consciousness, but rather an abstract 
construction that broke away from religiously or ethnically constructed models. The 
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 By comparison, French women achieved these same rights in 1944, Italians in 1946 and Swiss women 
were given the right to vote in federal elections only in 1971. 
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ideas of a Turkish nation and a republican state became virtually synonymous, where 
social forces that deviated from the republican norms (but were otherwise legitimate) 
were squeezed out from public discussion (Seufert 2000). The reform process 
interpreted the general will in a very particular way. 
 Another element of the paradox arises from Turkey’s ambivalent attitudes 
towards Westernisation. The desire to build a modern Turkish state in the image of 
Western civilizations has been counterpoised by a deep-seated suspicion of the West. 
This ambivalent attitude has become coined as the “Sèvres Syndrome”. Although the 
Treaty of Sèvres, drawn up by the Allied powers in 1920 following the end of the First 
World War, was later nullified, it remains as a reminder in the Turkish social 
consciousness of the potential untrustworthiness of the West. In addition to the 
secession of Ottoman territories in the Middle East, the treaty divided most of present-
day Turkey into zones of influence between the Allies (France, Britain and Italy), and 
ceded territory to Greece (in the west) and Armenia (in the east). Only central Anatolia 
and the Black Sea region in the north would have remained fully independent. These 
terms were deemed wholly unacceptable and formed one key determinant mobilising a 
series of guerrilla wars against the occupying forces. These culminated in the national 
resistance led by Mustafa Kemal in the victorious War of Independence (1919-1923). 
The end result was the Treaty of Lausanne, which annulled the earlier Treaty of 
Sèvres, retrieved the territories that the Treaty of Sèvres had given to Greece and 
Armenia (apart from the Dodecanese Islands on the Mediterranean), and recognised 
the present-day borders of Turkey. The lesson that Turkey took on board from this 
experience, argues Hakan Yilmaz, was that the Europeans saw Turks as illegitimate 
occupiers of lands that rightfully belonged to European-Christian people (Yilmaz 
2006). The Sèvres Syndrome has had two deep policy imperatives: isolationism (never 
trust Western states or enter into economic, political or cultural pacts) and 
Westernisation without the West (modernise the state, military, economy and the 
society but never lose sight of the importance of isolationism) (Yilmaz 2006 p. 36). 
The nationalist and anti-Western attitudes, therefore, sat uneasily with the 
cosmopolitan civilizational agenda that looked to the West for inspiration. These 
mixed attitudes continue to inform the political debate around the processes of 
Europeanisation and how the accession negotiations in general are interpreted, an issue 




Modernisation and a two-tier civil society 
The lack of a practical resolution to the inherent contradictions that arise from the 
merging of East and West has left its imprint on the development of civil society in 
Turkey. Gökalp and the early republican elite found a certain theoretical resolution to 
this dilemma in identifying two separate spheres of influence: Western influences were 
used as a guide to policy reform, whilst Eastern traditions remained relevant within the 
cultural sphere. 
 The resultant national identity was premised on secular Turkishness, forming a 
rather narrow overlap with other existing identities. Society was not deemed an 
aggregation of different interests but rather as a system where each individual was 
expected to abide by a particular interpretation of the general will. Ethnically or 
religiously informed identities in particular were sidelined (Seufert 2000). In the 1930s 
the six key principles of Kemalism were formulated. Enshrined in the constitution in 
1937, these were formulated in order to define a hegemonic discourse that would 
ensure the success of the post-Ottoman nation building process (Poulton 1997). The 
six key principles of Kemalism are republicanism (rule of law, elected sovereigns, 
representative democracy), secularism, populism (elite working towards the best 
interests of society), etatism (state has central role in economic development), 
nationalism (one based on citizenship rather than ethnic origin) and reformism 
(introduction of modern institutions of governance that are constantly improved) (Kili 
1980). Under the republican era Eastern traditions were gradually pushed away from 
the public sphere and firmly into the private domain. 
 The secular state and its governing discourse ended up being defined through a 
series of binaries, such as “progressive vs. conservative”; “modern vs. traditional”; 
“progress vs. backward”, delineating the social and political landscape in secular vis-à-
vis non-secular terms (Keyman 1995). The essentialist nature of this language, which 
expresses the belief among the Kemalists that certain concepts were so important they 
should be taught methodically to all citizens, left virtually no room for alternative 
views to surface onto the public agenda. Civil society became to reflect these divisions 
between what was to be regarded as official (secular/Kemalist) civil society and the 
rest of civil society. 
For the masses, however, this discourse was not entirely convincing, as they 
were unable to sympathise with the reformist logic. As the eminent Turkish 




The republic had not been able to propagate a social ethic that was 
sufficiently meaningful to the rural masses to enable them to react 
positively to its modernization drive. This was its main failing, and it was 
especially galling to the Muslim population of Turkey (Mardin 1995 p. 
163) 
 
Although Kemalist ideas and policies enjoyed a hegemonic position in Turkish society, 
this did not mean that alternative conceptions were not also a significant force. These 
remained alive and well in the private sphere of individuals. As Keyman has observed, 
the elite orientation of the reform movement meant that villages and particularly the 
Eastern part of the country, away from the centres of power, were much less likely to 
internalise the new values and norms (Keyman 1995). The dominance of Kemalism in 
public life meant that public expressions of difference, through mediums such as civil 
society, were not tolerated. Civil society, in this setting, found very little room to grow 
unless attached to the official Kemalist ideology. In this context, public expressions of 
an autonomous civil society were impossible. 
 
Political chronology: 1940s-1970s 
Up until 1946 the Turkish state functioned more or less as a single-party dictatorship. 
It was a case of “radical change first, democracy only later” (Dodd 1992). Atatürk in 
fact experimented with the idea of parliamentary democracy, by arranging the 
founding of an opposition party – the Free Party – to his own Republican People’s 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) in 1930. The new party was overwhelmed by 
membership requests, breathing life into the smouldering discontent against the single-
party state and fuelling mass demonstrations. Faced with such outcome, Atatürk 
withdrew his support, and the party was dissolved the same year it was founded (Dodd 
1992; Weiker 1990). In 1946, Ismet Inönü, Turkey’s second president following the 
death of Atatürk in 1938, organised the first multi-party elections, which his party, the 
CHP, won comfortably. During the next four years however, the main opposition 
party, the Democrat’s Party (Demokrat Partisi – DP), did their homework and were 
well prepared for the 1950 elections (Sunar 2004). 
In 1950, the DP won a landslide victory in the general election. The DP stood 
for a less militant form of secularism than the CHP, and were seen as the champions of 
the people with a large slice of their vote coming from the rural peasantry (Tachau and 
Chapter 4 
 100 
Good 1973). The DP won convincingly again in the 1954 general election, but its 
gradual downfall begun in 1955. Adnan Menderes, the prime minister, begun to 
assume – much like the CHP before the DP – that the government constituted the state. 
For example, he denied the CHP airtime on the radio on the grounds that radio was an 
“organ of the state” (Dodd 1992 p. 20). This was combined with reduced popularity 
due to worsening economic performance. Relations between the government and the 
opposition gradually deteriorated, until on May 27th 1960 the military stepped in, 
masterminding a coup d’état. Despite the undemocratic end to the period, the 1950s 
marked the emergence of civil society as an actor in Turkey’s political dynamics. One 
sign of this was the establishment of the first labour federation, the Confederation of 
Turkish Trade Unions (Türkiye Đsçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – TÜRK-ĐŞ), in 1952. 
The TÜRK-ĐŞ represented anticommunism, patriotism and non partisanship, retaining 
a non-political stance wherever possible (Blind 2007). In the 1950s society began to 
emerge as an “independent entity” in Turkey (Sunar 2004 p. 54), able to flex its 
muscle in support of political parties of its own choosing.  
Following the 1960 coup, hundreds of DP political activists were arrested and 
Adnan Menderes together with two close associates were executed. In 1961, prior to 
the elections, the DP was outlawed. In the four years that followed, clumsy coalition 
governments between the CHP and the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi – AP) struggled to 
agree on economic and domestic policy whilst operating under the military’s watchful 
eye. In 1965 the AP, the political descendant of the DP, won a clear majority and was 
able to bring temporary stability to Turkish politics. However, the AP was soon 
struggling to manage the new Right-Left politics that were entering Turkey’s political 
stage (Sunar and Sayarı 1986). Influenced by the leftist student movements in Europe, 
particularly France, the youthful activists on both sides of the Right-Left continuum 
engaged in increasingly violent acts. In 1967, the TÜRK-ĐŞ stepped in to quell a strike 
organised by a group of factory workers and expelled the unions involved in the strike. 
This led to the establishment of the Revolutionary Labour Unions Confederation of 
Turkey26 (Türkiye Devrimci Đşçi Sendikalari Konfederasyonu – DĐSK), which pursued 
a more political, independent and socialist line of action in its operations (Blind 2007). 
In 1970 the more radical leftist groups decided that agitation in itself was not enough, 
and a more systematic campaign of terrorism was required to destabilise the country 
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 Also translated as the “Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey”  
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(Zürcher 2005). A wave of bombings, bank robberies and kidnappings ensued. 
Nationalist groups on the right responded, soon matching the leftist movement in 
levels of violence. University campuses were brought to a standstill and factories shut 
due to strikes. By 1971, the military establishment, convinced that the government was 
not able to contain the increasing violence, issued a military memorandum and on 
March 12th the AP-led government resigned. The 1960s in Turkey thus witnessed how 
civil society entered the political arena with a bang. By the early 1970s, the military 
had intervened and forced civil society to retreat back into the trenches. From here on, 
the military and secularist elite regarded freely organised civil society as a potential 
threat to Turkey’s political stability. 
Between 1971 and 1980, there were two elections and ten different 
governments in Turkey. Three quarters of voters supported one of the two main 
parties, the CHP led by Bülent Ecevit, and the AP led by Süleyman Demirel. Yet, it 
was the two right-wing fringe parties, Necmettin Erbakan’s National Salvation Party 
(Milli Selamet Partisi – MSP) that supported fundamentalist Islamic principles and 
Arpaslan Türkeş’ ultranational and pro-fascist Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi – MHP) that held the balance of power in the rickety coalition 
governments (Gunther 1989). To consolidate their positions, the MHP launched the 
Nationalist Labour Union’s Confederation (Milliyetçi Đşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu 
– MĐSK) in 1970, to be followed in 1976 by the MSP launching its own labour 
federation, the Confederation of Turkish Just Workers’ Union (Hak Đşçi Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu – HAK-ĐŞ). These unstable times witnessed a return to political 
violence, which escalated in the late 1970s. The youth movements at the extreme ends 
of the Left-Right continuum had no problem in recruiting new members among the 
discontented youth that were unemployed or unable to enter university due to lack of 
places. In January 1980, members of the DĐSK clashed with military troops in Izmir, 
sending a ripple effect through the city, sparking several new clashes as students joined 
in on the fight (Gunther 1989). The events culminated in the assassination of a former 
Prime Minister Nihat Erim by leftist terrorist groups, to which their right-wing 
counterparts responded by murdering Kemal Türkler, the former President of the 
DĐSK. Eventually the army responded by carrying out a coup d’état on September 12th, 
1980. By this time society was saturated by such tense political activity between the 
far left and far right forces that twenty people were killed each day due to political 




4.2 Year 1980 as watershed: multi-tiered civil society 
In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, an increasing plurality of voices began 
gradually to find space within civil society. In an answer to the political tensions that 
had gripped Turkey, there was a conscious shift in focus from defending the Kemalist 
project from religious and ethnic divergence to actively depoliticising society. 
Politically motivated civil society activity was believed to have contributed to the civil 
violence that preceded the coup, and action was taken to prevent the politicisation of 
associations and unions in the future (Dodd 1992 p. 23). For example, the DĐSK, the 
MĐSK and the HAK-ĐŞ had their bank accounts frozen and were each assigned military 
appointed administrators (Blind 2007). 
 In its efforts to re-align the political spectrum in a way that would destabilise 
the left-right divisions, the military junta found a useful ally in moderate Sunni Islam. 
The purpose of the alliance was to quell the Marxist and Fascist movements, and begin 
to stabilise social relations. This policy was framed as the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”, 
aiming to utilise Islam in the struggle against Kurdish nationalists and leftists in 
particular. To this end, the significance of Islamic values was emphasised within the 
official government discourse (Kadioğlu 1996). A policy of active support was realised 
by encouraging the establishment of Imam Hatip Schools (Kubicek 1999). These were 
vocational schools with an emphasis on religious education, and led to the 
establishment of several civil society associations for the purposes of their 
management (Grigoriadis 2009 p. 50). By this point the Islamic movement also 
benefited from the efforts of a well educated and adaptable leadership, which was able 
to negotiate a rhetorical path between traditional values and modernism, and thus make 
the most of this new-found political legitimacy (Yavuz 2003; Kubicek 1999). 
Religious intellectuals were thus able to offer an increasingly persuasive synthesis of 
tradition and modernism and were able to launch a more politicised campaign in its 
support. The emergence of political Islam as a key force in Turkish politics has been 
perhaps the most significant long-term outcome of the 1980 coup.27 
 Global market forces and the logic of liberal market economics entered Turkey 
in the 1980s, punching holes in the insular and protective economic policies that had 
dominated until then. Both the 1960 and 1980 coups were preceded by financial crisis 
                                                 
27
 This Islamic dimension will be reviewed in more detail in section 4.4 of this chapter. 
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initiated by populist cycles in government spending and in both scenarios the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was the key player supporting the post-crisis 
economic recovery (Keyman and Öniş 2007). In 1980 Turkey began the 
implementation of a series of long-term structural neo-liberal reforms. Trade 
liberalisation, privatisation and a growth in exports were three of the key drivers 
behind the market-based reforms (Öniş and Şenses 2007 p. 15) and by the mid-1980s 
Turkey had received five consecutive structural adjustment loans from the World Bank 
(WB) and become the number one recipient of structural funds from the IMF. Turkey 
was even regarded as a particularly successful example of a country that had adopted a 
structural adjustment programme (Keyman and Öniş 2007 p. 107; Mosley et al. 1991 
p. 9). Economic liberalisation was another factor that contributed towards a more open 
political system where the claims made by the Kemalist elite to represent a universal 
ideology for the whole of Turkey was becoming increasingly unconvincing: 
 
The political climate that prevailed in the 1980s and the early 1990s has 
opened the Kemalist Pandora’s box out of which have emerged multiple 
identities making references to the different sets of Islam and the Kurds 
(Kadioğlu 1996 p. 192). 
 
These linkages between economic development, political pluralism and growth of civil 
society in Turkey echo the ideas first developed by the theorists reviewed in Chapter 
Two – Ferguson, Hegel and de Tocqueville – who saw civil society as growing out of 
commercial and industrial development. 
 
The “autonomisation” and “essentialisation” of civil society 
Hence the transition witnessed in the 1980s was one from “confrontation to tolerance” 
(Göle 1994 p. 213). Through the relative autonomisation of economic activities, 
political groups and cultural identities, an autonomous civil society began to develop, 
shifting the focus increasingly from state to society. Instead of questioning or 
supporting the legitimacy of the ruling regime, the debate focused on particular 
policies. One component of this change was the rise of a new kind of “technocratic 
elite” among Islamic intellectuals whose rhetoric synthesised Islamic values with the 
values of the modern Turkish state. In addition women, gay activists and 
environmentalists were successful in carving out new spaces for themselves within 
civil society and making louder demands on the government. What followed was not a 
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depoliticisation, argues Göle, but “politics of different style” where people of differing 
political opinions would frequent the same coffeehouses and engage in debate that no 
longer ended in stalemate (1994 p. 219-20). 
 However, despite an increasingly autonomised civil society, other elements of 
civil societal activity have not seen a matching change. Fuat Keyman, for example, 
does not think that the nature of the debate changed. Like Göle, Keyman agrees that 
there are now an increasing number of voices able to stake their claim through civil 
society, challenging the cultural homogeneity of the past. Yet, he asserts that the 
debate is still conducted in a binary-seeking, essentialist spirit (Keyman 2000). The 
emergent particular discourses should all constitute part of an array of discourses 
coexisting in a pluralist civil society. Instead, the Islamist discourse, for example, tends 
towards the formation of a new singularity, a new “totalizing discourse” that aims to 
replace the universal discourse of the Kemalists with another (Keyman 1995 p. 71). 
Consequently, civil society has emerged as the new battle ground where the debate has 
retained its essentialist nature, the Kemalist and Islamic groups leading the charge. 
 What can we learn from comparing these two points of view? Göle, wearing 
her sociologist’s hat, focuses on the detail – on the behaviour and agency of the 
individual. Keyman, a political scientist, focuses on the broader, structural terrain and 
outlines what he deems to be the salient points in the story for civil society. It is 
plausible to argue that Turkey in the post-1980 period has witnessed both trajectories 
of development. Civil society has been both autonomised and essentialised. From the 
point of view of a liberal democratic political discourse, commented on in Chapters 
Two and Three, and on which EU policies as a donor institution are largely based, this 
simultaneous autonomisation and essentialisation generates both opportunities and 
shortcomings. On the one hand, civil society has become an increasingly pluralist 
force, where various minority interests and issues are represented. Such voices – 
whether Islamic, gay or environmental – have gained legitimacy as autonomous actors 
who are listened to and for whom it may be possible to influence government policy 
(Kadioğlu 1996). These kinds of developments offer opportunities, in particular for the 
potential success of EU civil society policy in Turkey. On the other hand, despite the 
increasing number of voices within civil society, it is not certain that these new actors 
will behave in a democracy-enhancing way. The new autonomous voices in civil 
society phrase issues in essentialist language, where demands are made in an 
uncompromising style. Thus for example a women’s group, which focuses on gender 
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issues in their work, will also define their position along the secular-Islamic axes, 
although the issues themselves would not require this. To view this in Gramscian 
terms, the essentialist debate mirrors the struggles between hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic ideas, and supports the view that civil society in Turkey is best 
conceptualised as a battlefield where contested ideas are tested out. 
The story of Turkey’s post-1980s pluralist civil society has two trends, and it is 
important to keep a focus on both: the autonomisation of civil society, as well as the 
essentialisation of civil society rhetoric. This should not be surprising, given that civil 
society has so far had a relatively short time to develop in Turkey. What is more, civil 
society is required to operate within an environment with a weak traditions of 
philanthropy and giving (this domestic landscape of giving is elaborated on in Chapter 
Six). Doing so will help to keep an eye on both the opportunities and shortcomings, to 
understand the political struggles that are played out in civil society, and therefore 
recognise the potential limits of the EU accession process from the point of view of 
civil society. 
 
4.3 The EU pre-accession phase 
Europeanisation remains an important concept in explaining social change in Turkey 
over the past two decades. The effect of Europeanisation has been to change the 
context in which state-society relations are being negotiated in Turkey because such 
external criteria limit the ability of national political actors to maintain their hegemonic 
positions (Keyman and Icduygu 2003). These outside forces have, for example, had a 
significant role in breaking up a previously homogenised culture, contributing in turn 
to the emergence of local identities (Kadioğlu 1996). Since Turkey’s membership in 
the Council of Europe in 1949, and later when Turkey’s ambitions to accede to the EU 
sprang out of the starting blocks, Turkish policy has been notably influenced by the 
recommendations made by the EU (Karaosmanoğlu 1994). EU civil society policy in 
Turkey, which was outlined in some detail in Chapter Three, can be regarded as an 
extension of these broader aims that seek to change the state-centred nature of Turkish 
politics and policymaking. 
 Although the Turkish case may not qualify for the classical definition of 
Europeanisation as member countries adapting to various rules and norms of the 
European Union, the criteria Turkey faces as a candidate country leads to virtually 
identical challenges. The processes of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria and 
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attempting to harmonise the various chapters in the pre-accession negotiations equate 
with the policy Europeanisation and political Europeanisation as described by Thomas 
Diez and colleagues (Diez et al. 2005). Policy Europeanisation, in a nutshell, amounts 
to the changes that are taking place as a result of Turkey’s gradual adoption of the EU 
policy framework (the EU acquis). This consists of the one-way imposition of 
particular policies and political structures – spreading the European norms on policy 
design. Political Europeanisation refers to the integration of executive and 
administrative structures, how to improve the efficiency and decision-making in 
policy, as per European standards, and ensuring that the policy reforms are 
successfully implemented. This view of Europeanisation therefore resonates more with 
rational choice institutionalism and historical institutionalism, which both emphasise 
the role and impact of European institutions in determining how domestic processes of 
Europeanisation unfold. Potentially, these processes alter the domestic political and 
societal context of Turkey in important ways. From a civil society point of view, the 
adoption of European norms opens up new fields of activities, which either take place 
in the expanded societal space that is made available to them, or makes use of the new 
policy language that has been introduced. The reform process offers new opportunities 
for civil society to wield influence. 
However, NGOs are also an object of Europeanisation themselves. They are 
expected not only to benefit from a Europeanised social and political setup that is more 
conducive to civil societal activity, but also to internalise the European norms within 
their own behaviour and as such, be themselves Europeanised. Often those 
commenting on EU impact on civil society focus on the structural and political 
improvements that contribute to an environment where NGOs are more able to act. In 
addition, this thesis also asks how processes of Europeanisation affect NGOs directly, 
how organisations respond to these processes, and in doing so reflects the sociological 
institutionalist approach to Europeanisation. 
 
Reform, civil society and Europeanisation 
The reform process in relation to EU accession, therefore, raises interesting questions 
about the role of civil society. Are NGOs merely following in the slipstream of an 
accession process directed by the EU, and taking advantage of the opportunities 
brought about by consequences of democratic reform? Or is the role of NGOs integral 
to seeing through the democratic reform process successfully? It is clear that much of 
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Turkey’s reform process has been motivated by the EU, evident from the wave of 
policy reforms that began in the aftermath of the 1999 candidacy status: between 2001 
and 2004, in a mere two and a half years, no less than nine constitutional reform 
packages were passed through parliament (Müftüler-Baç 2005). Primarily, 
Europeanisation has appeared in the form of pressures emanating from a potential EU 
membership upon the administrative institutions at the centre of government. This is 
not surprising: when Turkey became a candidate country the next logical step was to 
undertake wide-ranging political reforms in order to begin accession negotiations. In 
this sense, Europeanisation has thus far been interpreted largely as democratisation, 
and the EU incentive has been tremendously successful. This equates, more or less, to 
the policy and political Europeanisation referred to by Diez and colleagues above. The 
debate, however, has been relatively limited to the field of high politics where civil 
society has played less of a role. The next challenge, Müftüler-Baç notes, is to ensure 
that the political reforms are actually adopted and implemented (Müftüler-Baç 2005). 
In essence, what she is referring to is societal Europeanisation, internalisation of the 
policy and political Europeanisation that has so far taken place. It may be, therefore, 
that from the point of view of civil society actors, the real work is only about to begin. 
 Some observers give more weight to the role of civil society in the accession 
process. Paul Kubicek, for example, describes the combined efforts of the EU and 
Turkish civil society as a pincer that pushed forward the reform agenda, illustrating 
how civil society organisations have played an instrumental role in taking forward the 
political reform process within the domestic realm (Kubicek 2005). Nathalie Tocci in 
turn asks the question whether the accession process has been the trigger for reform, or 
whether domestic actors have merely used the EU as an external anchor upon which to 
hinge their efforts. What happens is in the end dependent on the role of domestic 
actors, emphasising the importance of endogenous processes in supporting 
democratisation and modernisation in Turkey (Tocci 2005). Turkish NGO activists 
themselves have highlighted the ability of the EU to introduce additional points onto 
the agenda28 and the impact the EU has had in terms of creating space for new issues.29 
NGOs and other civil society actors make good use of the new opportunities presented 
to them as the EU accession process continues. 
                                                 
28
 Interview with a member of a women’s NGO, Istanbul, 16 August 2007. [C6] 
29
 Interview with a member of a women’s NGO, Diyarbakir, 01 July 2008. [C11] 
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 The nature of Europeanisation in the context of accession-related reform 
therefore says something interesting about the role of civil society in the pre-accession 
process. Civil society can function as a pincer, for example, influencing the processes 
and content of political and policy Europeanisation. In other words, societal 
Europeanisation has already taken place at least in some level, as civil society actors 
are advocating for further Europeanising changes. The second issue to consider is how 
to get from policy- and political Europeanisation to societal Europeanisation. Here 
NGOs could be involved in carrying the process of Europeanisation from merely 
changing laws to being internalised by society at large. In equal measure NGOs may 
actively resist these processes and argue against further harmonisation along the 
European lines. Both sides of the debate are reflected in the domestic political arena. 
 What motivates domestic decision-makers such as politicians to engage in 
Europeanisation processes? As Kubicek asks, is the reform predicated on it being 
appropriate (it is the right thing to do), or leading to the right consequences (it has to 
be done for EU membership)? He leans towards the latter, since the costs of 
compliance would otherwise be too high: too much ground would be yielded to 
minority groups without political gains (Kubicek 2005). Such issues are underlined by 
the fact that the short-term costs of reform look relatively high when weighed against 
the long-term gains of membership, especially when one considers the uncertainty over 
the eventual outcome of the accession negotiations (Tocci 2005). The commitment to 
the reforms is then, perhaps, somewhat erratic.  
These difficult assessments have been confounded by the election results since 
2002, and the reshuffling of political positions that has followed. It was in 2002 that 
the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP), the political 
party with an Islamic genealogy came to power. This has added an interesting dynamic 
to the whole process. Politics in the AKP era present a paradox: the political party 
representing the conservative and Islamic interests in society, with a tradition of 
opposing Europeanisation, has become its strongest supporter. At the same time, the 
Kemalist elite, the former moderniser, has withdrawn their unreserved support for the 
European project. A long-term transition in the Islamic rhetoric has enabled the AKP 
to be able to adopt this position. Today, it is very adept at synthesising economic and 
political pragmatism with more traditional concerns for social justice and traditional 
values. By claiming initiative on the EU agenda, the AKP has been able to anchor 
itself in the heartland of political centre-left, and gain votes from the liberal elite of 
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Turkey as well as from the new middle classes that have benefited from the export-
oriented policies of the AKP (Wiltse 2008; Pamuk 2008). The European anchor has 
encouraged the AKP to pursue moderate political and economic policies. In the 
Kemalist circles these efforts by the AKP are claimed to amount to nothing more than 
a sleight of hand, where the democratisation efforts pursued via the EU are seen to 
have been motivated by the AKP desire to weaken the secular state and military in 
Turkey. The ultimate aim of AKP politics, the Kemalists argue, is to introduce a social 
order which is compatible with Islamic traditions (for some Kemalists this means the 
introduction of Sharia law). In its political calculus, the AKP deems the EU to be a 
lesser opponent than the secular establishment in Turkey, leading many secularists to 
remain sceptical of the zeal behind the AKP efforts at democratisation. On another 
front, in an effort to garner populist votes, many Kemalist politicians have tapped into 
the nationalist backlash against the EU that has swept across Turkey in recent years. 
They have adopted a more critical stance on the EU, accusing it of making 
unreasonable demands and being disingenuous in its efforts to include Turkey. These 
changes in the political discourse at the top have meant that the notion of who in 
Turkey is being Europeanised has shifted, together with the notion of who defines or 
stakes a claim on what Europeanisation means and where it will lead Turkey 
(Müftüler-Baç 2005). The EU accession process is thus intricately entangled in 
Turkey’s domestic politics. 
Europeanisation has certainly pushed for change both in terms of policy and 
politics, which in turn has led to a deeper commitment to the realisation of democratic 
reforms. It has helped CSOs by pushing forward a favourable agenda, for the reforms 
have meant that civil society has more space to make its case, as well as providing an 
external anchor around which domestic actors have been able to hook their demands 
for change. On the flip side, the exposure to external policy influences has raised 
suspicions in line with the Sèvres syndrome. Those who have seen their stakes reduced 
as a result of the Europeanisation process are likely to be less supportive, and there are 
of course those CSOs and NGOs that would echo such sentiments.  
 
4.4 Shades of civil society in Turkey 
This section aims to trace the civil societal developments since 1980 in more detail, 
exploring different perspectives. The first two parts consider the role of Islam and 
secularism in shaping civil society, and the third explores the nature of the women’s 
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movement in more detail. The final part offers examples from relations between 
Turkey’s political culture and civil society in order to illustrate further how politics 
affects civil societal development in Turkey. 
 Throughout this chapter, as well as the rest of the thesis, it is useful to keep in 
my mind that active civil society – in the sense that the EU perceives civil society – is 
a relatively new development. As the above sections have shown, it has only been in 
the last 20 years that NGOs have begun to operate in larger numbers. Society is 
gradually getting used to the existence of these organisations, but they are still 
regarded with suspicion among governmental institutions (see Chapter Five), and the 
tradition of giving has not evolved in tandem with the growth in civil societal activism. 
 
Islam and civil society 
From the early years of the Republic until the early 1980s, Islam was deliberately 
confined to the outskirts of the state. The Islamist vision of a single Islamic community 
that would transcend nation states was promptly challenged by the vigour of Turkish 
nationalism. Islam was presented with a role as the common denominator for the 
Turkish nation, rather than the Muslim Umma (Kadioğlu 1996). In response to this, 
political Islam shifted from state to society, where it emerged as a radical political 
ideology that raised its head during the times of political upheaval in the 1960s and 
late 1970s. Until the1980s, the principal aim of political Islam was to resist the 
modernisation efforts of the secular elite, recapture the state and to re-introduce 
Islamic rule in Turkey (Yilmaz 2007). Religiously motivated civil society groups had 
very little room to manoeuvre between the radicalised Islamic political agenda and the 
secular state determined to restrain the Islamic political groups. 
 In the post-1980 era however, the Islamic political agents in Turkey have 
changed their position. Their identity has shifted to become more accepting of 
modernity, rephrasing modernity in Islamic terms that offers a credible challenge to 
the Kemalist interpretation. The political element of Islam is no longer categorically 
radicalised. The new discourse has been able to challenge the hegemony of the secular 
nation state whilst embracing the legal framework of the democratic and pluralistic 
parameters. This does not mean that the entire Islamic movement has shifted towards a 
new direction, but rather that it has become more fragmented, pulling in various 
directions (Yavuz 2003). This variety reflects increasing opportunities and space for 
Islamic civil society activity, and has paved the way for a variety of women’s group to 
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emerge, for example. Both Yilmaz and Yavuz observe that the key challenge going 
forward is to find ways to expand the public sphere that make it possible to integrate 
the modern Muslim identities within it. Doing so is likely to reduce the social 
polarisation that currently exists, and to reduce political upheaval. Civil society 
organisations are potentially a key player in any such reconciliation efforts. 
 The Fethullah Gülen movement is probably the most interesting example of 
modern Islamic thinking in Turkey. Their approach to Islam has been heavily 
influenced by the Nurcu movement, referring to those following the writings of Said 
Nursi (1877-1961). A prominent religious authority, Nursi’s writings gained 
widespread popularity through Turkish society in the 1950s, despite best efforts by the 
state to prevent this (Aras and Caha 2000). A key premise behind the Nurcu and 
Fethullah Gülen movement is the belief that religion and science are not irreconcilable, 
but rather the rationality of science and spirituality of religion compliment each other 
(Yavuz 1999). Neither is it necessary, nor helpful to speak of a clash between East and 
West, these modern Islamic scholars assert (Aras and Caha 2000). Democracy and 
Islam are not contradictory. This happy marriage between tradition and modernity 
resonates strongly with the views advocated by the forefather of Turkish nationalist, 
Ziya Gökalp. In doing so the movement is publicly subordinating itself to the dominant 
discourse on Turkishness that is based on nationalism and secularism, to the extent that 
it upholds the primacy of the nation state over individual rights. On this point of 
nationalist undertones the Gülen movement diverts from the mainstream Nurcu 
movement. However, by embracing a general discourse based of human rights and 
democracy, the Gülen movement has also been able to question the exclusivity of the 
Kemalist worldview in terms that cannot be ignored. Fethullah Gülen has been 
spearheading a movement that encourages Muslims to become more involved in the 
social political life of Turkey without compromising their Islamic identity in order to 
do so. This is possible, they argue, as long as a dialogue exists between Muslim and 
secular elements of society. The Gülen movement is a prime example of how 
religiously motivated associational activity has become increasingly commonplace in 
Turkey, and poses a difficult hurdle for those who see increased Islamicisation of 
society as a problem. 
 The hybridity of Islamist CSOs between traditional and modern identities is a 
theme that has been observed elsewhere as well. In a study of modern Islamic civil 
society groups, Jenny White describes the characteristics of the local associations in 
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Ümraniye, a relatively poor and conservative district of Istanbul (White 1996). One 
association in Ümraniye that White refers to has been organised around religion, but 
this is not its raison d’être. The members of the association describe it as a “People’s 
School” (Halk Okulu), staffed by amateur volunteer teachers who provide training for 
both secular and religious women. The association also represents the needs of the 
community to the municipal government. The association, argues White, fits neither 
the Western model of an NGO (a human rights, or a women’s rights group, for 
example), nor is it purely an Islamic community-based organisation. This encourages 
rethinking of our categories when classifying civil society organisations into the boxes 
of modern and traditional. 
 A recent research project that reviewed the agendas and views of three Islamic 
human rights NGOs in Turkey suggests a range of approaches as to how religious and 
modern concerns might be reconciled. Two of the organisations, AK-DER and 
ÖZGÜR-DER, were formed primarily as single-issue organisations in response to the 
ban on wearing headscarves at universities in 1997. Both of these organisations have 
consciously avoided any engagement with the political debates and with political 
parties (Kadioğlu 2005). Although refusal to engage with the democratic political 
mechanisms may lead one to question the democratic commitment of the NGOs, 
Kadioğlu argues that this is more a reflection on the inadequacies of the political 
system. MAZLUM-DER, on the other hand, a Muslim human rights organisation with 
a broader range of issues under its mandate, is much more open to diverse views on the 
issue of the headscarf ban, and willing to engage in a discussion with political forces 
on the matter. There is evidence of pragmatism here that was absent in the case of the 
first two NGOs.  
A modern Islamic element to Turkish civil society has been evolving, which is 
synthesising together the dichotomies of a modern, progressive, democracy-yearning 
movement and a conservative, traditional movement with an authoritative agenda. 
However, one cannot speak of a unified movement. The Islamic civil society in Turkey 
consists on the one hand of organisations styled on the Western model of NGOs, as 
outlined by Kadioğlu’s study. The organisations vary in their reactions to the challenge 
posed by the existing political system. On the other hand, local municipal 
organisations are able to marry both old and new in their operations, providing services 
with a communitarian spirit but with an open mind that broadens the associations 
beyond any particular religious boundary. These ideas correspond with the notion of 
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Muslim civil society as society with ethics put forward in Chapter Two, dealing with 
concepts such as social solidarity. In other words, whilst there is clearly some common 
ground between Western ideas about civil society and how civil society manifests 
itself in the Muslim context, these commonalities are better understood along 
communitarian lines than liberal democratic lines. Existing ideas about liberal 
democracy and the nature of civil society prevalent in EU civil society policy are 
limited in their ability to make sense of the various ways in which Turkish NGOs 
operate. 
 
Secularism and civil society 
In the post-1980 environment, the state rhetoric of Kemalism found itself increasingly 
questioned and under pressure to adapt. The emergence of a variety of new voices 
within civil society exposed Kemalism as a clunky way to look at the world, 
particularly since the post-Cold War world no longer valued authoritarian solutions. 
Thus methods that had worked in 1960, 1971 and 1980 in the form of coups d’état 
were likely to have much more significant negative consequences after 1980. In this 
context, CSOs became an important vehicle for adapting Kemalism to manage the new 
balance of power in the 1990s and 2000s. 
 To illustrate the change, we can look at an example of a rhetorical shift in 
regard to civil society, where traditional Kemalist position has lost ground. As has 
already been alluded to, Turkish nationalism and Kemalism have been deemed crucial 
in explaining what kind of behaviour is to be regarded as civil, and thus acceptable 
within the realm of CSOs (Seufert 2000). Turkish nationalism and Kemalism 
constituted the common denominator to which appropriate civil society activism 
should adhere to. It was aimed to legitimate certain type of behaviour within civil 
society that coincided with the cultural and civilizational (in terms of Westernisation 
and modernisation) aims of the Kemalist state elite. Whilst during the unstable 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s this may have been justifiable, it was less so in the post-1980 context. 
 In the mid-1980s Turkey’s Prime Minister Turgut Özal criticised these 
civilizational aims because they did not amount to a “civilianizational” aim (Evin 
1994). This is an important terminological distinction in Turkish, for the word “civil” 
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(sivil) indicates that something is non-military.30 In other words, when Özal was 
suggesting that Turkish policy must pursue convergence between being civilised and 
being civilian, he meant that Turkish policymaking should no longer tiptoe around the 
military and prioritise society instead. At the time policy failed on this account because 
the military elite continued to judge civilian behaviour not on its own merits, but on 
the basis of how it reflects a Kemalist reading of acceptable behaviour. The statement 
was a direct challenge to the political role played by the military, also questioning the 
legitimacy of the authoritarian, or militaristic, aspects of the Kemalist position. Was 
the state justified in its top-down imposition of the Kemalist worldview? As the 
authoritarian version of Kemalism was losing its legitimacy, particularly in the face of 
an increasingly pluralist civil society, the Kemalist movement also began to shift in the 
direction of civil societal space. 
 The emergence of Kemalist NGOs can therefore be seen as a move to 
rearticulate the Kemalist rhetoric in a more civilian version of itself. It can be regarded 
as a response to a perceived threat, where NGOs are appropriating the civil societal 
space to pursue long-term goals with negative outcomes for the Turkish republic, 
Islamic NGOs being a case in point (Erdoğan 2000). The Kemalist civil society 
movement has thus sought to reinstate the hegemony of Kemalism and to create 
popular support for the ideas of nationalism and secularism that hold it up. The 
authoritarianism of the past needs to be remoulded into a persuasive argument. The 
role of the Kemalist NGO has become one of parroting the behaviour of the 
authoritarian Kemalist state, perceiving of themselves as the civil society responsible 
for protecting the ideology of the state (Erdoğan 2000).  
 The events surrounding the “post-modern coup” of 1997 help to illustrate the 
relationship between Kemalist civil society and the state in more detail. Coined the “28 
February process”, the coup originated in the unprecedented electoral success of the 
Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi - RP) in the December 1996 election. During the 
subsequent tug-of-war between the new government on one side and the secular state 
elite and military on the other, the RP was ousted from power. In early 1997, on 
February 28th, the National Security Council (NSC) issued a statement making a series 
of recommendations for government policy. These included turnarounds on aspects of 
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 For a discussion of how this distinction between “civil” and “non-military” affects Turkish definitions 
of “civil society” (sivil toplum), see Seckinelgin (2004). 
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religious policy that had been advocated since the early 1980s, as the NSC called for 
restrictions in religious activism and curbs on educational establishments run by 
religious entities (such as Imam Hatip schools). The government refused to act upon 
these recommendations and was eventually forced to resign, and in January 1998 the 
RP was shut down and its operations deemed illegal (Karaman and Aras 2000). From 
May 1997 onwards trade unions, professional groups and women’s groups – for 
example – joined in what became coined as the battle to save secularism and 
democracy as well as to protect the Turkish nation with its Atatürkian heritage (Seufert 
2000). Two leading Kemalist NGOs, the Association for Kemalist Thought (Atatürkçü 
Düşünce Derneği – ADD) and the Association for the Support of Modern Life, 
(Çağdaş Yaşam Destekleme Derneği – ÇYDD), conducted joint press conferences in 
favour of overthrowing the RP government. Together with a number of Labour Unions 
they joined the “Union of Non-Governmental Organisations” (Sivil Toplum 
Kuruluşlarι Birliği), signing a join declaration against the “anti-democratic and anti-
laïc acts” of the government (Erdoğan 2000 p. 256). What is more, the members of the 
NSC actively solicited this support from civil society, arranging meetings with the 
heads of the Kemalist NGOs. These organisations then took part in the public 
discussion in the media and took to the streets in protest, all in order to legitimise the 
anti-government position established by the NSC. This example is a pertinent 
illustration of how civil society participation in political debates unfolds along 
Gramscian lines. 
 Kemalist civil society remains active in this role. Almost exactly ten years 
later, on Sunday May 13th, 2007, a mass demonstration was arranged in Izmir, 
attracting a staggering 1.5 million people. This was the third demonstration of its kind 
in six weeks, with similar events having been arranged in Ankara and Istanbul 
previously. The purpose of the organisers was to demonstrate against the nomination 
of Abdullah Gül as AKP’s presidential candidate. As the presidential election was 
conducted by the parliament, and the AKP enjoyed an overall majority in parliament, 
the parliamentary vote to confirm Gül’s nomination was expected to be a mere 
formality. Critically, his wife wore a headscarf, which to many seemed incongruous 
with what the presidency represented in Turkey: its incumbent had, since Atatürk 
himself, been a bastion of Turkish secularism. Yet in fact, the demonstrators were 
mobilised for a variety of reasons apart from secular concerns: unemployment, 
economic hardship, or dissatisfaction with government in particular areas such as 
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gender or the rights of sexual minorities. Even devout Muslims joined in the 
demonstrations.31 Despite the heterogeneous and ambiguous cast, the public rhetoric 
that emerged from the demonstrations was crystal clear. An opinion piece from the 
Turkish Daily News (TDN) newspaper cuts to the heart of the public debate: 
 
Turkish nation […] will not give up pursuing the principles of Atatürk. 
Turkey is a whole and unity is its fundamental characteristic […] the 
nation demands to claim secularism and democracy (Kilercioğlu 2007).  
 
In other words, this rhetoric perceived that the actions of the demonstrators were 
protecting all three of the following: secularism, the whole of the nation, and the unity 
of the nation. However, as Levent Köker opined at the time, the argument behind the 
demonstrations was somewhat paradoxical. The claim was to protect the unity and 
wholeness of Turkey, but this was defined in a particular, narrow way. The unity was 
in being protected from a section of Turkey’s citizenry. The only way not to see this as 
paradoxical was to redefine citizenship to include only the like-minded (secular) 
individuals and exclude others (Köker 2007). 
 Finally, in 2008, the Turkish political circle was gripped by the events in the 
Ergenekon trials. Although at the time of writing the trials are still ongoing, the 
allegations point to a clandestine ultra-nationalist organisation called Ergenekon that 
reportedly planned to bring down the government and to assassinate prominent 
intellectuals. The alleged plans were part of an effort to preserve Turkish nationalism 
and laicism. The investigations have unearthed plans by Ergenekon to create civil 
society organisation with the aim of moulding public opinion (Zaman 2008a). Searches 
of the homes of retired army generals found a report containing detailed minutes from 
meetings where CSOs participated, wittingly or unwittingly collaborating in their 
plans. Subsequently, two former university rectors and one current rector were 
detained. Two organisations were also implicated as the chairwoman of ÇYDD and the 
deputy chairman of ADD were briefly detained (Zaman 2008b). Although the details 
remain murky, the Ergenekon case seems to crystallise some of the arguments made 
here in their extreme form, by exhibiting a movement struggling to protect the 
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secular/Kemalist legacy of Turkey, and appropriating the civil societal space in an 
effort to achieve this.  
 
Women’s movement 
Throughout the history of the Turkish Republic, women’s issues headlined the project 
of modernising and civilizing Turkey. Women’s formal emancipation was achieved 
early, as part of the legal reforms that followed the establishment of the secular 
republic in 1923. The adoption of a new Civil Code in 1926 made polygamy illegal, 
gave women equal rights to divorce and to the custody of children. In 1930 women 
were given the right to vote in local elections and from 1934 women could vote in 
national elections, as well as hold public offices. These rights were not achieved 
through women’s activism, however, but were granted by an “enlightened governing 
elite committed to the goals of modernization and ‘Westernization’” (Kandiyoti 1987 
p. 320). Whilst for some these developments were inevitable steps to achieving 
democracy and civil society in the Turkish context, others have interpreted women’s 
rights to have played a strategic role in destabilising the ideological roots of the 
Islamic political and ideological system. Women were identified as the group most 
vulnerable to oppression under an Islamic regime and central to the republican struggle 
against the Islamic forces in Turkish society (Tekeli 1981). 
 Thus, the emergent feminist movement of the 1930s was limited to issues in the 
public sphere that coincided with the secular state-building project. Women were 
perceived to have benefited from the reforms introduced by Atatürk in several ways: 
Western clothing for women was encouraged whilst the veiling of women was 
discouraged, and a new civil marriage was introduced banning polygamy. Recalling 
the modernising zeal of the early Republic, women were expected to embrace the new 
freedoms and civilised ways of being, as defined by the Republican elite. The ideal of 
a modern Turkish woman could therefore be summed up as married, unveiled and in 
public service. However, the reforms were purely focused on the public sphere, 
leaving patriarchal family structures of the private realm untouched (Tekeli 1997; 
Ayata and Tütüncü 2008), and leaving women “emancipated but unliberated” 
(Kandiyoti 1987). Only the public element of women’s rights was seen as relevant, and 
the embryonic feminist movement became overlapped with the secular state ideology. 
Gaining full voting rights as early as 1934 may in fact have been counterproductive, as 
this led to claims that gender equality had already been achieved. Feminism was 
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underlined by a strict separation of state and religion as well as an aspiration for a 
modern republic in the image of the West. This form of “state feminism” (White 2003) 
meant that the dominant voice within the movement was focused on the public, secular 
role of women, leaving all other issues facing women in the private sphere outside its 
immediate agenda.  
To offer an example from within the women’s movement, Esim and Cindoğlu 
describe the movement at the end of the 1990s as having diversified into three main 
strands: Kemalist, Islamist and Feminist (1999). The Kemalist organisations are 
identified as the largest group by this study. There is a strong alignment with state 
feminism, whereby women participate in the public sphere in support of the principles 
of Kemalism. The work of these groups is focused on the central level, on working 
with the state. Although conducting some work in the poor neighbourhoods of the 
largest cities on educating women on the nationalist and secular ideas, these groups on 
the whole have very limited grassroots reach. The Islamist women’s groups, on the 
other hand aim much more towards the delivery of services in their activities. These 
often combine religious education with welfare programmes. The work of the groups 
has generally focused on regions where an Islamic party controls the municipal 
government. The services provided are managed through a well-organised grassroots 
apparatus and the programmes sustained are wide-reaching. The services cater mainly 
for the religious communities, and provide support for women within the traditional 
and conservative context of being a wife and a mother within a family structure. 
Finally, the smallest group of women’s organisations are the Feminist organisations. 
These take gender as the core organising principle, making women’s needs and rights 
as the ultimate priority of their work. The central services these organisations provide 
are shelters for victims of domestic violence and child care centres. It is not difficult to 
perceive the women’s movement – with the Kemalist/Islamist fault line cutting 
through its centre – as a microcosm representing the divergent interests that have been 
reconfiguring the fabric of Turkish society since the 1980s. 
Since the late 1990s, when Esim and Cindoğlu conducted their study, the fault 
line between Kemalist and Islamic groups within the women’s movement has become 
more defined. Particularly since the electoral victory of the Islamic-leaning AKP party 
in 2002, the success of moderate political Islam has changed the terms of the debate. In 
the slipstream of the rise of political Islam, the Islamic women’s groups have also 
moved closer to the centre ground, merging feminist and Islamic ideas in their rhetoric. 
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The demands to wear the headscarf in public institutions, such as universities, is now 
framed as an issue of human rights, where liberal intellectuals as well as Islamic 
groups argue that all should have the same right to higher education regardless of their 
religious belief (Yavuz 2003). Such attempts by Islamic groups to claim the middle 
ground in the political debate between religion and secularism have in part led to the 
increased tension that we witness today (such as the demonstrations in 2007 mentioned 
above). 
Some observers of Turkish civil society lament the fragmented and 
heterogeneous nature of civil society, describing the lack of homogeneity as its 
“Achilles heel” (Diez et al. 2005; Kubicek 2005). When compared with the ideal of 
civil society development, as seen through Western eyes, Turkish civil society does 
indeed seem both fragmented and heterogeneous; the entire narrative of the post-1980s 
politics in Turkey tends to crystallise around the issue of particular identities, and the 
Kemalist/Islamist fault line illustrated through the women’s movement is only one 
salient example of this. Homogeneity and unity of civil society did exist in the past, 
but at the expense of minority interests. Civil society used to speak with a unitary 
voice thanks to a hegemonic state that had created a civil society in its own image. 
Under these circumstances, the lack of unity within civil society can be regarded as a 
welcome development in the right direction. Fragmentation and competition between 
the different voices in civil society is inevitable. 
The development of civil society in Turkey echoes many of the ideas expressed 
by Ferguson, Hegel, de Tocqueville and Gramsci. Civil society in Turkey has evolved 
in parallel to commercialisation and capitalist development, where the economic 
liberalisation efforts of the 1980s in particular were reflected in the growth of pluralist 
civil society. Perhaps the most pertinent observations come from Hegel and Gramsci, 
as Hegel described the inherent competition present in civil society and Gramsci 
pointed to the hegemonic versus counter-hegemonic struggles that take place in civil 
society. These characteristics are indeed descriptive of how civil society has played out 
in practice. It is therefore less certain whether the donors’ perception of civil society in 
Tocquevillean terms as a democratic counterweight to the state remains accurate in the 




Political culture and civil society 
Civil society may be eager further to develop its voice and to become a greater player 
in society, and forces within the EU may be keen to see civil society take a greater 
role; but what are the limitations to civil societal development within Turkey? This 
section will attempt to chart aspects of the political and social boundaries for civil 
societal development, for the political culture in Turkey remains antagonistic to civil 
societal development. Through specific examples, this section highlights the important 
role played by a strong state tradition in Turkish politics, and illustrates the kinds of 
issues that the EU civil society policy intends to address. Party structures and their 
policies remain hierarchical and top-down, failing to support a stronger civil society 
(Rubin 2002). The political debate in Turkey tends to gravitate heavily towards issues 
of high politics, such as the overall nature of democracy and secularism, and the role 
of religion in politics, devaluing the more mundane problems of effective practical 
policymaking (Heper 2002). The prominence of ideological debates in politics has led 
to most issues being interpreted in essentialist, either/or terms. Party leaders, in the 
heavily hierarchical party system, become representatives of these differing 
worldviews and the party becomes their personal fiefdom. The arrangement lacks 
intra-party democracy, and the space for constructive debate, leaving many socio-
economic groups outside all public decision-making processes (Heper 2002 p. 145). 
Civil society is notably affected by the political culture that emerges from this system. 
 The events surrounding the 1999 Marmara earthquake serve to illustrate these 
points. The earthquake impacted one of the most industrial regions of Turkey located 
just outside of Istanbul, claiming between 17,000 and 20,000 lives. In the aftermath of 
the earthquake, civil society initially mobilised in an unprecedented way, yet the 
organisations involved were reluctant to sustain such a high-profile role. Although this 
was a natural disaster, the losses could have been significantly reduced with proper 
precautions (World Bank 2001). To compound the public frustrations, the state 
institutions – including the military – were exposed as being utterly unprepared for the 
emergency, taking days rather than hours to respond to the crisis (Jalali 2002). Civil 
society groups were hailed as the heroes of the quake, able to respond immediately and 
provide critical assistance to the victims, particularly during the first 48 hours. During 
the subsequent relief effort, some 40 CSOs coordinated their activities through the 
formation of a Civil Society Earthquake Coordination Committee, constructing and 
managing a city of 2000 tents (Kubicek 2002; Jalali 2002). The contrast between the 
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nature of the responses and the subsequent public support for civil society-based relief 
initiatives carved an unprecedented opportunity for CSOs to stake their claim as an 
important societal voice. However, even more striking was the reluctance of CSOs to 
make any use of this opportunity. Despite the political capital gained by civil society 
activism, the organisations were unable to channel this into gains in the political arena. 
The network of organisations was simply too loose to transform to an effective 
movement. Civil society remained “less a ‘society’ than simply thousands of 
volunteers” (Kubicek 2001 p. 40). Gradually the state took over the humanitarian 
operations related to the earthquake and regained control of the agenda. CSOs 
managing the tent cities were asked to leave, the reluctant ones being persuaded with 
threats to turn off water and electricity supplies (Jalali 2002). From a civil society 
perspective, the events surrounding the aftermath of the earthquake suggest that civil 
society is still lacking the political edge that would enable it to become more than an 
array of activists and organisations each with their own particular agenda. 
Additionally, it would seem that civil society is vulnerable to the effects of political 
point-scoring. 
 In the summer of 2004, a fast train travelling between Istanbul and Ankara 
crashed, causing 39 deaths. The crash was caused by poor infrastructure that failed to 
meet the requirements of the new fast trains, something that industry experts had 
alluded to previously. In contrast, the Minister of Transport Binali Yildirim was 
interviewed only hours before the crash, describing the train as perfectly safe (Turkish 
Daily News 2004). Mr Yildirim’s credentials for the post were heavily questioned, for 
his qualifications did not extend any further than having worked in the Istanbul 
municipal government during Mr Erdoğan’s time as the mayor of Istanbul. When a 
reporter then inquired from the Prime Minister Erdoğan whether the Minister of 
Transport would be asked to resign, his response was: “know your place” (Ganioğlu 
2004). In response to the government’s refusal to admit responsibility, the 
Transportation Worker’s Union (Birleşik Taşιmacιlιk Çalιşanlarι Sendikasi – BTÇS), 
and the Turkish Chamber of Civil Engineers (Đnşaat Mühendisleri Odasι – IMO), 
acted together to indict the transport minister on the grounds of moral responsibility. 
The proactive stance adopted by the two CSOs was soon subsumed by political 
manoeuvring. The opposition party in government, CHP, filed a petition for an 
emergency parliamentary session during summer recess in order to discuss the 
dismissal of Mr Yildirim. With its comfortable parliamentary majority the AKP won 
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the vote and avoided further embarrassment on the issue. Nevertheless, the incident 
offers a useful example of the growing capacity of civil society to scrutinise 
government actions and to demand accountability. 
 The final illustration of state-civil society relations comes from a controversial 
proposal for law reform that played out in 2007. Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code 
has for years been at the epicentre of the freedom of speech debates in Turkey. Prior to 
the changes, the article stated that it was a criminal act to insult Turkishness. Given the 
lack of clarity as to what Turkishness meant in this context, a wide array of cases have 
been made against journalists and critics of the Turkish government under the auspices 
of Article 301. The government was facing increasing pressure from the EU to amend 
or completely scrap Article 301 (Zaman 2007). At the same time, for many others this 
Article forms an essential part of Turkey’s identity, and should at best be amended so 
that it cannot be used as a pretext for unjustifiably imprisoning thorny individuals. This 
case also exemplifies a situation where external pressures to Europeanise collide with 
domestic suspicions fuelled by the Sèvres Syndrome that see the EU agenda as 
wanting to weaken Turkey’s position under the guise of democratising its institutions. 
The government needs to display a commitment to the Copenhagen Criteria and 
democratic reform whilst proving to the nationalist sceptics that it is not about to 
dismantle Turkey’s national integrity. Placed between a rock and a hard place, the 
AKP government opted for a novel solution. It consulted a group of civil society 
organisations for an opinion on the issue. At the end of 2006, 18 professional 
chambers, trade unions and other CSOs got together to discuss possible changes to 
Article 301 (Aktar 2007). Three of the organisations invited to take part withdrew at 
once, as they saw no need to make any changes to the article and another two 
organisations demanded that the article be scrapped altogether. The 13 remaining 
organisations recommended alterations to the article.32 Following several months of 
negotiation, the recommendations led to minor alterations in the legal text. The 
proposal suggested that the word “Turkishness” be clarified as “having a citizenship tie 
to the Republic of Turkey” and the maximum prison sentence was reduced from three 
to two years (Turkish Daily News 2007). 
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Chapter 4 
 123 
 Bringing civil society into the 301 debate was a shrewd political move by the 
AKP government, utilising civil society to its own ends. Its actions responded to EU 
demands on two fronts: taking action on Article 301 and allowing for greater civil 
society involvement in political decision-making processes. In addition, the 
government was also able to keep a clean scorecard vis-à-vis their nationalist critics – 
if the recommendations went too far and the situation became too volatile the 
government could still retract on amending the Article, shift blame on civil society and 
emerge with no significant loss of political capital. Such pragmatism was also reflected 
in the selection of civil society representatives for the committee; business chambers 
and trade unions dominated the list. Their credentials as civil society representatives 
extended, at best, to representing the interests of workers and businesspeople in the 
formal economy. It may have been more appropriate to invite representatives of those 
individuals who have been directly affected by the law – such as journalists’ 
associations and human rights associations. Such action would even have resonated 
strongly with the third sector logic prevalent in Europe, and one of the aspirational 
goals of Turkey’s Europeanisation. It is true that business chambers and trade unions 
serve different interests from the government and cannot therefore be guaranteed to 
deliver a decision that is favourable to the government’s position. However, the 
consultative forum, in terms of its membership and mandate, seems to have been 
constructed in such a way that made it more likely than not for civil society to become 
the means for government to develop policy, as opposed to civil society influencing 
government policy. 
 Hegel regarded the state as the best possible representative of universal 
interests and thus remained the ultimate arbiter of civil societal disputes. The above 
examples show that the situation in Turkey is slightly different. The state is in fact 
intricately involved in shaping and managing civil society, creating a Gramscian 
representation of state-civil society relations that establishes hegemony. It is this kind 
of state tradition that the current EU civil society policy, with emphasis on dialogue, is 
trying to change.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The first part of the chapter referred to the Turkish paradox, namely the simultaneous 
pursuit of civilizational and cultural goals that were at odds with each other. To make 
this synthesis work, politics were conducted in a top-down manner that firmly 
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sidelined diverging points of view. Kemalism framed its project in essentialist either/or 
terms. The synthesis was never able to weld society together, however, yielding a 
compartmentalised society. The differences, particularly across the secular-Islamic 
divide, remain a defining feature of an individual’s identity. This tradition continues to 
cast its shadow upon the way in which voices within civil society present themselves 
in the public sphere. Even though the number of voices has grown exponentially, the 
debate in civil society has retained an either/or mentality. Established structures and 
learnt behaviour will affect the interaction between EU policies and the development 
of civil society. 
 The Sèvres syndrome – the suspicion of Western intentions based on the 
treatment Turkey experienced by the Allies after the First World War – continues as a 
common shorthand, particularly in political punditry, for understanding elements of 
Turkish foreign policy. It also remains a point to consider in the current phase of EU-
motivated domestic changes. To what extent is the EU agenda guiding these 
developments? Or is the success of political and policy Europeanisation in Turkey 
largely dependent on the way in which the EU project is able to navigate the domestic 
political dynamics? The former Europe enthusiast – the secular elite – has begun to 
doubt the propriety of the EU accession project because it has been a key part of the 
strategy of the Islamic AKP government claiming the political centre stage. The more 
nationalist actors have recently begun re-branding pro-Europeans as agents of the West 
trying to harm Turkey’s national integrity. It would seem that EU policies are 
potentially compromised by the domestic political environment, where the meaning of 
Europeanisation began to shift since the AKP came to power in 2002. This chapter has 
offered an account of likely ways in which the domestic political context of Turkey 
may mediate the impact of Europeanisation processes, and indeed, mediate the impact 
of EU funding to NGOs. 
 The three chapters that follow will in turn offer a more detailed account of 
NGO behaviour in Turkey. Whilst the thesis points to a correlation between historical 
and political context of Turkish civil society and the behaviour NGOs exhibit in the 
face of EU funding, this is not meant to argue for the uniqueness of the Turkish case 
vis-à-vis other country cases where the EU has offered similar support under similar 
circumstances. In each instance, EU funding is motivated by an external agenda that 
aims to bring about change, and NGOs attempt to appropriate this agenda in order to 
make it more beneficial to them. Rather, this correlation aims to underline the 
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importance of each individual set of historical, political and social circumstances as 
part of the explanation for NGO behaviour. In each country context, similar behaviour 
is rationalised through different kinds of ideas and discourses that stem from the local 
context. These are the confines within which this thesis puts forward its findings with 
regard to NGO behaviour in Turkey.  
The challenge remains one of ensuring that the Europeanisation processes 
continue. This challenge is particularly acute as regards democratisation, as these 
processes should bring the different groups in Turkish civil society closer together. 
From a civil society point of view, the democratic developments in Turkey since 1980 
have been full of both opportunities and shortcomings. An autonomous and colourful 
civil society has emerged, but the new forms of organisation are still caught up in the 
either/or styled thinking of the past. The heterogeneous and fragmented nature of 
Turkish civil society, as well as its weaknesses as a counterpoint to the state are well 
documented. The historical context offers a way to make sense of the opportunities and 
shortcomings that are found in the current phase of civil society development. Can the 
EU accession process work toward narrowing the gulf that exists between the secular 
and Islamic camps in Turkish society? 
 Recalling momentarily the argument of Chapter Three, which suggested that 
EU policy on civil society is primarily guided by the requirements of the accession 
process, where human rights and civil society dialogue are presented as a neutral 
agenda for civil society support. Funding is in theory available to NGOs of all shapes 
and sizes that underwrite the EU agenda for civil society development. By adhering to 
such broad ultimate goals, the EU can introduce a sense of impartiality and fairness to 
the policy intervention. However, funding is only available to organisations that are 
able to navigate the complex project application procedures. In practice this means that 
the option of funding is readily available only to a section of NGOs: a professional and 
secular NGO with moderate views is clearly the ideal type to fit EU’s liberal 
democratic agenda. The EU’s expectations to fuel democratisation and a vibrant civil 
society through its funding initiatives are problematic, for the impact of the EU is not 
limited to those NGOs that are being funded. As the following three chapters will 
illustrate, even where NGOs are not directly benefiting from funding they are affected 
by EU’s civil society policy. With the limitations in the direct reach of EU funding on 
the one hand, and the unanticipated spill-over effect of EU policy among NGOs not 
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5 Governance of NGO Relationships 
 
This chapter aims to shed light on the nature of the relationships that Turkish advocacy 
NGOs engage in, both with state actors and with other advocacy NGOs. The activities 
of such organisations tend to focus on affecting government policy, making it 
important to analyse the relations that exist between state actors and NGOs. The 
alleged capacity of NGOs to participate at the various stages of the policymaking 
process contributes to the view that NGOs can improve effectiveness of these 
processes. Additionally, the strength in numbers element of NGO advocacy is regarded 
as the enabling factor behind NGO ability to influence governmental decision-making 
processes (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Thus the relationships NGOs build with each 
other are also at the heart of advocacy work. This collaborative element of advocacy 
activity remains an important reason for why a link tends to be drawn between liberal 
democratic practices and civil society activity – why vibrant civil society is seen as a 
precursor to democratisation, and why donors are so enthusiastic about civil society 
funding. These links between issues of effectiveness and processes of democratisation 
resonate with EU policy documents for civil society engagement (discussed in Chapter 
Three). The analysis of NGO relationships will therefore feed back to the assumptions 
about the role of civil society in EU policy, with a view to reflecting on the suitability 
of these in the Turkish context. 
 This chapter is organised in three sections. In the first section the discussion 
focuses on the concept of advocacy, outlining what the term means in the NGO 
context, and what kinds of roles can we see NGOs undertaking. This section will also 
underline the linkages between the advocacy NGOs and a liberal democratic 
understanding of state-civil society relations, and how this resonates strongly with the 
democracy-building agenda of EU civil society funding. The second section explores 
the relationships NGOs build with governmental actors in Turkey. Whilst there has 
been significant progress towards cooperation in recent years thanks to improved 
legislation, NGO-state relations in Turkey tend to serve the purpose of legitimising 
state actions. Furthermore, the fact that these relationships have not been 
institutionalised – there are no formal structures for such collaborative arrangements – 
questions the long-term viability of these relations.  
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Finally, the nature of the relationships between NGOs is explored, with 
particular emphasis on the relationships between women’s NGOs. Although there are 
examples of collaborative projects that have led to successful outcomes, these remain 
anomalous. At the level of daily activities the collaborative spirit is much less evident. 
One explanatory factor in the realm of women’s NGOs is the struggle for hegemony 
between the various secular and Islamic forces in Turkish society, a struggle that is 
being in part acted out in civil society.  
Whilst developments have taken place which indicate that a vibrant, liberal-
spirited civil society may be emerging, we should be wary of drawing conclusions too 
quickly. Visible signs of the positive developments include the legal changes to 
unshackle civil society actors and the examples of successful advocacy coalitions. In 
this regard EU policy, with its emphasis on the liberal components of civil society, 
may be justified. However, there is persuasive evidence to suggest that this is not a 
trend that manifests itself in the everyday relations between NGOs and governmental 
actors, nor in the relations between NGOs. 
 
5.1 Advocacy and NGOs 
Advocacy in the very broadest sense is about achieving change. The word is derived 
from the Latin ad vocare, meaning “to speak to”, arguing for a particular position. It 
refers, in particular, to groups that argue for a particular position, or seek to influence 
government policy (Clark 2010). NGOs in particular, have been associated with the 
concept. The actions surrounding this aspiration can take place in two different 
directions: making a connection with the public (the population at large) or through 
efforts that attempt to directly engage decision-makers (national government, 
municipal government or corporations, for example). The change is achieved through 
persuasion, either by informing others about an issue, or by making explicit demands 
for change (Lewis 2001). Generally, the strategy of informing is employed on both the 
public and the decision-makers whilst the strategy of making demands is more often 
exercised on the decision-makers. 
 The role of NGOs as advocates of change is also closely linked with Turkey’s 
Europeanisation efforts. In this regard NGOs can take part in both policy 
Europeanisation and political Europeanisation. NGOs can facilitate the changes that 
are required to assist the government in achieving required reforms, or NGOs can use 
the knowledge that reforms are required as the means to challenge the government to 
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deliver on the expected changes. In addition, and as is illustrated by the two chapters 
that follow this one, NGOs are an integral part of the societal Europeanisation 
processes, of internalising the reforms and making them meaningful in the Turkish 
context. 
 Conceptual understandings of advocacy tend to focus on the aspect that deals 
with policy and governmental decision-making. David Korten points out that advocacy 
NGOs represent an organisational evolution from addressing the symptoms of social 
ills to a concern in remedying their root causes (Korten 1987). In so doing he separates 
advocacy from the other central NGO activity: service delivery. Similarly, David 
Lewis opines that advocacy leans towards the “articulation of a set of policies, but not 
necessarily the enactment of such policies” (Lewis 2001 p. 124). Perhaps because of 
the policy orientation, the focus for many analysts of advocacy is the relationship 
between NGOs and government. Thus, Adil Najam observers that advocacy NGOs 
“prod the government to do the right thing” (Najam 1999, quoted in Lewis 2001: 123), 
while Jenkins has argued that advocacy compares to “any attempt to influence the 
decisions of any institutional elite on behalf of collective interest” (Jenkins 1987 p. 
267). The equation is not quite so simple, however. How is the “right thing” that 
Najam refers to determined? Is there only one such right, and if multiple rights exist, 
how can NGOs reconcile between them? To answer these questions it is also important 
to extend the investigation to include the nature of the relationships between NGOs 
themselves.  
 There may be a certain logic in focusing on the role of NGOs in affecting 
government policy when discussing advocacy, and it certainly remains relevant to 
exploring the processes of Europeanisation. Advocacy work with the public at large is 
often carried out with a view to gaining sufficient leverage to change government 
policy. Additionally there is the more obvious option of working directly with 
governmental actors towards change. In pursuing such a logic there is a danger of 
overemphasising the importance of upward advocacy – policy reform or legal reform – 
at the expense of downward advocacy that ensures that changes are in fact internalised 
or understood by the public. The EU, in its funding of NGOs, tends to favour activities 




Roles for advocacy NGOs when engaging with the state 
How should we conceptualise the different roles available to NGOs? On the one hand 
these can be categorised on the basis of the nature of the resistance against the state 
that is manifested by NGO action. On the other, the roles can be seen through a more 
pragmatic lens which focuses on the different ways in which NGOs can influence 
government policy. Both considerations are relevant to the case of Turkey, as the 
former concept allows us to analyse the influence of ideology and power politics on 
the behaviour of NGOs, whilst the latter concept pushes for an appreciation of the role 
NGOs have in the policymaking processes. A preference for either of these methods of 
advocacy, it will be argued, will have an impact on the types of relationships that 
NGOs wish to construct.  
The “nature of the resistance” argument for explaining roles of advocacy 
NGOs is elucidated by the work of James Tully. In discussing the nature of 
governance, he argues that any exercise of power by the state opens up a field of 
potential responses by societal forces. These responses outline different ways NGOs 
can bring about change in the state. Tully calls these the “practices of freedom” and 
groups them into three categories. First, the governed can cooperate with the state, and 
thus help to sustain the current forms of conduct. Even such uncritical behaviour, he 
argues, can induce significant changes. Second, it is possible to problematise and 
challenge existing state policies. This can happen through a formal framework such as 
the legal system or through the accepted avenues of protest, demonstrations for 
example. In the third instance the state is not open to any negotiations on the issues a 
group is concerned about. In such a scenario these groups may categorically refuse the 
state exercise of power and engage in a direct, even violent, action against the state 
(Tully 2002). Thus in the NGO-state context, this tripartite model yields three potential 
roles for advocacy NGOs in trying to bring about change: supporting, challenging or 
confronting the state. As far as civil society’s Europeanisation role goes, it falls within 
the first two categories. 
Another angle for understanding the role of advocacy NGOs vis-à-vis the state 
is through NGO influence on policymaking. Najam (1999) sees NGOs as policy 
entrepreneurs able to engage on three different levels of policymaking. First, they can 
aim to influence the setting of the agenda, to have a say in what issues will be taken up 
in policy discussions. At the second stage, NGOs can influence the development of 
policies by having an impact on the choices governments have to make between 
Chapter 5 
 131 
various possible policy approaches. Finally, once a policy approach has been selected, 
NGOs can influence the actual methods that are implemented in realisation of that 
policy. Najam’s policy entrepreneur model assumes that a broad consensus already 
exists between the NGO and the policymakers over the direction of a given policy. The 
role given for NGOs is to nudge, or prod the policy onto an alternative course, but 
never to derail it completely. Any such policy-related work, therefore, falls largely into 
the first category of Tully’s model. All such advocacy takes place in broad support for 
government policy. 
The vision of NGOs as advocates feeds into two salient assumptions about 
what the societal role of NGOs ought to be, both of which resonate with the liberal 
democratic – or donor – perspectives. First comes the assumption that NGOs challenge 
the autonomy of the state and in doing so check state power (Mercer 2002). Such 
understanding is largely informed by NGO experiences in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America, and supports the neo-liberal view of state-NGO relations. Civil society and 
state are placed in an antagonistic relationship, or a zero-sum game for autonomy and 
legitimacy (Trägårdh 2007). Taking its cue from writers such as Robert Putnam, an 
autonomous civil society that is understood to be autonomous of the state is seen as a 
prerequisite of democracy and in this view NGOs are central to processes of 
democratisation. The second assumption is that advocacy NGOs are all inherently 
good. The focus tends to have been on the countervailing force NGOs collectively 
present to the state, without problematising the nature of civil society itself (Howell 
and Pearce 2001b). By being part of civil society, NGOs are all part of the democratic 
process and together form a bulwark against the state. In this way there is a degree of 
assumed homogeneity across NGOs, in that they are all meant to share this 
democratising characteristic (Chandhoke 2007). Instead a more nuanced understanding 
of the political role of NGOs that is less dependent on such generic assumptions is 
required.  
This chapter problematises these assumptions. To what extent can NGOs truly 
challenge the state through their advocacy? Most advocacy work takes place within the 
narrow constraints of established policy trajectories, where the negotiation is over 
nuances in the policy. When NGO advocacy is focused on policy efficacy, any 
outcome is also very likely to help legitimise state policy. This poses a pragmatic 
obstacle to the depth of the democratising impact NGOs can have. Second, NGOs are 
not necessarily any more democratic in nature than the state they constitute a part of. 
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How NGOs position themselves vis-à-vis the government or the state is contingent on 
the ideological and political positioning of a given NGO. Their advocacy activities are 
informed by this ideological agreement or disagreement. The chapter thus calls for a 
more nuanced and complex understanding of the nature of the relationships NGOs 
forge around them, and the impact these relationships have on the democratic – or 
Europeanising value that donor policy perceives Turkish NGOs to hold. 
 
5.2 NGO-state relations 
In the current state of NGO-state relations one can observe both positive developments 
towards greater collaboration between government agencies and NGOs, as well as a 
lack of enthusiasm for greater NGO independence and involvement in the policy 
processes. The current relationship is thus suspended in a transition phase between a 
history of mutual suspicion following the crackdown on civil society activism in the 
early 1980s and the dramatically improved institutional and legal framework that 
emerged in the run-up to the start of the EU pre-accession talks. This section discusses 
three aspects of the relationships that NGOs have fostered with governmental actors. 
The first of these elaborates on the connections that exist at the level of central 
government; the second explores the links with municipal government; and the third 
looks more closely at an EU-funded project on improving relations between NGOs and 
the public sector in order to illustrate the development of NGO-government 
relationships in practice. 
 
Central government and NGOs 
There have been a number of significant changes at the level of central government 
that at least in theory make it possible for NGOs to lobby the government more 
effectively. For one, there have been a number of legal reforms which benefit NGOs. 
In October 2004, the Associations Law was amended, lifting several restrictions that 
had previously curtailed civil society activism. More recently, the Foundations Law 
was substantially amended in February 2008. The key changes brought about by the 




Table 2: Summary of the new Law on Associations (European Commission 2004a; TUSEV 2004) 
Table 3: Summary of the new Law on Foundations (TUSEV 2008) 
 
The impact of these legal changes has been significant. The notion of freedom 
of association is no longer an oxymoron: CSOs are able to freely cooperate with other 
organisations, both local and foreign; they can receive funds from both local and 
foreign organisations without requiring government permission to do so. The two 
campaigns by women’s groups, for example, to lobby for specific changes to the Civil 
and Penal Codes benefited from this changing attitude towards civil societal activity 
(see section 5.3 of this chapter). The consequences of the relaxed legal framework 
reach beyond the technical changes to the law. It amounts to an expression of trust in 
THE NEW LAW ON ASSOCIATIONS (October 2004) 
• Lifting the requirement:  
• to seek permission when opening branches abroad, joining foreign 
bodies and holding meetings with foreigners; 
• to inform local officials of general assembly meetings taking place; 
• to seek permission to receive funds from abroad 
• Requiring: 
• governors to issue a warning prior to taking legal action against CSOs; 
• security forces to obtain a court order before being allowed on the 
premises of a CSO 
• Enabling CSOs to:  
• establish temporary platforms or networks;  
• conduct joint projects; 
• receive financial support from other associations and public institutions  
• Setting up a Department of Associations within the Ministry of Interior, thus 
removing security forces as the first point of contact and oversight for civil 
society 
THE NEW LAW ON FOUNDATIONS (February 2008) 
• Tax exemptions:  
• All foundations with or without Public Benefit status will be exempt 
from gift and inheritance tax; all persons making grants or expenses to 
foundations will be exempt from income and corporate tax 
• Board membership:  
• Removing a board member will only be possible against evidence of 
criminal acts 
• Role of foreigners:  
• Foreigners are now able to establish foundations, and to serve as board 
members of existing foundations 
• Foreign funding:  
• Receipt of foreign funding no longer requires a permission; a prior 
notification of authorities by the foundation will suffice 
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these organisations – they do not need to be subject to surveillance, their operations are 
not clandestine or suspicious. During field research for this thesis, the NGO 
respondents offered these same two broad positive messages when asked about the 
positive impact of the reformed Associations Law. Non-governmental is no longer 
understood as anti-governmental. It was felt that this expression of trust together with 
the increased financial and organisational freedom legitimised the work the NGOs 
engage in.  
 The commissions that were set up as part of the law reform process have also 
opened their doors to NGOs. The law reform process requires the relevant department 
of the judiciary to create a commission to review the proposed reform.33 These 
commissions are composed of judges, academics, representatives of NGOs and other 
experts on the given area of legislation. In order for an NGO to participate, first it is 
required to submit a written report on the subject of the reform. This is taken as an 
indication of their expertise on the subject, which is then reviewed by the judiciary. 
Since not many NGOs are able to write such reports, this in itself filters the number of 
organisations able to take on a committee membership down to the most capable and 
well resourced. However, the submission of such a report is no guarantee of 
participation in the commission: 
 
Committees within government are not institutionalised. The chair of the 
committee selects members for the committee. At the end, it is the 
famous within the commission that will speak, and their opinion the 
media will ask afterwards. NGOs are on the sidelines, even when 
included. Or most famous groups steal the show.34 
 
Representation is by invitation only, and given the limited size of these commissions, 
the larger and the better known NGOs tend to gain the positions within these 
commissions by virtue of being known to the selection committee. This also means 
that only a very small number of NGOs can participate in any given commission. 
Several NGO respondents were somewhat disillusioned by the process. Writing such 
reports was time consuming work with no guarantees of a fruitful outcome. Without an 
invitation to participate it was difficult to know if the recommendations of the report 
were in any way considered by the committee. Furthermore, what kind of report will 
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gain an NGO the required access to the negotiating table? How critical can an NGO be 
of the proposed legal reform and still be successful in participating? These 
commissions provide NGOs with access to the negotiating table and with the chance to 
express their argument in favour of a certain policy direction. At the same time the top-
down and hierarchical nature of the selection process for participating in committees 
means that this avenue is only available for a select few NGOs. 
The establishment of the Department of Associations (DoA) further 
exemplifies the extent of the changes that have taken place in recent years. Prior to the 
DoA, CSOs dealt with the local police as the first point of contact on all bureaucratic 
matters. As respondents with personal experience recounted, it was the local police 
station that issued permissions to carry out projects, to apply for funding, and to travel 
abroad. At issue is not only the fact that this role was given to the police, but also the 
fact that standard organisational processes required official permits. The amended 
Associations Law, by establishing a DoA, addressed this rather uncivilian way of 
treating civil society and illustrates the notable extent to which the governance of 
NGOs has changed.  
The DoA retains an aloof approach to facilitating NGO-government 
relationships.35 Their point of view iterates that the reformed legal framework provides 
sufficient guidelines for NGOs to both lobby government and to partake in 
policymaking. The strategy put forward by the Department of Associations places the 
onus for greater collaboration largely on the shoulders of NGOs. Whilst government 
ministries are encouraged to sponsor NGO projects, there is an underlying belief that 
NGOs should first prove themselves to be developed enough to make good project 
partners. Article 10 of the new Associations Law allows ministries to co-sponsor up to 
50 per cent of any NGO project. This arrangement may complement EU project 
funding, which expects beneficiary NGOs to find at least 10 per cent of the funds from 
other sources. Where such complementarity exists between, for example, the aims of 
the Ministry of Education and an EU project on encouraging rural families to send 
girls to school carried out by a youth NGO, the facility now exists to utilise such 
synergies. The DoA has been trying to encourage this kind of greater cooperation 
between NGOs and government ministries, and to this end the DoA issued a circular to 
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all ministries to make sure that everyone is aware of the possibility for cooperation. 
The remaining challenge is to convince government officials that partnerships with 
NGOs are worth their while. Thus far, despite wider awareness of the existence of such 
possibilities, there has not been a great deal of enthusiasm for such activity within the 
ministries. The DoA hopes that by engaging with NGOs, the government can lead by 
example and show that these organisations are trustworthy partners, encouraging in 
turn the public to trust NGOs. They are not yet fully conversant with the new 
legislative infrastructure and are therefore not aware of all the avenues that will lead 
them to effective lobbying and be part of policymaking. NGOs are just beginning to 
emerge as a sector, and need therefore time to establish themselves within society. As 
Dr Uzun opined: 
 
We are dealing with people that are just now forming NGOs. You must 
therefore be patient, more tolerant and continue to promote the [third] 
sector. It is important to promote trust between government and the 
[third] sector, and to build trust between NGOs and the public. The 
department [of Associations] is using the instruments it has to help, and it 
makes also sure the right of association is not being misused which 
would give the sector a bad name among public. The problem with 
government is that people there don’t think it’s worth dealing with 
NGOs. Here the department [of Associations] should lead by example 
and build confidence and trust.36 
 
The above account reveals certain assumptions about NGOs and civil society in 
the Department of Associations. Basing ideas about civil society on something that is 
new and emerging in Turkey reveals a particular understanding of how NGOs are 
perceived. This understanding resonates well with words such as modern and 
professional, and less well with words like traditional and voluntary, in the end 
favouring those organisations that aspire to this particular model. Furthermore, 
preoccupation with projects where government agencies partner with NGOs 
communicates a particular understanding of what NGOs are – organisations that focus 
on delivering services. The way the potential relationships between NGOs and 
government institutions are structured leave little room for NGOs to influence 
government policy. They can only support it. 
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Overall the framework for civil society participation at the governmental level 
is structured largely in a top-down fashion. The responsibility to develop the sector is 
seen to lie with the NGOs and other civil society actors. Whilst avenues exist for 
NGOs to participate (such as the commissions and the part-funded projects), there is 
little room for unsolicited input and in practice the access is likely to be limited to the 
most capable and professional NGOs. Much more work needs to be done to ensure that 
institutional mechanisms are put in place that make it clear how collaboration between 
government ministries and NGOs should be formulated.37 For the moment, any such 
cooperation is contingent on the enthusiasm the officials employed by the ministry 
show towards NGO involvement. Perhaps it is unrealistic to expect a more flexible 
arrangement at the highest levels of government. If this is the case, then relations at the 
municipal level may provide greater insights. 
 
Structure of local government 
Local government in Turkey is made of three entities: the provincial administration, 
municipal administration and the village level (Köker 1995 p. 58; Polatoğlu 2000 p. 
157). The appointment of each governor (vagi), the head of provincial administration, 
is approved by the president. Each province consists of roughly eight districts, and 
each district is governed by a district chief (kaymakam), also appointed by the 
president following a nomination made by the Ministry of Interior. Municipal 
administration is similarly found in each provincial and district capital, as well as in 
any community with more than 2000 inhabitants. Each municipality is headed by a 
mayor who has been elected by the local citizens for a five-year term. In villages with 
fewer than 2000 inhabitants an assembly of village adults elect a village headman 
(muhtar) to oversee local affairs. Overall, the system has been described as similar to 
the strong mayor model, where municipal councils work under the shadow or 
influence of the municipal mayor to a great extent (Kösecik and Sağbas 2004). In 
effect, the structures of local government do not really contribute to democratisation 
because local government remains subordinate to central government, functioning 
more on the basis of delegation rather than decentralisation (Köker 1995). Historically, 
at least, local government in Turkey has not been a great source of democratic citizen 
participation. 
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 The coexistence of two systems, based on one side on the appointments by 
central government, and on local elections on the other, complicates the political 
relationships at the local level. This is particularly true in instances where the 
governor’s office and municipal government are represented by two different political 
parties. The local government actors – whether representing the governor’s office or 
the municipal government – are not neutral and value-free in their actions. This is also 
likely to have an impact on how they choose to engage with the processes of policy 
implementation as they relate to NGO-local government relations in the context of EU-
funded projects.  
 Local government reform has indeed been also in the agenda of EU support 
from Turkey. In 2004 a Local Administration Reform Programme was launched, that 
aimed to strengthen the capacity for local administration reform at the level of central 
and local government, to improve financial and budgetary procedures, and to develop 
the efficiency and effectiveness of human resource management (Ministry of the 
Interior 2010). This reform programme is part of the modernisation efforts that are 
expected to precede any future EU membership, not least because of the importance 
the EU attaches to local authorities. The proximity of local government to the public 
gives it an important role in persuading the public of the benefits of integration 
(Kösecik and Sağbas 2004 p. 362). 
 
NGO-local government relations 
At the level of local government, the relations with NGOs are different because a more 
intimate relationship can be developed. The leadership of a municipal government is 
naturally a more accurate reflection of the local nuances and therefore more 
representative of, and attentive to local needs and demands. However, at the same 
time, local government can be an unpredictable and even mercurial partner for NGOs. 
These relationships can pan out in a variety of ways depending on the nature of the 
particular local government actors the NGO is dealing with. Political affiliations and 
personal relationships become increasingly salient factors. The section offers examples 
of this diversity of ways in which these relationships develop.  
 The relations depict a persuasive correlation between the political alignments 
between local government and NGOs, and the extent of their collaboration. For 
example, an Islamic women’s NGO interviewed in Istanbul, has developed a positive, 
constructive relationship with its municipal government that dates back to 1994. The 
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municipality also happens to be governed by an Islamic party, and despite political 
upheaval at the national level during this time, the municipality has been consistently 
governed by the same party. The NGO has gradually forged a close relationship, and 
collaborated on a number of small scale projects. Several of the NGO volunteers are in 
fact workers from the municipal government. Similarly, an Islamic women’s umbrella 
group has also been given rent-free office space by the same municipality.38 These 
relationships were built on the basis of a worldview that shared a common base in 
religion. Religion in the public domain, as Chapter Four has illustrated, is virtually 
always a political issue. Through other interviews, I heard of other examples where 
political views shaped the relationship between municipal government and NGOs. A 
municipality in Istanbul governed by the Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk 
Partisi – DEHAP)39 was unable to find a partner NGO for a project because all NGOs 
which were approached refused to work with the party for political reasons. In 
response, the municipality displayed its innovative capabilities and created its own 
NGO in order to qualify for the funding. In slightly different ways each of these cases 
illustrates the importance of congruence in political views between local government 
and NGOs, both as a bridge and an obstacle to collaboration. 
 Political alliances also played a role in determining government-NGO 
relationships elsewhere in the country. During the interviews I conducted in the 
southeast of Turkey, in Diyarbakir, every NGO I interviewed made the same 
distinction when asked about collaboration with government offices:  
 
We collaborate with the municipality, they even invite us sometimes. But 
we cannot do the same thing with the governor’s office, and the previous 
governor was more moderate that the current one. The governor’s office 
has a tendency to classify NGOs as ‘this’ or ‘that’. There is even a UN 
project called ‘Local Agenda 21’ that aims to include the local 
municipality and governor, but the governor here has always refused to 
take part.40 
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The governor’s office plays by the ‘official’ rules that it needs to follow. 
They have a different point of view to working with NGOs from the 
municipality.41  
 
The reasons for these differences were the following. The governor is appointed by the 
national government, and acts in accordance with the official government line and can 
therefore be less attuned to local issues. The previous governor was more moderate in 
his views whilst the current one tends to see NGOs as an extension of the irredentist, 
Kurdish movement. The municipal government, on the other hand, is elected locally so 
office-holders are more likely to be concerned with local issues and therefore also 
work on collaborative events with local NGOs. In this way, different sectors of 
government are likely to develop different kinds of relations with NGOs. One 
women’s NGO that I interviewed in Diyarbakir described itself rather openly as a part 
of the municipal government. The NGO was effectively set up by the municipality in 
order to respond to EU calls for proposals that required local government-NGO 
partnerships.42 In some of the interviews, similar anecdotal examples were repeated; 
often funds from the EU require cooperation between NGOs and municipalities, and in 
some instances this has encouraged municipalities to set up their own NGOs. These 
examples attest to the inventive ways that local actors have to establish NGO-local 
government relationship in order to qualify for EU funding (this issue of agency is 
taken up as one of the central themes of Chapter Seven). 
The lax boundaries between civil society and local government seen in the 
above example of the women’s NGO that was set up by the municipality demonstrate 
the unorthodox way in which citizens may position themselves in relation to municipal 
government. Given the hostile response of the current governor towards both NGOs 
and the local municipal administration, it may not be as surprising that NGOs and the 
municipality view themselves as being on the same side, vis-à-vis the governor. 
 This is not to say that collaboration between NGOs and local government is not 
witness to any contestation. A women’s NGO which runs two shelters for women 
suffering from domestic violence in Istanbul has collaborated with local government 
offices in an Istanbul municipality. Upon completion of the project, against the wishes 
of the NGO, the municipality insisted that the development should not be called a 
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“shelter”; it should instead be named “guesthouse” (konukevi). Using the word shelter 
would insinuate that there is a problem in the neighbourhood, and for this reason a 
guesthouse was deemed a more appropriate and neutral term to use.43 Thus, there is a 
danger for the politics surrounding the projects to take over, changing the way the 
outcomes of a project will play out. 
 Similarly, in both Ankara and Istanbul the governor’s office has initiated court 
proceedings in an effort to close gay-rights NGOs. In Istanbul, the governor’s office in 
early 2007 filed a case against Lambda, the largest queer advocacy NGO in Turkey, on 
the grounds that its activities are “against the law and morality of Turkey”, and that the 
NGO’s objectives were offensive to Turkish moral values and family structures 
(Human Rights Watch 2008). The Ankara governor’s office has also previously 
attempted to close down two other queer organisations, KAOS-GL and Pink Life 
(Pembe Hayat) on similar charges, but in these cases the charges were dropped by the 
prosecution. In November 2008, following an appeal, the proceedings against Lambda 
have also been dropped. Nevertheless the episode shows how local government 
institutions may take an interest in controlling what kind of associationalism should be 
allowed. 
Overall, the way in which local government is able to engage with NGOs is 
more relevant to NGOs. The relationships are more intimate, not least because they 
often centre on a practical project. The examples above point to the variety of views 
that are found across municipalities, both along political (e.g. Islamic vs. secular and 
Kurdish vs. Turkish) lines and along lines of sexuality. As the section has shown, the 
positions NGOs take largely determine the nature of any relationship with 
governmental actors.  
 
Facilitating NGO-local government relations through EU projects 
As a final example of NGO-local government relations I look at an EU-funded project 
that aimed to facilitate the development of such connections. As has already been 
mentioned, in the context of the pre-accession process EU has gradually shifted its 
attention away from NGOs and towards a variety of governmental agents. In 
connection with this shift, an EU-funded pilot project was conceived that would 
encourage improved NGO relations with public sector agents, and with municipal 
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governments in particular. The account presented here is looking at the project from 
the point of view of a children’s NGO that took part in the pilot project.  
 The programme was set up for an initial time-frame of two years, with the EU 
Secretary General, the Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU), the British 
Council and the EU Delegation to Turkey as the supporting partners. In total, 2 million 
Euros were committed to the programme aimed towards “fostering cooperation and 
dialogue” between NGOs and the public sector (European Commission 2007b). The 
project was perceived as the beginning of a long-term process of increasingly close 
cooperation between NGOs and municipal officials. In the words of an EU Delegation 
representative: 
 
[The programme] was a result of the changes following the start of 
accession negotiations, where public institutions were coming more into 
the picture […] there is a severe mistrust between the two parties for 
historical reasons – the two parties being civil society and the state – 
there is really a severe mistrust that stems from the experience of the 
1980 coup and all that. There was very limited experience of working 
together between the parties. So we came up with this project, which 
basically wanted to look at the state of play, how the organisational 
structure of the two sides allows collaboration and dialogue cooperation, 
and what could be done in terms of improving dialogue and cooperation 
between the two sides.44  
 
The programme had two central elements. First the programme arranged for a wide 
consultation process where representatives from both sides came together to produce a 
memorandum of understanding. This document aimed to lay out the basic principles of 
cooperation between civil society organisations and public institutions. Secondly, the 
programme cultivated 11 pilot projects where NGOs public bodies as partners on 
specific projects. 
 So how did this project play out in practice? Here is an account from the point 
of view of one of the 11 NGOs that described its experience of partaking in a pilot 
program.45 In the experience of the director, the entire project was a “disaster”. She 
claimed that the programme director – who had previously been employed by the 
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CFCU – behaved like a military commander, and managed the operation through a 
series of financial threats. The NGO director was said to have frequently arrived at the 
office to find emails making demands such as: 
 
The money will not be transferred to you unless you do this; unless you 
agree to do things our way, you will have to pay a penalty. Nearly every 
week we received such emails.46  
 
This style of management was demotivating for the group, the NGO director recalled. 
She felt that the programme director did not appreciate the NGOs’ limited staff and 
therefore very limited capacity to comply with such demands, especially at short 
notice. Managing the relationship with this intermediary organisation ate up most of 
the productive time for the NGO. The NGO was eventually compelled to write a letter 
of complaint about the programme administration, copying the letter to all project 
partners: the EU delegation, British Council and the EU Secretary General. Overall, 
the NGO was given €38,000 under the program, but due to lack of compliance with the 
procedural demands for EU funding (the NGO was accused of spending the funds in 
what were deemed unaccountable ways), they were required to reimburse €25,000. 
Following long discussions with the CFCU and the EU delegation, the amount to be 
reimbursed was reduced to €300. The NGO director found the whole process so 
draining that she made a decision not to apply for any EU funding for at least two 
years. 
 Aside from the difficulties in managing relations with the intermediary 
organisation, the relationship with the municipal government proved also tricky and 
politicised. Throughout the project, the NGO had only one point of contact within the 
municipality. In other words, the project was not institutionalised within the municipal 
office. The project itself focused on working with children who had spent time at 
correctional institutions, with a view to facilitating their re-integration in society. This 
issue is central to the day-to-day work of the NGO, so the content of the project was 
not new to them: only the partnering organisation was new. The Republican People’s 
Party (CHP) governed the municipality at the time, which is a party with a 
conservative policy orientation. As it happened, the project coincided with a vote in 
France (October 2006) on the issue of the Armenian genocide by the Ottoman armies 
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in 1915. The vote would make it illegal to claim it was not a genocide, much like the 
case of Holocaust. Given that on issues such as this the CHP has a staunchly 
nationalist political stance, and it refuses to recognise the events of 1915 as genocide, 
the party remained adamantly against any such legislation and was actively involved in 
arranging protest demonstrations outside the French embassy in Ankara. The Cankaya 
municipality, being governed by the CHP, also contributed to the protests. The person 
at the municipal government responsible for the NGO project on children’s 
rehabilitation collected several of the project’s participants, children aged 6 to 14, and 
transported them to the demonstration. Here the children were given anti-French 
slogans to carry and asked to participate in the demonstration. The project was thus 
hijacked by the political processes that the municipal government was engaged in, 
making use of the NGO and the child beneficiaries as pawns in the political 
manoeuvres being executed. 
 This project was unable to deliver on its aims. Following the 12 month pilot 
programme, it was discontinued. It was difficult to determine the reasons for this, as 
the informants interviewed were unforthcoming when asked this question. The 
example of one of the pilot projects described above may offer some insights, 
however. For the municipality to assign one member of staff to work on the project 
does not suggest that the project was seen as the beginning of a long-term partnership, 
nor did it reflect a change in how relations with NGOs were operationalised. If that 
member of staff had been more dynamic and interested in the project and the work the 
NGO was doing, the project may well have been much more successful. Having just 
one point of contact within the municipality did mean that the project lacked 
institutionalisation, but this, as long as the right people are involved, does not 
necessarily mean that the project will necessarily be a failure. What it does suggest, 
however, is that the transaction costs for participating in such projects tend to be too 
high for governmental actors to truly engage in them.47 The costs in terms of time and 
political ability outweigh the benefits of genuine, full participation.  
 This may also tell us something about the limits of what can be achieved 
through project-based development. The project was conceptualised between the EU 
Delegation, the CFCU and the EU Secretary General, and €2 million were introduced 
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to the equation. The only common denominator between the municipality and the 
NGO was the project and the funding. There may have been a valid reason why these 
two actors would not have worked together under normal circumstances – perhaps 
their political views were too different, a reason that was suggested earlier. 
Partnerships for the sake of partnership may not be that constructive.  
 
Sub-conclusion 
Exposing the different layers of relations between NGOs and representatives of the 
state reveals a variety of relationships. Whilst the opportunities for engagement are 
much narrower at the level of central government, here the channels have been more 
institutionalised than at the level of municipal government. The use of commissions is 
one example of how these relations are institutionalised at the level of central 
government, as is the facility for government departments to offer their support to 
NGO projects. Under the reformed legal framework there is greater scope for NGOs to 
tap into these relationships and make good use of the possibilities that exist. It is fairly 
clear how civil society can gain access to policymaking and influence governmental 
decision-making. The issue of who is able to gain access is less clear and the system 
appears to facilitate access for elite NGOs – the larger professional groups. NGO 
relations with municipal government vary, largely because municipalities represent a 
spectrum of political positions in a way that central government does not. Whilst there 
are more possibilities for NGO-government relationships at the local level, these are 
not as well established as those at the central government level and have the potential 
to play out in a variety of ways. Beyond this NGOs can of course enhance their voice 
by gaining the support of the broader public, or indeed by working together with other 
NGOs. 
 
5.3 NGO-NGO relations 
If relationships with governmental entities offer only limited opportunities for 
engagement, then good relations with other NGOs can offer greater scope for NGOs to 
influence government policy. This section explores this claim by looking at examples 
from within the women’s movement in Turkey. Women’s groups in Turkey make for 
an interesting case because whilst a broad array of women’s NGOs have collaborated 
successfully in policy campaigns, there are deep seated sources of tension within the 
movement as well. The case presents both opportunities and shortcomings for 
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advocacy activities in Turkey and suggests that civil society is still going through 
growing pains. As a result, it does not necessarily contribute to democratisation in the 
way that EU policy anticipates. Given the essentialist tendencies of NGOs in Turkey, 
what remains unresolved is the question of how to allow all points of view to be given 
space, whilst also ensuring appropriate guidelines for tolerance and cooperation. 
 
Successful NGO relationships between women’s NGOs 
During the last decade the women’s movement in Turkey has had a significant impact 
on a reform process that has paved the road to greater gender equality. Although the 
realisation of these reforms was set as a precondition for the beginning of the EU 
accession process, the women’s movement has nevertheless played a significant role in 
shaping the final mould of these reforms. The new Turkish Civil Code, adopted in 
2001 integrated many of the amendments the women’s NGOs had advocated for since 
the early 1980s. It abolished the position of a man as the (legally recognised) head of 
the family and provided women with new legal rights in marriage and divorce. Spurred 
on by the success of the campaign to reform the civil code, the women’s movement 
regrouped behind another campaign to reform the Turkish Penal Code (Anıl et al. 
2005). Following three years of campaigning, a new Penal Code was adopted in 2004, 
representing another major shift in gender equality. Sexual violence is now regarded as 
a crime against the individual, not against society; rape within marriage now 
constitutes a crime; and a rapist can no longer marry their victim as a means to avoid 
punishment. In all, over 30 recommendations made by the campaign were included in 
the final document (Anıl et al. 2005). In these two cases women’s NGOs have been 
tremendously successful in influencing legal reform – or legal Europeanisation – in the 
context of the EU reform process. 
 Although the reform process has provided a focus around which women’s 
activism could crystallise in recent years, it is important to consider the role played by 
women’s NGOs in the context of the wider story of women’s activism. As Chapter 
Four has already outlined in more detail, the current women’s movement in Turkey 
dates back to the 1930s, to the early years of the republic, when women’s liberation 
became a symbol for the kind of modernisation and progress the new leadership 
aspired to. As such, it was juxtaposed against the Islamic tradition that represented a 
traditional and backward role for women. For a long time it was the secular, modern 
women – the state feminists as they were described as in Chapter Four – who occupied 
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the civil societal space (Tekeli 1981). Particularly since 1980, following the military 
coup, a more diverse set of organisations has gradually come to inhabit women’s civil 
society. The impact of this has been most visible in the growth of the Islamic women’s 
movement since the late 1980s (Göle 1994), and the bipolarity of women’s civil 
society, poised between the secularist and Islamic influences (Keyman 1995), has 
become increasingly clear. 
 It is therefore somewhat surprising that despite the increasing polarity within 
the women’s movement, NGOs across the spectrum came together behind the 
campaigns on legal reform. How should we explain this success of the women’s NGOs 
in influencing the legal reform process? When I put this question to the respondents, 
they pointed at three possible explanations.48 First was the urgency of the issue. The 
parliamentary discussions regarding the Penal and Civil Codes took place over a 
limited time-frame, after which the window of opportunity to have an impact would 
pass. The awareness among women’s groups that success would require a short, high 
impact campaign brought many of them together for the first time. The second factor 
was the universal nature of the issues that the women were demanding, which made it 
relatively easy for all to agree on the demands of the campaigns. In addition, these 
demands were not developed simply for the sake of this campaign; they had existed for 
a long time and had been internalised within the movement. Finally, the campaign 
operations were directed by a relatively small number of women. The campaign on the 
Penal Code, for example, was headed by members of 26 organisations (Anıl et al. 
2005). This meant there were fewer differences to reconcile between the most active 
participants, whilst others were happier to follow in their slipstream. Ideological and 
political differences between the participants – particularly those relating to the role of 
religion in public life – were cast aside for the purpose of achieving lasting structural 
change. These are the key reasons as to why the women’s NGOs were able to foster 
such an effective network of relationships behind a single-issue campaign. 
 The two campaigns paint an ideal picture of an advocacy campaign. The 
women’s NGOs are “prodding the government to do the right thing” as Jenkins’ 
definition of advocacy suggests. By setting out a list of demands for legal reform, the 
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organisations publicly challenged the state to change its ways (Tully 2002). The 
campaigns were based on an antagonistic relationship with the government, making it 
attractive to draw comparisons with the Turkish case and the liberal democratic 
discourse depicting civil society as a bulwark against the state. We see an independent 
and well-organised movement that has been able to successfully challenge the 
hegemony of the Turkish state. Yet, the factors contributing to the success of the Penal 
and Civil Code campaign suggest that these campaigns were conducted under 
exceptional circumstances that may not reflect the true state of civil society in Turkey.  
 As these campaigns were elite-led by a small number of urban NGOs, it is 
important not to extrapolate overoptimistic conclusions about the state of Turkish civil 
society more broadly. Caution is particularly important where there are possible policy 
implications. The interview respondents, both civil society activists as well as EU and 
Turkish officials, often referred to the success of the women’s movement as an 
example of the potential within Turkish civil society to develop. It would be tempting 
to conclude that women’s activism offers an example of how to achieve further 
democratisation by building a vibrant civil society. The examples here have shown 
there exists a group of NGOs and activists that are extremely productive, vocal and 
relatively influential in their criticism and commentary on government policy. At the 
same time, it is important to be clear of the extent to which these campaigns were a 
unique example of a particular, non-replicable process. As one respondent described 
this situation: 
 
There are many more opportunities to ‘shake hands’ for NGOs in Ankara 
and Istanbul. This is where the politicians are. This is where the 
embassies are. Also, there are people here that can help us make 
something with these chances, like our board members. This type of 
chances don’t exist for organisations in Van [a city in the southeast of 
Turkey].49  
 
Such policy influence as was evident in these campaigns can only be realised by the 
large, professional organisations working near the central government. Another 
respondent remarked that in the months that followed the approval of the penal code 
the “intellectual women of the movement took the message to other women, in order to 
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inform them of their new rights and responsibilities”.50 Although this is also an 
example of downward advocacy and is in itself a positive step, it should also remind us 
that the successes described were largely limited to the organisational elite among the 
women’s movement. The aim is not to devalue the successes, but to recognise the 
context in which they have been achieved, as this is important in understanding how 
the changing relationship between state and certain groups can (or cannot) be seen to 
have broader implications on state-civil society relations and democratisation. It is 
unlikely that a similar feat of influencing government policy could be replicated in, for 
example, a more rural setting in Turkey, with local government and local NGOs. Here 
the elite NGOs were able make use of certain channels to influence government policy 
that made good use of a rare window of opportunity to have a say in legal reform. 
 The opportunities realised by the women’s movement can be regarded as an 
example of Sidney Tarrow’s “political opportunity structures”, which emerge when the 
political opportunities and constraints change. It is at such junctures, Tarrow argues, 
where civil society actors are able to create new, unique opportunities that arise from 
events around them (Tarrow 1998 pp. 19-20). The process of law reform that 
accompanies EU accession has been one such opportunity. It is important both to 
acknowledge the potential of the EU accession process to generate these opportunities, 
as well as to remember that the outcomes rely on delicate chains of causation that 
makes anticipation as well replication of such opportunities very difficult. 
 
Complicated NGO relationships between women’s NGOs 
Shifting the focus away from the two particular legal reform campaigns, this section 
focuses on the more complex and colourful array of relationships that underline 
relations between women’s NGOs. Outside the realm of the highly focused campaigns, 
women’s NGOs have not found it very easy to collaborate. This is due to a 
combination of reasons that gravitate around two issues: struggles for position and 
ownership within the women’s movements on one side, and divisions based on 
ideological differences on the other. 
Struggles for position and ownership within the women’s movement get in the 
way of collaboration. In 2006 the Nordic embassies in Turkey extended their support 
to one women’s NGO by funding a campaign entitled “women’s agenda”. The 
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campaign was headed by a well-known women’s NGO based in Ankara. Other NGOs 
and women activists, however, took offence at this project. They questioned the term 
“women’s agenda”. It was not deemed appropriate to generalise in this way when the 
agenda in question is a particular one devised by the organisation in charge of the 
project. They argued that not all NGOs would agree with its content and therefore one 
should not regard it as an agenda for all women. In addition, others regarded the 
foreign funding behind the project as a problematic issue. Since it is difficult for many 
NGOs to access foreign funds, these kinds of funds therefore tend to gravitate towards 
the larger, more established organisations. “How can such a top-down campaign be 
framed in terms of all women?”, they questioned.51 In other words, there is resistance 
to individual organisations using the collective identity of the women’s movement to 
further their own cause. 
 In a similar fashion, the second example recalls the experiences of one activist 
attending an annual conference that was organised by a pioneering women’s 
organisation in Turkey. The conference was initially named after the organisation that 
organised the event. A discussion took place early on among the participants whereby 
it was agreed that the name should be changed, so that it would be more representative 
of the movement as a whole. Year after year, the name of the conference remained 
unchanged, however, and continued to carry the name of the host organisation. As the 
respondent recalled, questions began to be raised among the participants:  
 
Some people started to think, ‘Am I really here? Am I an outsider or an 
insider? Am I a guest, or an owner?’ This led to discussions about 
problems between women’s NGOs, so when we met we had no chance to 
talk about the real problems.52 
 
This resistance towards the name of the conference and the subsequent debate 
expresses the political nature of relationships within the women’s movement. Like in 
the example above, other groups reacted in this way because the name of one 
organisation was used to represent the whole of the women’s movement. The 
conference was understood as an attempt by one organisation to further its own agenda 
in the slipstream of the women’s movement as a whole. Although such political 
                                                 
51
 Interview with a female activist, Istanbul, 24 June 2008. [B13] 
52
 Interview with a female activist, Ankara, 01 April 2008. [C14] 
Chapter 5 
 151 
struggles are by no means unique to Turkey or to the women’s movement, it remains 
an issue to be borne in mind when formulating policy. 
  This struggle for position within the movement is further exemplified by a 
court case between two women’s NGOs that took place in 2004. The case involved 
two large and well-known NGOs: Women’ for Women’s Human Rights (WWHR) and 
the Women’s Centre (Kadın Merkezi – KAMER).53 WWHR is an Istanbul based group 
and KAMER is based in eastern Turkey, in Diyarbakir. WWHR accused the KAMER 
of plagiarising its publication materials, took the case to court, and won. The process, 
however, created a split within the women’s movement at large. Some organisations 
sided with KAMER, arguing that the accusations made by WWHR had been petty and 
harmful to the movement. They argued that the women’s movement should display 
more solidarity, and the court case was undermining this. Others supported WWHR, as 
the court decision was made in their favour and KAMER was shown to have been in 
the wrong. Although it may have not been the primary intention of WWHR actions, 
the case had a negative impact on both KAMER and the women’s movement more 
broadly. In all three examples the internal politics of the movement thus come to take 
precedence over the issue of women’s civil society activity. Whilst in theory one might 
expect the issues of women’s rights to bind women’s NGOs together (these are 
universal rights-based issues that all can agree on), in practice the political struggles 
for position and prestige within the movement often take priority. 
Divisions of an ideological nature also contribute to the struggles that occur 
between women’s NGOs. The first of four examples illustrating this relates to the 
relations between Kemalist and Kurdish NGOs taking part in the Annual Nationwide 
Women’s Conference. In 2005, a more explicit conflict of interests surfaced between 
two camps of NGOs. One respondent described how a group of Kurdish women’s 
NGOs wanted to organise a break-out session to discuss state violence against women. 
The secular, Kemalist NGOs refused to allow this meeting to take place, and even 
called the police in an effort to stop the break-out session from taking place. The 
break-out meeting did still go ahead, but according to the respondent, the actual 
purpose and aims of the conference were sidelined. The conference no longer remained 
a constructive platform for discussing women’s status in Turkish society as the focus 
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had shifted onto the internal divisions within the movement. This example also 
illustrates how some Kemalist NGOs view their role as guardians of the secular state, 
embracing a similar role to certain NGOs in the run-up to the 28 February Process and 
the post-modern coup in 1997 (as discussed in Chapter Four). 
The ideological differences between the Islamist and secular women’s NGOs 
are at the heart of these kinds of divisions. The legal reform campaign referred to 
earlier in this chapter offers an example of how the ideological divisions play out in 
practice. Yahoo! groups – an online discussion group – formed an important tool in the 
early phases of the campaign. The vice-president of an Islamic women’s organisation 
took part in these discussions, and her suggestions were warmly welcomed by the 
group of online activists. However, in these discussions it was impossible to tell that 
she was wearing a headscarf. Her choice to wear a headscarf became a source of 
contention later on during the face-to-face meetings that followed. Here the differences 
between secular and Islamic ideological positions took over the agenda from the issues 
of penal code reform, and the working relationship between the activists became more 
difficult to manage. These differences kept resurfacing as the campaign matured and 
the participating Islamic NGOs elected to opt out from supporting certain clauses in 
the reforms. In particular, they opposed the demand to remove all references to 
morality, chastity and honour from the new penal code. Additionally the Islamic 
groups decided to opt out from lobbying on other issues where the reforms demanded 
by the campaign would have objected with their religious world view. For them, 
religious commitments came first. One secular women’s activist interviewed summed 
up her reaction to this as she commented: 
 
We had negative experiences with women who had deceived us. Some 
NGOs did not want to be against some issues. They did not want to be 
against some laws which were against women, but came from religion 
[…] they were not around when these issues were being discussed and 
did not lobby for these issues.54 
 
Despite the overall success of the campaign, the ideological differences among 
women’s NGOs are of such nature that it was difficult to reconcile these in one unified 
campaign. These boundaries are difficult to overcome and the different priorities that 
exist between secular and Islamic groups are difficult to reconcile. 
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These ideological differences surface on various occasions. In early 2008 the 
new deputy director of the EU delegation to Turkey invited 12 representatives of 
women’s NGOs to attend a meeting at his office. According to a respondent he was 
very welcoming and wished to learn about the kinds of problems that women’s NGOs 
faced with EU funding. A representative from an Islamic women’s NGO, however, 
moved away from this topic, and insisted on questioning the official over the reasons 
why the EU has not been more explicit in its support for a greater freedom to wear the 
headscarf in Turkey. Her actions decidedly undermined the meeting. As the respondent 
recalled: 
 
“when she did this we had many things to say to her – we wanted to tell 
her to shut up. We wanted to continue the meeting about the problems of 
EU funds, but it was not a good platform for this anymore”.55 
  
In other instances the ideological cleavages between secular and Islamic NGOs 
have undermined an entire campaign and demonstrate the tendency by NGOs to 
appropriate the civil societal space for particular ideological agendas. In the spring of 
2008 women’s NGOs planned to organise a campaign around a new issue: a 
government proposal for reforming the social security in Turkey. The campaign was 
prompted as NGOs concluded that the government proposals failed to address issues of 
gender equality. Under the proposed reforms, women still would not have gained equal 
benefits. A new campaign was organised, one which bore great resemblance to the 
Penal Code and Civil Code campaigns mentioned earlier, with the aim of bringing 
these thoughts to the attention of the government and the public. However, this time 
fundamental divisions amongst NGOs were exposed by the campaign rhetoric. Public 
protests, in particular the overarching message delivered by these demonstrations, 
became a divisive issue. The comments made by one respondent, who was a member 
of an Islamic NGO, lucidly illustrates this: 
 
I personally wanted to attend some street protests about this reform, but 
they are shouting things like ‘this AKP government and this parliament 
are backward’. They are swearing at them because they are Muslim. I 
really feel that this is my problem, but I cannot attend these protests. 
They are swearing at us, so we cannot be together.56  
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The campaign was framed simultaneously as both promoting women’s rights and 
protesting against the current government. The inadequacies of the reform agenda from 
a gender perspective were taken as evidence that the government adhered to a more 
conservatively religious understanding of social relations that was detrimental to 
further progress on women’s rights. The lobbying efforts within the campaign were 
framed less in terms of universal women’s rights and more in terms of a particular 
political agenda aimed at undermining the government. In this example, the secular 
face of the women’s movement claimed centre ground within the campaign, defining it 




The examples presented here suggest that relationships between women’s NGOs 
contain a level of tension that is unhelpful to collaborative efforts. The causes of this 
tension can be understood to be either political or ideological in nature. The term 
political refers to politics of the women’s movement, where NGOs are playing for 
position, offering resistance where it appears that other organisations are gaining a 
more central, or higher, position. Ideological differences are another source of 
contention that surface in particular between those groups that have a strong secular or 
Islamic point of reference to their activities. Thus, even where NGOs may agree on the 




NGO advocacy, in the broadest sense of the word, is about aspiring for change. In this 
context relations with governmental actors are important for negotiating change, and 
relations with other NGOs help to accumulate societal support and voice behind a 
campaign for change. Interpreting advocacy in this way in fact resonates well with the 
idea of Europeanisation, or policy harmonisation in the context of EU accession that 
has been discussed elsewhere in this thesis: Europeanisation and the EU pre-accession 
process are both premised on change. It is therefore useful to reflect on the character of 
these relationships and how this relates back to EU civil society policy in Turkey.  
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 The legal and structural reforms have contributed to the development of a more 
enabling environment when it comes to NGO-government relations. The process of 
legal reform – one of the prerequisites of the EU accession process – has set these 
relationships on a more formal footing. The avenues through which NGOs can 
influence government policy have become more formalised, and in the shape of the 
Department of Associations civil society has gained a governmental actor that can 
facilitate this relationship. At the level of municipal government, there is a great deal 
of variety in how local government actors approach civil society, and how this plays 
out in NGO-government relations is contingent on the adaptability of the political 
positions each side holds. The variety of political influences that affect the character of 
local government means that different municipalities will offer their support to 
different kinds of NGOs on the basis of political affinity. Thus secular, Islamic or 
Kurdish NGOs can all identify access points at the level of local government.  
 There is, however, scope for developing these relations further. For example, 
the avenue for NGOs to contribute to legal reform processes remains narrow. 
Government departments, despite the existence of a facility where each department can 
co-sponsor NGO-run projects, remain reluctant to do so. At the level of local 
government the diversity of political opinions has proven to be a double-edged sword, 
as this can contribute to a political backlash against NGOs whose political ideas do not 
conflate with those of local government. It seems there are distinct political limitations 
to how far NGO-local government relations can develop at the moment. One 
persuasive explanatory factor can be found in the higher transaction costs that 
governmental actors face. In other words, NGO partnerships need to deliver politically 
worthwhile outcomes before governmental actors truly want to engage with NGOs. 
 Likewise, relations between NGOs exhibit both opportunities and 
shortcomings. The examples from the women’s movement show that NGOs do have 
the potential, under the right circumstances, to successfully influence government 
policymaking at the highest level. The question is, however, to what extent are the 
experiences of the Penal Code and Civil Code campaigns replicable elsewhere within 
civil society activity? Among women’s NGOs, at least, opportunities for collaboration 
have been decidedly limited by two factors. Competition for position on one side and 
ideological differences on the other have both contributed to the lack of progress in 
reconciling the dissonances within the movement. These dynamics agree with a 
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Gramscian reading of the situation: a struggle between hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic voices is being played within the women’s movement. 
 How do these observations compare with the assumptions that underline liberal 
democratic political theory and the Europeanisation processes of EU accession? Since 
advocacy NGOs are primarily engaged in processes of change, there is a natural 
affinity between the policy harmonisation and advocacy activities. In theory, advocacy 
NGOs epitomise liberal civil society, constituting a sphere of activity that is 
autonomous from the state and that challenges the state to change. In practice, 
however, NGOs do not operate in a terrain that is fully independent or autonomous. As 
I have shown, politics play a significant role in determining what kind of relationships 
NGOs can build. Neither is there often agreement on what it is that NGOs ought to 
lobby for when engaging with governmental actors. To paraphrase Najam’s definition 
of advocacy, there is no one “right thing” that NGOs can prod the government with.  
 Given the existence of competitive relationships within civil society, and the 
essentialist nature of the debate between the various voices within civil society, is there 
any scope for a successful strategy as far as the accession process goes? Somewhat 
counter-intuitively, the undemocratic rhetoric that emerges is an important phase in the 
democratising process. The schisms between NGOs originate from important societal 
debates that should not be ignored and which need to be sustained. One could regard 
them as growing pains in the context of democratisation. In this context, the long-term 
goal of the accession process should be the determination of common denominators for 
public debate that guarantee freedom of expression. This should contain parameters 





6 The Landscape of Civil Society Funding in Turkey 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to draw a picture of the funding environment for civil 
society in Turkey, and describe the way NGOs behave in this environment. The aim is 
to understand how the availability of EU funds, coupled with the relative unavailability 
of domestic funds, influences the fundraising choices NGOs make. Domestic civil 
society funding is difficult for advocacy groups to obtain, especially if their work is 
focused on issues such as human rights. The current culture of giving has not yet 
familiarised itself with the concepts of advocacy and NGOs. This lack of domestic 
funding sources creates a natural push for advocacy NGOs to seek external funds. 
 The chapter offers an outline of domestic funding opportunities in Turkey and 
juxtaposes this with the system of EU funding for NGOs. The chapter begins with an 
account of the nature of the funding relationships between donors and CSOs, sketching 
out the trends in donor aims and the ways in which these aims become operationalised 
in their funding frameworks. The second section sketches the contours for the overall 
landscape of civil society funding in Turkey and points out the opportunities and 
shortcomings this poses for advocacy NGOs. The third section takes a closer look at 
the domestic actors involved in the operationalisation of EU civil society policy. The 
fourth and final section places the magnifying glass on NGOs, taking account of NGO 
attitudes and approaches. The argument put forth is that these organisations take very 
different approaches when faced with the decision of whether to seek external 
assistance or not. These approaches are contingent on how NGOs view the role of the 
EU in Turkey, what their experience of Europeanisation has been thus far, and the 
extent to which the organisations have chosen to either internalise or resist the EU 
influence upon them. These observations feed into the conclusion that the nature of the 
changes this funding is effectively sponsoring, and the outcomes of EU civil society 
funding, will remain uncertain. 
 
6.1 Donor aims 
Donor support for civil society is intricately linked with assumptions about broader 
processes of development, to which NGOs allegedly contribute with their actions. The 
underlying argument is one where strong civil society (often referred to as one that is 
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populated by a high number of active CSOs) is seen conducive to a democratic society, 
and a weak civil society (one where only a few civil society organisations are active) is 
associated with less democratic states. Additionally, in the EU context in particular, 
vibrant civil society is expected to assist in the formulation and effective execution of 
policy. It was in such a spirit that Chapter Two described the duals aims of donor 
policies towards civil society as achieving democratic development and sustainable 
economic development. This logic can be traced back to the work of Alexis de 
Tocqueville as well as to the work of his contemporary, the liberal theorist John Stuart 
Mill (1806–1873). They both saw the growth in government apparatus as a challenge 
to political liberty and independence (Held 1996 p. 105). Robert Putnam has echoed 
these views as he argues that civil society “inculcates democratic habits” (Putnam 
1995). In practice, the way these observations have been operationalised has tended to 
lead to policies of NGO-building. Chapter Three demonstrated this by outlining the 
common denominators that underline EU civil society policy in Europe, the 
Mediterranean region and Turkey: achieving democratisation and greater policy 
effectiveness through the funding of NGOs. However, the consensus position on what 
policies ought to be pursued also represents a hegemony of particular donor-led ideas 
(Hurt 2003). The relationship between NGO-building and inculcation of democratic 
habits may be rather tenuous. 
The EU accession process offers two levels at which to operationalise policy 
towards civil society: to support broader systemic reform or more specific sectoral 
agendas (Blair 1997). On the one hand, the EU as the accession negotiator can focus 
on establishing an enabling environment by improving the rules and regulations under 
which CSOs operate, which is what political and policy Europeanisation in part aims 
to achieve. On the other hand, the EU as a donor entity can extend its support to CSOs 
that can bolster citizens’ voice in a variety of policy areas. In this way, civil society 
activities can help to internalise new modes of behaviour and in so doing contribute 
towards societal Europeanisation. In most cases, Blair argues, these aims of donor 
funding lead to support for a particular group of NGOs within the broader fabric of 
civil society: advocacy groups dedicated to modern socio-political matters such as 
women’s rights, human rights and environment. Such support may lead to a cyclical 
strategy, where civil society funding, by virtue of voicing citizen concerns and pushing 




 Out of the various civil society actors, it has been NGOs that have become the 
most important partners for donors. This is because of the complementarity between 
donor aims and expected NGO behaviour. As Thomas Carothers observers, NGOs are 
favoured for what are perceived as their pro-democratic functions of increasing citizen 
participation in activities that aim to hold the state accountable for its actions. These 
NGOs are also seen to be non-partisan advocates of discussion on neutral issues, 
moving away from traditional boundaries of political ideology. Hence, the funding 
programmes often end up targeting a small segment of NGOs on the outskirts of local 
civil society, staffed by youthful, westernised professionals with much common 
ground with the donors (Carothers 1999). Behind this style of operation stands a liberal 
agenda, which understands public interest in terms alien to the local context. It is 
NGOs, more than any other type of civil society actor that fits the mould they have in 
mind. 
 Finally, donors tend to work with an agenda for change – this is certainly the 
case for the EU in Turkey – and NGOs make for very suitable partners in this context. 
One reason suggested is that NGOs are responsive to the bureaucratisation and 
routinisation that come with donor funding, able to comply with the bureaucratic 
minutiae that is at the heart of donor-funded projects (Howell and Lind 2009 p.35). 
Additionally, as Howell and Pearce have pointed out, unlike the market, NGOs are 
not-for-profit, and unlike the state they are “non-authoritative” (2001b p. 122). NGOs 
offer an alternative to the other possible partners who may not be quite so enthused by 
the donor agenda for change. Donors see their aims to constitute a neutral, value-free 
approach, forming a template ready for use in any context (Howell and Pearce 2001b 
pp. 39-40). Yet, aspiring for change in the areas of democratisation and policy 
effectiveness, and seeing NGOs as the preferred civil society partners, clearly forms an 
agenda in itself. Critically, as both of the above authors have noted, such preference 
for NGOs limits the breadth of organisations that are considered as potential partners 
in donor-driven programmes. The existence of such agendas among donors has a direct 
impact on their behaviour and on the choices NGOs make, as they aspire to (or reject) 
the donor demands.  
 Whilst the EU is not the only source of external funding for NGOs in Turkey, it 
does represent the most prominent donor both in terms of the amount of funding it 
offers and the attention it has gained from the NGO community. The other donor 
institution offering a considerable amount of funding is the Open Society Institute. In 
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2007 the total operating costs of the Open Society Foundation Turkey amounted to 
$2,3 million. The foundation supported initiatives in EU integration, HIV/AIDS, 
education reform and promotion of the rights of the Roma. This funding was divided 
across a number of recipients, including universities, think-tanks, hospitals, schools as 
well as NGOs (Open Society Institute 2007). German foundations have also been 
involved in NGO funding. Heinrich Böll Foundation (affiliated with Green politics), 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation (affiliated with liberal politics), Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation and Kondrad Adenauer Foundation (both promoting social democracy) all 
have offices in Istanbul and offer funding towards a range of social activities. Given 
the strong links with German political parties, these foundations tend to support NGOs 
with similar political views, however the funding provided is not particularly 
extensive. It is aimed at facilitating workshops, meetings and general distribution of 
information, but rarely extends to projects or any long-term financial commitments.57 
Finally, a number of embassies offer small grants to NGOs, but such programmes tend 
to come and go, as they are often set up by enthusiastic members of staff who receive 
the support of the current ambassador.58 Other sources of funding do therefore exist, 
but these do not constitute a significant alternative to the funding provided by the EU. 
Most of the funders, with the possible exception of the Soros foundation, are very 
focused in the financial support they offer, and even then offer their funds towards a 
limited range of activities. It is therefore unlikely that these funders have had 
significant effect on the role of the EU as the central hub for external funding of NGOs 
in Turkey. 
 
Operationalisation of donor funding 
In practice, the modality for delivering funds to civil society is through projects. 
Technical competence is prioritised among donor and NGO staff, which often comes 
at the expense of paying attention to the local institutional, political and social realities 
(Cassen 1994 p. 137). Research on civil society funding in Russia, for example, has 
shown how donor support has been largely limited to projects that perceive civil 
society as a third sector inhabited by professionalised NGOs (Crotty 2003; Hemment 
2004; Henderson 2002). The donor agenda in Russia has subsequently suffered from a 
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 Interview with a representative of the Finnish Embassy in Turkey, Ankara, 04 April, 2008 [B12] 
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lack of contextualisation and misdirection. Short-term projects are unlikely to build 
civil society, as this does not correspond with the available historical experience. The 
modern European third sector is the outcome of a specific historical process and its 
duplication in a different context therefore unlikely to succeed. As projects take centre 
stage, technical and bureaucratic issues are prioritised at the expense of broader 
contextual and political concerns.  
 Projects have indeed had a significant role in shaping the way in which donors 
engage with civil society actors. In his discussion of the multifaceted nature of project-
related donor funding, Alan Fowler identifies three key conditions that shape the 
project experience: the nature of the pre-conditions placed on the funds by the giver; 
the level of administrative burden that is imposed; and the stability of the funding in 
terms of predictability and continuity (Fowler 1997). The way these three issues play 
out in the project context tends to straitjacket the recipients, particularly in terms of 
how received funds can be used. Projects tend also to require a high administrative 
commitment. Finally, project funding is based on short-term goals and often remains 
conditional on periodic performance reviews, making it a rather unreliable source of 
income. The appropriateness of these donor aspirations to strengthen democracy and 
policy effectiveness through civil society related initiatives needs to be evaluated 
against the reaction this generates among the recipients in civil society. 
 
6.2 Domestic funding opportunities for civil society in Turkey 
This section traces the contours of domestic funding in an effort to explain how the 
availability of funds within Turkey shapes NGO attitudes towards external funding 
opportunities. The culture of giving in Turkey together with the legal framework 
governing philanthropy make it more difficult for advocacy NGOs to benefit from 
domestic funding. Reliance on short-term, foreign, project-based funding in turn 
means that their activities are less sustainable in the long term. 
In 2005, the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report59 for Turkey was published 
(TUSEV 2005). The data collection for the Civil Society Index (CSI) included 
secondary sources, a population survey, stakeholder consultations, a media review and 
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 The CIVICUS Civil Society Index reports are compiled by CSOs at the country level that offer an 
assessment of the current state of civil society by employing the “Diamond Tool” developed by Helmut 
Anheier. This is a four-dimensional assessment of the “health” of civil society based on the criteria of 
“structure”, “values”, “environment” and “impact”(CIVICUS 2010; TUSEV 2005). 
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a series of case studies (TUSEV 2005 p. 27). The population survey contained a 
sample of 1536 interviews, and in the stakeholder consultation 452 interviews were 
carried out with foundation managers. These interview results formed the basis for a 
sister study entitled Trends in Individual Giving and Foundation Practices (Carkoğlu 
2006). The following table summarises the key findings from the population survey: 
Table 4: Summary of key findings from “Trends in Individual Giving” (Carkoğlu 2006) 
 
Whilst it is somewhat uncertain how accurate these projections are, they nevertheless 
point to some interesting general observations. For example, as these results are based 
on interviews, it is possible that these figures reflect aspirational rather than real 
donations. There are also religious obligations for philanthropy in Islam that play a 
part here: almsgiving is one of the pillars of Islam, requiring each individual to give a 
small percentage of their wealth to charity annually. These donations are distributed by 
mosques or given directly to the poor in the community. Respondents may have been 
inclined to report donations at a level they feel they ought to have contributed, for 
example, to street beggars, rather than what their real donations were.  
 The statistics also speak to the importance of a personal connection when 
making philanthropic donations. The Islamic tradition encourages donations to be 
made directly to individuals, emphasising a personal connection with the recipient. 
The role of institutional intermediaries is minimal, possibly because it cannot add 
anything to this giving relationship. The results also suggest that the culture of giving 
stems from a sense of solidarity between the individual donor and the beneficiary, 
expressing a clear preference to support a relative, neighbour or someone from the 
same region.  
 
• In 2004, individuals donated a total $1.910 billion in Turkey. 
 
• 80% of the public donate money each year. Of these:  
• 87% preferred to give donations directly to individuals, without an 
institutional intermediary (e.g. NGOs) 
• 82% of respondents preferred to support a relative, neighbour or 
someone from the same region 
• 70% of respondents felt it was the responsibility of the state or the most 
wealthy to look after the needy in society 




 The survey results point to a culture of giving that leaves relatively little room 
for NGOs to benefit from public philanthropy. This culture, with its origins in the 
Islamic traditions of giving, constitutes a method of complementing social services 
provided by the state. In effect, donations serve the purpose of an informal social 
service, making up for state funds where they are insufficient on their own to provide 
for the less fortunate. An informal family support network has traditionally 
supplemented state provision of welfare, and the informal donations made by the 
public can be regarded as an extension of this system. On the other hand, 70 per cent 
of the respondents regarded the state as the primary actor in protecting the interests of 
the least fortunate in society. In-between the Islamic tradition of giving with emphasis 
on a personal connection between the donor and the beneficiary, and the tendency to 
place responsibility on the state to look after the less fortunate, NGOs are likely to find 
it difficult to solicit financial contributions from society. Figure 1 below helps to 
illustrate in monetary terms the breakdown of donations between different areas: 



















Figure 1: Breakdown of total public donations into four categories, adapted (Carkoğlu 2006) 
Figure 1 elucidates the double bind in which NGOs find themselves. The proportion of 
funds donated both as direct giving (donations made informally and intermittently to 
individuals) and religious giving (this includes organised giving to mosques and other 
religious institutions as fulfilment of religious obligation) is significantly higher than 






institutions). It is the “lack of structured funding practices”, the CIS report opines, that 
limits NGO access to funds (TUSEV 2005 p. 13). 
 We can find out a bit more about this category of “organised giving”. Where 
individuals choose to make donations to CSOs, 19 per cent make their donations to the 
Turkish Aeronautical Association (Türk Hava Kurumu – THK). The THK was 
established in 1925 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and has remained a popular 
organisation to offer donations to. Atatürk attached great importance to aviation, not 
least because his adopted daughter, Sabiha Gökcen, was the world’s first female 
fighter pilot. Her story became embedded in the broader secular narrative about 
progress on women’s rights, and was taken as evidence of a progressive, modern 
society that was developing the republic. The THK has thus become a symbol of 
Kemalism and secularism. It remains the only aviation association in Turkey and 
traditionally it has been the only organisation allowed to receive the skins of animals 
sacrificed in religious celebrations as donations, and to make an income from this.60 
Thus, a significant portion of the total donations under the organised giving category is 
taken by one organisation alone. In addition, among those who chose to make 
donations to organisations, the three most preferred categories were “helping the 
needy, education, and helping the handicapped. The three least preferred causes were 
“consumer rights, human rights and animal protection” (Carkoğlu 2006). In 
conclusion, the organisations that are likely to find it most difficult to access domestic 
funds are NGOs that are non-religious and focused on rights-based work. 
The above discussion makes the case that in the current climate CSOs – and 
advocacy NGOs in particular – have limited possibilities for raising funds 
domestically. There is some real potential within the domestic giving framework that 
needs to be noted – a genuine interest in philanthropy, indicated by the proportion of 
population that are active donors each year, as well as by the total amount donated. Yet 
Turkey is lacking in a culture of philanthropy that would instinctively support NGOs. 
The prevalence of both ad hoc giving to individuals and religiously-organised giving 
means that donations to secular NGOs are not intuitive, and the avenues for funding 
these organisations are not clearly marked. Although one should not take funding to be 
the life and soul of civil society activity, it nevertheless seems reasonable to argue that 
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the potential of advocacy NGOs is encumbered by the unavailability of domestic 
funding. 
 How does the case of Turkey compare with the funding opportunities available 
in the United Kingdom? This brief discussion intends to provide some frame of 
reference for the Turkish experience in the context of Europe. Two broad conclusions 
can be arrived at from looking at the data for UK.61 First of all, individual giving tends 
to concentrate heavily around research and services: medical research receives 17 per 
cent of the total given by individuals to charitable causes, religious causes 16 per cent, 
hospitals and hospices 11 per cent of total giving. The report mentions human rights 
under the category of “other”, sharing a 7 per cent stake with other causes such as 
rescue services, and refugees (NCVO 2007 p.20). In this sense, advocacy work 
receives a notably low proportion of the total giving available, reflecting a similar state 
of affairs as that in Turkey. However, whilst rights-based advocacy may not feature 
prominently among the most popular causes, the preferred methods of funding do 
seem more sustainable. 29 per cent of all giving was donated through regular giving 
(defined as donations made by direct debit, payroll giving and membership fees),  of 
which 24 per cent is made through monthly direct debit payments (compared with 18 
per cent in cash). This style of giving ensures a continuous flow of funds until the 
donor chooses to discontinue these payments and stands in stark contrast with the ad-
hoc and unstructured nature of giving in Turkey.  
  
NGO views on domestic funding 
Interviews with representatives of advocacy NGOs revealed further obstacles to 
domestic fundraising. Advocacy NGOs’ work is perceived as troublemaking by the 
broader public. Despite working on potentially less political and sensitive agendas, for 
example on environmental protection or consumer rights, this still constitutes an 
agenda for change. The NGO is advocating for change in government policy in order 
to improve environmental protection measures, for example. Asking for change 
conveys an underlining message of unhappiness with the present state of affairs – that 
the government in some way has got it wrong. Whilst this is the essence of what it 
means to be an advocacy NGO, others often view this position differently: 
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Most support goes to health and education because these are safe areas 
with no controversy because the NGOs are not criticising the 
government. Businesses are worried about supporting NGOs that criticise 
government policy because they might also be labelled as questionable.62 
 
Money from abroad is very important to us, as there is no money 
forthcoming in Turkey. Even one very well known Turkish financier told 
me that he really would like to support our work, but he was reluctant as 
he felt this would label him as an “enemy of the state”.63 
 
For NGOs to question, or problematise the role of the state in Turkey is often 
regarded as opposition to the state – not constructive criticism. The public 
reluctance to support NGOs can be explained, at least in part, by this concern of 
being labelled troublemakers. Chapter Four discussed the state tradition of 
regarding civil society as an ally of secularism and the tendency to bifurcate civil 
society along the official (secular) and informal (non-secular) lines. Similar 
dynamics seem to be at play here, where advocacy work is vulnerable to 
becoming politicised against the polarised, black and white canvas of Turkish 
politics. It is difficult for NGOs in Turkey to work alongside the state: you are 
either with the state, or against it. 
 The difficulties NGOs face in achieving tax exemption status illustrates 
another tricky hurdle in trying to raise money from domestic sources. In order to 
qualify for tax exemption, each NGO requires an approval from the level of 
government to assure it is indeed conducting philanthropic work. The minimum 
standards require all applicants to work in one of the following four areas: 
education, arts/culture, health, or scientific research (TUSEV 2004). For 
comparison, the UK Charities Act from 2006 lists 13 different meanings of a 
charitable purpose, offering a significantly broader range of activities that are 
considered to be for public benefit and therefore enjoying from tax benefits 
(OPSI 2006). To date, a mere 700 out of the approximately 80,000 associations 
in Turkey, and 170 of the 4,500 foundations have the status of a public benefit 
organisation and are able to return tax exemption gains to their donors. This 
equates to 0.875 per cent of all associations and 3.78 per cent of foundations 
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(TUSEV 2005). The narrow interpretation of what is meant by public benefit has 
implications for advocacy NGOs in particular: 
 
The NGOs that have achieved tax exemption status are almost all 
working in service delivery, and businesses are keen to support these 
organisations, as they gain tax benefits also. Our application for tax 
exemption status was declined on the basis that our organisation focuses 
only on women’s issues, not on the public at large. So advocacy groups 
really lose out.64 
 
To compound the effect of this policy, the report on Trends in Individual Giving 
(table 4) showed that 70 per cent of individual donors are motivated to make a 
donation in return for tax exemption benefits (Carkoğlu 2006). The limited scope 
for tax exemptions significantly dampens the chances of NGOs finding domestic 
funding.  
 What to make, then, of the opportunities and shortcomings present within 
the domestic landscape of civil society funding? Whilst a significant amount of 
money is donated each year to charitable purposes in Turkey, the way in which it 
is distributed generates pockets within civil society that are isolated. The areas 
most affected by funding limitations relate to new types of charitable activity, 
such as advocacy. These are new in the sense that they have not historically been 
part of Turkish civil society, or they alternatively are taken to resemble the 
trouble-making organisations responsible for the political unrest in the 1970s or 
1980s and therefore avoided. This need not mean that financial support is the 
central essence of civil society activity, however, for it is entirely conceivable for 
NGOs to function effectively with minimal funding, as many do. However, for 
those advocacy NGOs that deem improved financial support beneficial to their 
activities, the domestic opportunities for increased funding are very limited. It 
makes sense, therefore, for such NGOs to concentrate their efforts on funding 
opportunities available elsewhere. 
 
6.3 The EU funding process 
This section describes the available funding mechanisms and outlines the role of 
certain domestic actors that play a key role in channelling funds from the EU to civil 
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society. There are three financial instruments through which Turkish NGOs are able to 
access EU funding. The main instrument is the budget allocation for pre-accession 
assistance, an annual allocation of financial support to Turkey directly.65 This money is 
channelled to the Turkish government to facilitate the harmonisation process in areas 
such as adopting the EU acquis and meeting other requirements for political and 
economic reform. In 2008 this allocation amounted to approximately €540 million, 
rising to €654 million in 2010 (see figure 2). In fact, since the start of the pre-accession 
process in 2004 the annual funding has increased by a factor of 2.5. Within the 
harmonising process, funding for civil society falls under the criterion of political 
reform, where the Turkish government and the EU Delegation in Turkey come 
together annually to decide on priority areas of funding. All the EU funds available 
through this instrument are distributed through the Central Finance and Contracts Unit 
(CFCU). Another important channel is the Civil Society Development Centre (CSDC), 
an independent organisation that acts as a go-between the CFCU and NGOs. The roles 
of both the CFCU and the CSDC will be discussed at length later. 
The other two financial instruments are linked to the central budget of the EU. 
These are community programmes and thematic programmes, and Turkish NGOs are 
eligible to apply for a number of funds within these programmes. The application 
process for these latter two is located at Brussels, and the funds through these 
instruments are allocated largely to cooperative projects requiring European partner 
organisations. Whilst the research discussed here focuses on the funding made 
available within the confines of the pre-accession process (the first financial 
instrument), it is important to note that other avenues through which NGOs can access 
EU funding exist also. In particular, this illustrates the complex web of funding 
channels that NGOs are required to negotiate in the EU context: 
 
Access to EU funds is getting more complicated by the day. The 
application process is totally complicated for the NGOs, and for the 
capacity they have, but it’s also getting more complicated in terms of 
access points.66 
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The EU Delegation in Ankara emphasises the need for civil society funding as a way 
of expanding the impact of the political reforms that are taking place, by extending the 
political debate to the level of citizens. NGOs are seen as key intermediaries in this 
process. However, very little consultation takes place with NGOs on what the priorities 
ought to be: 
 
We [the EU Delegation] are bad at consultation. We come up with ideas 
internally and take them to civil society representatives to make sure that 
these ideas can “fly”. To do this we either consult individual and well-
known NGOs, or we have larger roundtable meetings.67 
 
The EU delegation receives a lot of criticism from outside that our 
funding goes only to the elite NGOs. This is certainly not the case; we 
have data on the geographical spread of our NGO funding. I don’t think 
that only the most professional NGOs based in Ankara and Istanbul have 
capacity benefit from our funds.68 
 
It is the EU representatives and the Turkish government who ultimately decide on 
priorities. The initiative for civil society involvement in decision-making comes from 
the EU Delegation, not from the organisations themselves. Nor is the process 
particularly participatory, as NGOs have no role at the early stages of this process 
when priorities are negotiated. Instead, the consultation meetings become the means of 
furthering an agenda that has already been decided upon elsewhere. The decision as to 
how NGOs are supported to take part in the political debate, and through what kinds of 
projects, is made through a top-down process with minimal consultation. 
 The medley of three tables (figures 2, 3 and 4) that end this section, offer a 
brief numeric journey through the story of EU funding in Turkey, and give an insight 
to the way in which financial support is distributed. As figure 2 shows, the amount of 
financial support has been steadily climbing up throughout the past six years. As 
shown in Chapter Three, under the policy of Civil Society Dialogue, the EU has made 
a commitment to channel ten per cent of this annual total to civil society. Therefore, a 
proportion of any increase in total funding becomes available to CSOs. The first half 
of figure 3 demonstrates how the total assistance for 2007 was divided between the 
three main recipients: the EU secretary general (Turkish governmental department 
responsible for the EU harmonisation process), government ministries and civil 







society. The second half of figure 3 provides a further breakdown of how financing 
was distributed within civil society. 
 The relatively sizeable amount of funding received by trade unions and 
chambers of commerce requires clarification. First of all, this is a clear indication that 
the EU does not see civil society only in terms of NGOs. Instead, EU pursues multiple 
strategies, which in this case involves organisations that are closely linked with 
economic development. The financial support from the EU was channelled into two 
large projects, both of which fall under the broader programme of Civil Society 
Dialogue. One project aimed to strengthen the dialogue and cooperation between the 
Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve 
Bursalar Birliği – TOBB), an umbrella organisation with 364 members in Turkey and 
the European Association of Chambres of Commerce and Industry 
(EUROCHAMBRES), in so doing promoting the integration of Turkish and European 
business communities (European Commission 2006a). The objective of the second 
project was to strengthen contacts and mutual exchange of experience between the 
trade unions of Turkey and trade unions of EU member states. Four national trade 
union confederations from Turkey were involved (TÜRK-IŞ, HAK-ĐŞ, DĐSK and 
KESK) as well as confederations from seven European countries (France, Germany, 
Austria, Italy, Slovakia, Sweden and Greece) (European Commission 2006c). Thus, 
whilst civil society funding reaches a variety of stakeholders and not only NGOs, 
through the Civil Society Dialogue programme the funding rationale continues to be 
tightly linked to the pre-accession process and Europeanisation. 
Figure 4 shows how funding has been distributed across the five geographical 
regions. The results show that Central Anatolia (this region includes funding for 
Ankara) and Marmara (includes Istanbul) are the two regions far ahead of others in 
terms of funds received. These results question the claim referred to earlier that the EU 
offices in Turkey that funding is equally distributed. Although funding reaches all 
eight regions of Turkey, there are significant differences in the amount of funding each 
region receives. A significant proportion of NGOs is located in Ankara and Istanbul, as 
being near the centres of power makes it easier to gain access to funding. It seems 
much work is still required if more equal access to funds for NGOs across Turkey is 
















































Figure 3: Total allocation of pre-accession financial assistance in 2007 (top), and the allocation within 
this to civil society (bottom) (European Commission 2010b) 
 

































































































Figure 4: Distribution of EU funds by region (Central Anatolia includes Ankara, whilst Marmara 
includes Istanbul)69 

















































Figure 5: Distribution of EU funds per person within each region70 
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However, when in figure 5 we reflect on these figures in terms of total 
populations within each region, the three peaks that emerge in figure 4 flatten out 
somewhat. Although Central Anatolia remains the main recipient of funding, the 
amount of funding distributed to the Marmara region is more in line with the other 
regions. In addition, Eastern Anatolia emerges as a region that receive more funding 
per head than the crude numbers in figure 4 indicate, joining Southeast Anatolia as a 
key recipient. Therefore, when we consider EU funding in terms of regional 
populations, the logic behind the funding strategy becomes clearer. Central Anatolia 
and Marmara regions receive significant amounts of funding, because these regions are 
the two most densely populated regions. The two regions in eastern Turkey – Eastern 
Anatolia and Southeast Anatolia – have relatively low population densities, but in the 
end receive more funding per head than Marmara region. Furthermore, these eastern 
regions are among the poorest in Turkey, having suffered from a limited investment in 
infrastructure due to the unstable political situation in the region. These findings 
suggest that the logic behind EU funding takes into consideration the number of people 
and the relative need of the population living within a given region. 
 
Domestic intermediaries in the EU funding process 
Since the preparations for accession negotiations begun, the EU has shifted 
responsibility for many of the procedural operations to Turkish actors. Civil society 
funding is one such area, where the CFCU and the CSDC have played an important 
role. These roles offer a useful insight to the changing nature of civil society funding 
since the start of the negotiations. 
Central Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU): The CFCU is the key 
intermediary, and the most important governmental actor in civil society funding. It is 
the governmental body with financial oversight over all EU-funded programmes. As 
has been the case with all recent candidate countries, the CFCU was established as part 
of the accession negotiations in order to develop an umbrella structure aimed at 
transferring the contracting authority of the European Commission to the Turkish 
government. As such, it is part and parcel of the policy Europeanisation processes that 
the accession negotiations have sparked. Since 2003 the CFCU has gradually come to 
shoulder the responsibility for budgeting, tendering, contracting, and all other financial 
aspects of EU-funded programmes in Turkey, including grants to NGOs. Most of its 
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employees have a background in the civil service, having worked at government 
ministries, or as lawyers and accountants. Many regard this as a simple technical 
switch, a response to calls to manage the overall funding processes more effectively 
and to shifting more responsibility onto Turkish institutions – as per the requirements 
of the pre-accession process. The CFCU is an integral part of the bureaucratic-
technical framework of the EU pre-accession process. 
 The introduction of the CFCU to the funding process denotes a real shift in the 
EU-civil society relationship. Since the start of the accession process, the EU 
delegation in Turkey has developed relationships with a broad variety of stakeholders. 
Many activities that were previously a direct responsibility of the EU offices in Turkey 
have been delegated to others. By creating additional levels of administration between 
the EU offices and the recipient NGOs, the changes have led to a layering effect in 
civil society funding processes. The shift in the relationship is captured by the 
following comment: 
 
Before 2003, when the debate was about reforms required for Turkey to 
reach the pre-accession stage, we were working closely with civil society 
actors to steer the agenda and the debate. Once the pre-accession 
negotiations started, the priority for us shifted from civil society to public 
institutions that are required to do the actual harmonisation work. I don’t 
think the role of NGOs has changed, but the spectrum has changed, and 
now they are one among many important actors.71 
 
From an NGO perspective, the change that has taken place is more than a technical 
amendment to operations. The introduction of the CFCU, a third party, to the EU-civil 
society relationship significantly alters the dynamics. A representative of the CFCU 
summarised this change in an interview, as he said, “we need to be more rigorous and 
more detailed in our work because we are looking after someone else’s money”.72 The 
CFCU is responsible for a broad array of financing, where NGO funding constitutes 
only a small portion. Furthermore, the CFCU remains primarily accountable to the EU 
and to Turkish ministries to ensure that the money they are channelling is being spent 
in legitimate ways. Many of the NGO respondents were highly critical of the role of 
the CFCU in the funding process: 
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They are a stupid organisation. They are stupid, stupid, stupid. All I do is 
write reports, fill in forms, work on the accounts. We have now waited 
six months since we finished our project for the final 20 per cent 
[€20,000] of the funds to come through. Before, in a different project, the 
EU Delegation sent the remaining money within 15 days once we had 
sent our report to them. […] CFCU are really concerned about tax. They 
first want to make sure that we have paid all tax. Then they want to check 
that all those companies that we used in the project have also paid tax on 
the money they got.73 
 
There are implications for NGOs that arise from this new division of labour and that 
constitute more than a simple bureaucratic initiative. The way in which the EU 
Delegation and the CFCU perceive their role within the funding process is very 
different, and does not amount to a simple shift of responsibilities from one entity to 
another. The CFCU is ultimately a governmental body and it has therefore 
governmental interests at heart. After all, only a small segment of the funds that flow 
through the CFCU concerns non-state actors, making NGOs a sideshow for the CFCU. 
A poignant example of this came during my research when visiting CFCU offices, 
which happened to be on a Friday. My meeting finished just in time to witness the 
mass exodus as virtually all CFCU staff made their way to Friday prayers. 
Anecdotally, several of the NGO respondents interpreted this type of behaviour as a 
sign of allegiance with the AKP, the moderate Islamic party in power. Visiting Friday 
prayers was much less popular before the AKP came to power. Whilst it may not be 
surprising that the political party in power employs like-minded individuals, this 
behaviour is also indicative of the priorities that inform CFCU decision-making. 
Despite operating in a capacity that is independent of the state, at the end of the day 
CFCU staff are state employees, whose future careers are in part determined by their 
political affiliations. The state, not the non-state, lies in their direct gaze. 
From the point of view of the NGOs, the funding relationship is no longer seen 
as a partnership with mutual aims. Whilst this shift has been deemed a neutral, 
administrative operation by the CFCU and the EU Delegation, in fact this can have 
implications on the ability of NGOs to make use of their comparative advantage: to 
think outside the box and produce innovative, locally relevant projects. The process 
constrains them to conduct their work within the strict project criteria governed by 
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forms and reports. Whilst these are not new problems for NGOs in Turkey, the new 
structures have augmented the magnitude and extent of the difficulties. 
The Civil Society Development Centre (CSDC): The CSDC is a central player 
in civil society funding. An independent NGO itself, it has established itself as the 
domestic hub to distribute EU funding in Turkey, as figure 3 indicates. In 2007-8, the 
CSDC has reportedly issued € 3.1 million in grants. Although the project themes still 
originate from within the EU, the CSDC has considerable discretion over who is being 
funded. The idea for the CSDC originates from a project funded by the EU delegation. 
In 2003, a team of Turkish civil society experts were funded by the EU Commission 
under a two-year Civil Society Development Programme with the aim of providing 
NGO training across Turkey. It was following the success of the programme that the 
team was encouraged by the EU delegation to form an association and to apply for 
grants. The purpose of the CSDC has been the following: 
 
To be like an internal mechanism within civil society promoting its own 
development. They would be doing the work for themselves and we 
would only give them funding. We’ve given them considerable funding, 
actually.74 
 
CSDC is kind of a semi-donor, the middle man between CFCU and 
NGOs that gets asked to find grantees. The grant programmes are devised 
using our past experience in the field that helps us understanding what 
the immediate needs of NGOs are. Ultimately, the CFCU will need to 
accept our suggestions before things move ahead.75 
 
The CSDC aims to build the capacity of NGOs at the local level by identifying 
grantees and offering them support throughout the project cycle. The CSDC staff are 
Turkish civil society activist and experts, with locally relevant experience that aims to 
make the organisation more accessible to local NGOs. It is also an attempt to address 
the inequities of the application process for EU funding, which tends to favour the elite 
NGOs. The CSDC seems to respond to some of the criticisms that donor-funded 
programmes have faced, where they are seen as out of touch and imposing an external 
set of values onto local civil society (Ottaway and Carothers 2000). In comparison to 
these observations the CSDC is a constructive development. 
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Furthermore, given the origins of the CSDC, it is difficult to consider this 
entity to be truly an internal mechanism within civil society. The impetus to create the 
CSDC came from the encouragement within the EU family. The CSDC is not simply 
part of civil society, just another NGO, but an additional layer in the relationship 
between the EU and other NGOs. The CSDC offers support and capacity-building 
services to the NGOs it works with, but it does this in the context of EU-funded 
projects where the support is aimed at guiding the NGO successfully through the 
project cycle. In practice, therefore, the actions of the CSDC improve the efficiency of 
NGOs as vehicles for distributing EU funds and delivering projects. Does the CSDC, 
therefore, truly help civil society to internalise the new processes EU funding requires, 
or does it merely perpetuate the superficial nature of external funding? 
Earlier in this chapter, as well as frequently throughout the thesis, the 
motivations for donor funding toward NGOs have been linked to ideas about 
democratisation and Europeanisation. In this regard civil society funding strategies 
tend to pay special attention to the strengthening of civil society through support for 
advocacy NGOs. In operationalising such aims, there seems to be more focus on the 
management of the funding process and creating channels through which financial 
assistance is distributed and NGOs made accountable. In Turkey’s case this has been 
realised through intermediary organisations such as the CFCU and the CSDC. These 
developments are illustrative of how Europeanisation unfolds in practice but also point 
to a particular set of circumstances where the processes of change are potentially at 
odds with the agenda for democratisation. Funding for NGOs, despite best intentions 
by everyone concerned, is unlikely to lead to a more democratic society in any direct, 
measurable way. Governmental control of the finances for nongovernmental action 
may jeopardise the independence of NGOs. Similarly, the additional layers of 
management between the EU Delegation and NGOs are likely to increase the distance 
between the two sides, and compromise the active participation of the latter. 
 
6.4 NGO views on the funding process 
The above section laid out a scenario where the limited domestic opportunities 
encourage NGOs to look for external sources of funding. Access to external funding is 
facilitated by domestic organisations, the CFCU and the CSDC, which have been 
appointed by the EU to manage the funding process, and who exercise certain 
conditions on how the funds are accessed and managed. What kind of choices, then, do 
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advocacy NGOs make in practice and how do they rationalise their decisions? On the 
bases of interviews with representatives of advocacy NGOs, two determinants for their 
choices to either participate or not to participate in EU funding programmes are 
identified: the internal organisational capacity and what the NGO deems its source of 
legitimacy to be.  
 
Participation in EU funding 
Focusing on NGO capacity at first, this is understood in terms of an ability to carry out 
activities effectively. From the donor perspective, this idea is strongly linked with the 
debate on capacity-building. As discussed in Chapter Three in particular, this can be 
understood as strengthening the NGO’s role in providing services or supporting 
democratic processes by developing the organisational dimension of an NGO (Lewis 
2001). From the perspective of Turkish NGOs, the funding they have received from 
the EU did not change what they did, but it enabled them to do it quicker, or to do 
more of it. Donor funding was positive because it improved their capacity to get this 
done:  
 
Before, you could have projects if you paid from your own money. It was 
hard, really difficult. In the last ten years the funds have been really good 
in helping NGOs to really do something.76 
 
There is a new environment where if you have an idea about something 
you want to change, you can find money and do something easier… 
When we first founded a women's centre [early 1990s], we collected the 
money for the psychologist's salary by selling second hand clothes at the 
market…but now it’s different, the funds have become a chance to do 
something quickly, and to be more effective.77 
 
External assistance is regarded as a short-cut to achieving aims that previously 
required a great deal of individual effort. Several examples of the kinds of activities 
such funding had enabled emerged during the interviews. The additional funds have 
translated to the creation and dissemination of informational pamphlets about the 
issues they work on; financial and logistical support for organising workshops or 
conferences; support for research projects and publication of research on topical issues 
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such as honour killings.78 This is the first point in regard to NGO participation in EU-
funded projects: project funding is deemed a shortcut to pursuing the already existing 
objectives of these NGOs. 
In the second instance, the funding has also improved the organisational 
capacity of the NGOs, in the more traditional sense of capacity-building: 
 
When we receive EU funding that allows us to hire staff, then we 
prioritise those women who have been doing voluntary work for us.79 
 
Through EU projects we learnt about project management; we had a 
“learn by doing” approach to our work which helped us to learn a lot 
from the EU projects.80 
 
We have to accept that these [EU funds] are the most sustainable funds 
available to us, and we will do what is required to be able to apply for 
them in the future also.81 
 
The internal organisational dimension of NGOs has benefited from funding. This has 
happened through actions such as hiring staff from a volunteer base, thus avoiding a 
brain drain at the end of a project, and through the development of managerial and 
administrative skills during EU-funded projects. As a consequence, NGOs have 
become more professional in their activities. Arguably, the support received has made 
NGOs more viable as organisations. 
Thirdly, the NGOs partaking in EU-funded projects described the existence of 
a positive feedback loop where participation in EU-funded projects improves NGO 
capacity to succeed with future funding applications. On the one hand this may be the 
result of increased organisational capacity. On the other hand, the NGOs described 
themselves as being part of an inner circle that was more likely to succeed with 
funding applications:  
 
We find it easy to get funding. Because we have past experience [with 
EU-funded projects], which helps. The government knows us, the EU 
knows us – we have some really good contacts. We just do what is 
needed and we get the money.82 
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Since receiving EU funds, we have increased our public exposure in 
newspapers, and as a consequence of this we have been able to increase 
our financial and voluntary support.83 
 
In other words, EU support leads to developments outside the immediate terrain of 
project funding, offering benefits such as increased publicity that in turn helps NGOs 
to garner additional support. It is a virtuous cycle, where the first two forms of 
bolstered capacity – effectiveness and organisational strengthening – feed into this 
third effect. NGOs benefit both internally and externally in terms of publicity and 
public perceptions that make it more likely to attract more funding from other external 
sources. Thus the benefits to internal effectiveness motivate NGOs to apply for EU 
funding in the first instance. The actual experience of participating in funded projects 
can lead to further improvements, where the positive outcomes of funding both 
encourage and facilitate further applications for funding. For a group of NGOs, at 
least, the capacity gains have led to a choice to pursue EU project funding.  
 The second determinate of NGO participation in EU funding relates to 
perceptions of legitimacy. Legitimacy refers to the credibility of an organisation, based 
on perceived moral justifications for its social and political actions (Lewis 2001 p. 
201). In this regard, the EU pre-accession process has been helpful in expanding the 
spectrum of social and political issues that are deemed legitimate for NGOs to engage 
in and criticise the actions of the state:  
 
The EU has had an impact on creating more space for women and gender 
issues. “Gender” is now part of the EU application process and 
something we have to address in our applications.84 
 
EU provides additional points to the agenda…there is additional leverage 
gained for these points thanks to EU.85 
 
EU impact? To create new issues that we can take up in our advocacy 
work.86 
 
As discussed in Chapter Four, in this way the EU can offer an external anchor upon 
which NGOs hinge their efforts (Tocci 2005). The EU sustains a strong rhetoric in 
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support of human rights and democratisation (as discussed in Chapter Three) and the 
EU interest in these areas has widened the scope of issues that are legitimate for NGOs 
to work on. Such issues have gained legitimacy as areas of genuine concern, and 
several NGOs working on issues of environmental rights, child rights and women’s 
rights have begun to make their concerns heard at the national stage. Not only has EU 
involvement pushed such issues higher up the agenda, but by making the issue of 
rights an important one, the credibility of organisations working on these issues has 
also magnified. Both the issue of rights and the NGOs working on rights-based issues 
have gained credibility through EU involvement.  
What is more, the publicity and air of professionalism generated by EU funding 
also leads to legitimacy gains. It builds an image of a successful organisation, a 
professional organisation dealing with genuine issues of concern. Receipt of EU funds 
becomes shorthand for a successful NGO, and by making NGOs household names, 
funding from the EU can increase legitimacy of the advocacy work in the eyes of the 
public. EU funding therefore creates a virtuous cycle – at least for some. EU support 
leads to gains of both legitimacy and capacity among the recipients, and is 
advantageous in future applications for funding. However, for other NGOs these two 
very same issues of legitimacy and capacity can become a criterion for exclusion from 
EU funding. 
 
Non-participation in EU funding 
Staying first with the issue of legitimacy, here the question is what an NGO perceives 
its source of legitimacy to be, and whether affiliation with the EU would undermine 
this. Consequently several advocacy NGOs consciously avoid donor funding, and use 
this as means to garner broader support for their cause. The following comments 
clarify the kind of reasoning that leads to such decisions: 
 
We constantly face the question “who is funding you, who is behind 
you”. It is important that we can reply that our funds come from members 
and other supporters inside Turkey.87 
 
We have received no funding from the EU, and we don’t want to apply 
for such funding. Because we believe that we should enter the EU in 
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equal terms and nothing else […] we prefer local funds and wish to avoid 
dependence on foreign funds.88 
 
Independence is the precondition of being an NGO. External funds give 
you the label of being the back garden of another organisation.89 
  
The decision not to apply for EU funding is part of the organisational mission and 
sends a message that resonates well with their constituency and the membership of the 
NGO. If the NGO were to receive money from abroad, this would undermine the 
justifications for its social and political actions. It would face the possibility that its 
message would no longer be taken seriously because the NGO would be deemed to be 
delivering a message on someone else’s behalf. This is not a development that is 
unique to Turkey. In India for example, externally funded NGOs have received the 
label of agents of imperialism, and some NGOs, in order to gain popular legitimacy, 
openly distanced themselves from being referred to as NGOs (Jenkins 2007 p. 64-65, 
quoted in Howell 2010 p.139). This shadows the old saying “he who pays the piper 
calls the tune”, alluding to an assumption that an NGO is forced to trade some of its 
independence in exchange for external assistance. 
 The decision to avoid external funding is also a reflection on sources of 
authority. NGOs that position themselves along nationalist or Kemalist political lines 
source their authority from nationalist/Kemalist political rhetoric, which is in part 
framed in scepticism over the EU agenda in Turkey. By publicly refusing EU funding 
NGOs are able to assert their authority as being on the forefront of the nationalist or 
secular agenda. Contrary to its intentions, EU funding thus provides a potential avenue 
for anti-EU sentiment to flare up, and offers here an example of how the impact of EU 
funding reaches beyond the realm of the project. This again highlights some of the 
uncertainty present in the EU efforts to achieve Europeanisation in Turkey.   
Secondly, lack of organisational capacity leads NGOs to make the decision not 
to participate in the EU funding process. Here the exclusion is not necessarily by 
choice, but reflects a barrier between EU funding and NGO ability to manage the 
application and funding processes that surround the funding framework. In the 
interviews conducted for this research, some NGOs described the gap between their 
operations and EU funding as unbridgeable. As one respondent commented, “it’s 
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difficult to know enough about the funding process. There are only a few of us and we 
lack the knowledge.”90 In a similar manner, other respondents felt that the demands of 
an EU-funded project were beyond the abilities of the NGO: “We think the EU 
projects are too technical, complicated and demanding for us. If we applied, we would 
have to find someone to carry out the project for us.”91 These views are confirmed by 
another respondent who works closely with youth NGOs, supporting their activities: 
 
The application process [for EU funding] is unbelievable, we no longer think 
the gains are worth the effort and bureaucracy, especially for inexperienced 
youth groups. We now advise youth groups not to apply for EU funding [...] 
Turks normally don’t speak a second language, this becomes a barrier. This is 
especially difficult for youth organisations because many students only learn 
English once they come to university. 92 
 
Thus there are several issues surrounding the application process that lead to NGOs 
with less capacity deciding not to apply for EU funding. NGOs lack the human 
resources to cope with the additional work required to find out about opportunities. 
Second, there are the opportunity costs of conducting the work – the application 
process in itself is found to be too complex, bureaucratic and not worth the effort. The 
application process in most cases is in English, and this alone is a barrier for many 
NGOs, regardless of their capacity to conduct the work. Finally, as the quotation above 
suggests, EU projects have gained a reputation for being difficult to manage, and for 
some it is the anticipation of this workload that leads to the decision to avoid EU 
funding. These examples attest to the observation made earlier that donors prefer to 
work with organisations that are amenable to bureaucratisation and routinisation 
(Howell and Lind 2009). 
 There exist various ways that NGOs react to the availability of EU funding. 
Whilst some NGOs viewed external funding as something to aspire towards, other 
NGOs had made a conscious decision to completely avoid foreign funding. Reasons 
for this can be found in NGO perceptions of legitimacy and NGO capacity to apply 
and manage the projects to which funding is tied to. Despite what seems to be a 
distinct lack of domestically available funding for advocacy NGOs in Turkey, NGOs 
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do not apply for funding for the sake of it. The way EU funding separates NGOs into 
participating and non-participating groups should be considered more carefully. These 
dynamics set the ball rolling in developing an elite of NGOs that have strong capacity 
for high impact work, whilst other NGOs are inadvertently pushed away from these 
funding opportunities. It is important to think more carefully who in civil society is 
reached by these funds, what kind of impact this is likely to have, and how these 
outcomes relate to the announced aims of EU funding. It appears that the way in which 
project funding is operationalised means that organisations that are bureaucratically 
obedient and able are preferred. 
 
Funding through projects 
This section begins to unpack the way in which projects, the key mechanism for 
channelling funding, shape NGO behaviour (this discussion continues in more detail in 
Chapter Seven). EU funding to NGOs is distributed solely through projects. The 
centrality of the project in turn has changed the way NGOs think about their activities, 
shifting NGO priorities away from their beneficiaries, and shaping the inclusion and 
exclusion of NGOs in EU-funded projects. 
 The project approach to funding is highly complex and needs to be carefully 
deconstructed. Projects are packages of time-constrained activities within a fixed 
budget, where success and failure are regularly based on quantifiable cost-benefit 
analysis. Whilst projects can pinpoint money directly to an area where it is needed and 
ensure that activists with local knowledge are involved, the problem is that most 
projects are short-lived and often fail to sustain benefits beyond the life of a project. 
Projects also create dependence by creating a superficial funding environment, 
spawning groups that only exist because of available funding (Carothers 1999). 
Moreover, whilst projects are being carried out they often lack flexibility to adopt to a 
local reality. The monitoring of this work ties NGOs down to writing reports that are 
unable to convey the local situation. For each project, myriad NGOs apply – how do 
you pick the right NGO to work with? The tendency is to engage with those NGOs that 
speak English, particularly the development jargon, and know how to develop project 
proposals. The fact that all funding is made available through projects in itself acts as a 
selection criteria for NGOs. The short-termism of project funding also places limits on 
what kinds of outcomes can be expected.  
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 For those NGOs that partake in projects, or aspire to do so, the experience has 
certainly shaped them. As one respondent observed, “projects are increasingly 
becoming the focus of NGO work. The focus is shifting from voluntary work to having 
to secure some funding before an idea is worth acting upon”.93 In similar fashion 
another respondent opined, “the success of NGOs should be dependent on how well 
they can think ‘outside of the box’. But in reality, their success is measured by how 
many funds they win”.94 Both of these comments allude to the same phenomenon. The 
ideas and actions of NGOs gravitate towards projects, and thus towards types of 
activities that the EU has decided to fund. These activities are chosen with a view of 
supporting the Europeanisation processes that form the basis of the EU accession 
negotiations. Although the passion that spurs NGOs to speak for a cause is still there, 
this is now moderated by a new model as to how NGO work ought to be conducted. 
The project cycle tends to emphasise the practical needs of running a project and 
pushes NGOs towards realising these needs. In the words of another respondent, “you 
don’t have time to go and implement the project in the field because all your time is 
taken up by the financial management of the project”.95 The projects often offer 
significant amounts of money to NGOs, and the warning “you should not run before 
you can walk”96 aptly describe the dangers of NGOs applying for projects that are not 
within their organisational capacity. 
The way in which NGOs approach funding that is framed around projects has 
two key outcomes. On the one hand the projects become a measure of success for 
NGOs. The application process can be likened to an examination, the passing of which 
leads to a qualification of sorts. As one interviewee pointed out to me, the language 
used in this context also suggests this: NGOs “win” grant “competitions”.97 On the 
other hand, NGO activities are no longer developed organically based on local needs. 
Instead, the activities become synthetic, designed to meet project criteria. The project 
competitions are all based on similar ideas, requiring similar activities from the 
projects; there is no space for NGOs to think outside the box. By becoming the 
yardstick by which success is measured, projects bring about increased competition 
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among NGOs, potentially fuelling the essentialist nature of civil society activity in 
Turkey. 
What is more, the project approach limits methods of communication between 
the EU and NGOs to the application process. The NGO communicates its vision of 
what kind of activities it would like to carry out in a project application, which is then 
either approved or disapproved by the officials responsible. The nature of the process 
does not lend itself to a dialogue where, for example, good project ideas that may not 
be a perfect fit with project criteria, or proposals which are underdeveloped in 
technical detail but conceptually innovative, are given a chance. A more interactive 
application process would allow such ideas to be developed, increasing the diversity 
and breadth of projects as well as helping to make them more locally relevant. In 
similar fashion, the communication which takes place between EU representatives and 
NGOs once a project has been approved displays a similar rigidity. Unfortunately, 
much of the dialogue is dominated by matters related to financial monitoring, 
conducted by a third party, the CFCU. In this context, project-based approaches to 
democratisation are rated in terms of financial efficiency and accountability. As long 
as a project has spent all the money allocated in an accountable fashion, and does so 
within an agreed time frame, it is hailed as a success. Perhaps it is too soon to expect 
such a well groomed relationships to have emerged, and with time the dialogue 
between EU and NGOs may improve. Yet, in the accession context the EU insulates 
itself from direct contact by working through third parties such as the CFCU, which 
perhaps makes such long-term results less likely to materialise. 
 This is not to say that donors such as the EU should not engage in project-
based work. There are good reasons to do so and projects can bring about excellent 
results. But it is important to be more aware of their limitations and realise what 
constitutes a realistic expectation in terms of project outcomes. Projects are not a 
miracle that, when applied to NGOs, can bring about democratisation: the broader 
context matters. Other forms of support are required also, and on the front of 
democratisation, one crucial issue is the mindset of the public towards donating to 
local advocacy NGOs. Historically, the Turkish public has viewed the state as the only 
point of call for their grievances and this strong state tradition still prevails to a large 
extent. Nor is this helped by the generally dismissive attitude the by Turkish state 




6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has sketched an overview of the funding processes, in relation to both 
domestic sources and those made available by the EU. The landscape of domestic 
funding suggests that advocacy NGOs are drawn to external sources of funding, as 
support for advocacy NGOs is not yet part of the philanthropic culture in Turkey and 
therefore domestic sources of philanthropy are channelled in a different direction for 
the benefit of religious charitable activity and individuals in need. As the accession 
negotiations begun, the EU-NGO relationship in Turkey changed also. Civil society 
was no longer the key partner for the EU in Turkey, as this role has been taken over by 
the government. A third party, the CFCU has taken on the task of managing and 
monitoring the funding process on behalf of the EU Turkey office. These changes have 
made the process more formal and bureaucratic, focused increasingly on quantifiable 
end results and on ensuring that funds have been spent in accountable ways. This 
diverts attention away from the outcome and impact of the funded projects, as they 
unfold on the ground. 
It is important to recognise that among those NGOs that aspire to receive EU 
funding, at least two groups have emerged. One group has been motivated to 
internalise the opportunities that have come available. These organisations have gained 
new skills of project management and learnt how to successfully apply for funding 
also in the future. The other groups have remained outside of these opportunities, 
either through a conscious policy of resistance or because project funding does not suit 
the NGO’s circumstances. EU funding policies are effectively shaping a particular 
sector of NGOs; given that certain start-up capacity is required to engage in the 
funding processes, these groups are more likely to be urban, middle class professional 
NGOs or think-tanks that already possess a competitive advantage in carrying out 
projects. Thus a two-tier system of “have and have-nots” (or “want and want-nots” as 
the case is with those groups that refuse engagement) is gradually established with a 
core of organisations that are able to deliver projects in a professionalised, 
bureaucratised manner. Their actions increasingly resemble the actions of a third 
sector. Thus, the NGOs that participate in EU funding are likely to become involved in 
the Europeanisation processes that have begun in earnest with the start of the pre-
accession process. 
 These observations raise the question how achievable the objectives behind EU 
funding are. If the overall objective relates to the development of a vibrant civil 
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society, democratisation and Europeanisation, as the project documents purport, in 
what way are these to be achieved by the projects that are funded? One aspect to 
consider is the possibility that projects are re-moulding the way in which NGOs think 
about their activities. What activities are deemed important, and once engaged, what 
aspects of these activities are prioritised. Here the answer seem to be that activities 
selected by the EU to be part of their funding framework are deemed important, and 
the financial aspect of the project (how money has been spent) is prioritised over 
qualitative outcomes (how did project beneficiaries feel about their participation and 
what the long-term implications may be). Since NGO motivations for engaging in 
funded activities are not necessarily rooted in organisational aims, but in what kind of 
funding is on offer, it is plausible, although difficult to prove empirically, that NGOs 
would operate somewhat differently were there no project funding available. Arguably, 
there is a gap between what projects expect NGOs to do, and how NGOs would 





7 Tracing the impact of EU policy on the ground 
 
This final empirical chapter explains how NGOs navigate through the conflicting 
interests that arise from the incongruence between policy conceptualisation and how 
NGOs operate in practice. The chapter begins with a discussion of the project approach 
to development, its benefits and shortcomings, and places the actor-oriented 
perspective (Long 2001) against the model of rational decision-making that dominates 
the project-based approach. The actor-oriented perspective has explanatory power 
because it highlights the complex social processes that inform NGO behaviour in the 
project environment. Next, to illustrate the agency of Turkish NGOs in the EU project 
funding context, the chapter draws on the work Lewis and Mosse (2006) who describe 
NGOs as “brokers” and “translators”. In order to account for the types of roles NGOs 
have assumed the Turkish context, two additional roles are conceptualised: 
“navigators” and “antagonists”. Once this framework for thinking about NGO roles 
from an actor-oriented perspective has been established, the chapter moves to 
describing these roles in more detail. Firstly, the role of the Central Finance and 
Contracts Unit (CFCU) as the representative and executor of EU project policy is 
explored. The aim here is to illustrate the rational decision-making model that governs 
the technical management of EU-funded civil society projects. Secondly, the roles 
NGOs assume as “translators”, “brokers”, “navigators” and “antagonists” is surveyed 
more closely. NGOs, therefore, are not mere passive recipients of project funding. 
Instead, NGOs react to projects in locally relevant ways, and find ways to negotiate 
through the funding process in ways that delivers a more favourable (and 
unanticipated) result for them.  
In 1936, the eminent American sociologist Robert K. Merton wrote an essay 
where he described the “unanticipated consequences of purposive social action” 
(Merton 1936). When looking at the evolution of the relationship between the EU and 
Turkish civil society, many of his insights still ring true. For any social action, there is 
always a range of consequences, he argued, “any one of which may follow the act in 
any given case” (p. 899). Social action therefore implies irrationality of human action, 
whereby the outcomes of peoples actions will remain uncertain. Thus, the complexity 
of the social interaction that follows any social action mean that “its consequences are 
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not restricted to the specific area in which they were initially intended to center” (p. 
903). The theme of this chapter takes its cue from Merton’s idea, as it argues that there 
are multiple factors that coincide in any social process, which make it impossible to 
anticipate the outcomes of social action.  
One particular way this inability to anticipate the consequences of social action 
manifests itself in the context of EU-NGO relations is in the multiplicity of ways 
NGOs respond to the availability of civil society funding. Thus, whilst on the one hand 
social processes are inherently unpredictable, as Merton has shown, on the other hand 
it is also possible that actors consciously manipulate the processes for the attainment of 
their particular ends. In either case, the end result from the point of view of policy 
planning is the same: the outcomes of the policy processes are uncertain. Paraphrasing 
Merton, the theme of the chapter could therefore be summed as “the unanticipated 
consequences of EU project finance for NGOs in Turkey”. In other words, whilst 
recognising the complexity of social interactions and the gap that exists between EU 
policy and Turkish reality, how are NGOs reacting when faced with choices regarding 
engagement with EU policy? 
In the context of the “development project” the chapter discusses both rational 
and actor-oriented approaches to understanding how projects unfold. This comparison 
resembles the one introduced previously between rational choice institutionalism and 
sociological institutionalism and is an explicit attempt to draw parallels and bring 
together the theoretical discussions that take place within two different disciplinary 
perspectives, Development Studies and European Studies. The project is identified as a 
critical juncture where the unanticipated consequences of EU civil society policies in 
Turkey are located. Projects – particularly the procedures that surround the 
management of projects – are conceived in ways that prioritise the rational and 
scientific assumptions about what projects are meant to achieve, and how their success 
in achieving these goals are best measured. Projects, however, do not take place in a 
rational vacuum, but are rooted in the local social context. From this local context 
emerge diverse ways for local actors to relate to projects. It is therefore important to 
focus on the interaction between local NGOs and the EU in order to understand what 
kind of unanticipated consequences EU project finance can generate and as such the 
findings of this chapter also relate to the broader discussion of how Europeanisation 




7.1 Projects and rational problem solving 
In development work, projects are rarely regarded as particularly effective tools for 
altering human behaviour. They have often been criticised for imposing a linear and 
technical way of thinking, drawing a straight line between a problem and the policy 
designed to address it (Ferguson 1990; Fowler 1997; Mosse 2004). Yet projects have 
remained the dominant force for engaging NGOs in donor-funded programmes (Tvedt 
1998). Arguably, the emphasis on projects has receded in recent years, as donors have 
become increasingly aware of the need to coordinate their funding efforts. In 2005 the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness98 aimed to improve the harmonisation of aid 
objectives and delivery procedures, all in an effort to improve aid effectiveness 
(Foresti et al. 2006; DFID 2009). Whilst donor emphasis has shifted from discrete 
projects towards broader programmes, within these programmes projects still remain 
the primary mode of channelling funding to local actors, such as NGOs. This is 
certainly the case with EU funding in Turkey. The intervention offered by the project 
is a pre-planned set of actions with anticipated outcomes, which does not correspond to 
the reality of NGO work on the ground. Instead, we should see the project as part of an 
ongoing process, whose success is dependent on the broader context in which the 
actors engaged in the project operate. 
 Donors tend to see projects as an integral part of a rational method for finding a 
way to implement a given policy agenda that keeps the chains of causality short. The 
logical sequence of activities – setting the policy agenda, identifying the problem on 
the basis of this agenda, designing a policy intervention that is aimed at dealing with 
the problem, implementing the policy, and evaluating its success – surrounding the 
project has its advantages as far as fund-disbursing mechanisms go (Long 2001). It 
allows donors to embed accountability measures in their funding programs, which is 
an important aspect of EU funding given that the financial resources for the project 
originate from the EU taxpayer. Projects have pre-defined objectives that NGOs 
promise to fulfil, time constraints by which NGOs promise to abide and detailed 
budget frames that specify how the grant money can be spent along with quantifiable 
outcomes against which success is measured. It would be unrealistic to expect these 
conditions not to exist. For the NGOs, these requirements offer a concrete way to 
demonstrate success and at the same time donor expectations are made transparent. 
                                                 
98
 Section 7.3 discusses the Paris Declaration in more detail. 
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Projects remain attractive because they simplify the complex process of social change 
into bite-sized chunks that are more easily managed (Fowler 1997). From a donor’s 
point of view, it is this perceived simplicity and rationality that make projects an 
attractive option to fund. 
 However, the logical sequence of activities discussed above does not always 
match up with the logic of activities on the ground. A key issue in donor policy is 
precisely the fact that the policymaking agenda is established prior to problem 
identification (Chapter Six shows how the EU adopts this approach in Turkey). This 
order of events means that the policy agenda – such as the agenda for democratisation 
or the agenda behind civil society dialogue, both of which were discussed in Chapter 
Three – acts as a filter to the possible ways in which the problem is going to be 
conceptualised or understood. Agenda-setting thus becomes a critical point in the 
process because the chosen agenda influences all subsequent decisions regarding 
policy preferences, even where it differs from the ground-level issues it aims to 
address (Lukes 1974). Lack of congruence between the broad agenda and the issues on 
the ground means, in this case, that there is likely to be a gap between EU policy and 
NGO reality. 
The rational approach to projects favoured by donors is based on certain 
assumptions about the nature of planned interventions that need to be dissected. The 
project is assumed to form a discrete set of activities that sets aside a time and space 
“bubble” where the intervention is supposed to take place. In other words, it is isolated 
from “the continuous flow of social life and ongoing relations that evolve between the 
various social actors” (Long 2001 p. 32). Interventions that aim to alter human 
behaviour need to appreciate that the existing behaviour is a product of a long chain of 
events, whilst an inability to do so will mean that the project cannot engage with the 
historical and social context it is trying to change. Given the logical-rational mindset 
behind projects, they tend to have an innate focus on formal structures and 
organisations, making it difficult for these issues to be considered. The informal rules 
and practices that shape the context in which a project takes place get sidelined (de 
Zeeuw 2005 p. 500). NGOs that adopt a narrow project focus can become vehicles 
pursuing donor agendas that lack relevance to what is needed (Eade 2007). Having 
been developed by donors, projects are also more likely to reflect donor interests. We 
can then surmise that success is likely to be determined on the grounds of how closely 
projects resemble donor policy models (Mosse 2005). 
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The actor-oriented approach has been developed on the basis of such a critique, 
moving away from emphasis on structural and rational strategies and, instead, 
considering the relationship between policy and practice as “a messy free-for-all in 
which processes are often uncontrollable and results uncertain” (Lewis and Mosse 
2006 p. 9). In the context of development projects, the actor-oriented approach 
endeavours to develop a conceptual framework that is more attentive to the contextual 
nuances and offers a useful starting point for considering the uncertainty of outcomes. 
Key principles of the approach can be summarised as follows: 
 
Social life is heterogeneous. It comprises a wide diversity of social forms 
and cultural repertoires, even under seemingly homogeneous 
circumstances. 
 
It is necessary to study how such differences are produced, reproduced, 
consolidated and transformed, and to identify the social processes 
involved, not merely the structural outcomes. 
 
In order to examine these interrelations it is useful to work with the 
concept of ‘social interface’ which explores how discrepancies of social 
interest, cultural interpretation, knowledge and power are mediated and 
perpetuated or transformed at critical points of linkage or confrontation. 
 
Thus the major challenge is to delineate the contours and contents of 
diverse social forms, explain their genesis and trace out their implications 
for strategic action and modes of consciousness. That is, we need to 
understand how these forms take shape under specific conditions and in 
relation to past configurations, with a view to examining their viability, 
self-generating capacities and wider ramifications  
             (Long 2001 pp. 49-50) 
 
Social interface is a key concept within the actor-oriented approach, looking at the 
points of linkage where external factors become internalised by local actors. It is useful 
here because it offers a method of entering the black-box of what actually happens 
when policy gets implemented through a project (projects being one such point of 
linkage) (Latour 1999). A key part of an analysis based on the actor-oriented 
perspective is to understand the interaction between the various actors, to show how 
the interest groups, through negotiation, interpret the processes surrounding a planned 
intervention differently (Long 2001 p. 72). This style of inquiry puts us on a track that 
asks us to pay attention to the diversity, discrepancies and uncertainty that are present 
in development interventions. 
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The approach, however, has been critiqued for being too focused on formal 
interaction and negotiation between the external and local actors. It places the spotlight 
on understanding the strategies actors adopt without taking into consideration the 
impact of the broader context in which actors operate. The focus on points of linkage – 
on the formal interactions and negotiations – places unnecessary limits on how we 
should understand the way in which local actors operate. The “structural-functionalist 
strait-jacket” is replaced by a different one (Gledhill 1994 p. 134). The actor-oriented 
approach has made an important contribution by communicating a persuasive critique 
of the structural-rational approach to development, and is, therefore, an invaluable 
stepping-stone towards a more sociologically oriented understanding of donor-funded 
projects. Yet, there are strategies and methods of acting that are not explained by what 
takes place in the social interface, where it is necessary to look at the broader issues of 
power and structure. As Lewis and Mosse insightfully observe “it is the appearance of 
congruence between problems and interventions, the coherence of policy logic, and the 
authority of expertise that is really surprising and requires explanation” (Lewis and 
Mosse 2006). 
It is in this vein that Lewis and Mosse introduce the ideas of “brokerage” and 
“translation” as concepts that complement the work initiated by the actor-oriented 
methods. This aimed to push the analysis further, to consider both the agency of the 
actors involved as well as the influence of existing power structures on these actors. It 
is therefore not merely a case of looking at how external factors are internalised, but 
also how this works the other way around – how internal factors may become 
externalised. 
 
7.2 Brokers, translators, navigators and antagonists 
Conceptualising NGO roles through these four lenses enables one to demonstrate the 
agency NGOs have as actors within the project framework. It is not a top-down 
relationship, where NGOs participate in projects as mere vehicles implementing 
policies conceived by donors. The NGOs respond in various ways to the opportunities 
and challenges a project brings to them. Secondly, this approach considers NGOs as 
products of the socio-cultural context where they operate, creations of the broader 
structures within which they exist. Brokers, translators, navigators and antagonists 
function in the intermediary terrain between the funders and the local fund 
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beneficiaries, internalising the system of funding and making it meaningful in the local 
context. 
 The concept of translation emphasises the dynamic nature of the social world, 
where the meaning of ideas is constantly re-shaped, transformed and translated (Latour 
2005). The notion of translation therefore problematises policy, seeing it as a 
continuous process of transformation and translation (Lendvai and Stubbs 2009). The 
acceptance of new (policy) ideas is not solely dependent on the initial influence of 
agenda setting. Instead, the system is dependent on the willingness of others to take up 
the idea and transfer it further (Latour 1986). Translators, then, reinterpret the original 
idea and its meaning on the basis of their own interests and understandings. Viewing 
civil society actors as translators offers a useful lens through which to reflect more 
deeply on the donor-NGO relationship. The purpose of adopting this point of view is 
to move beyond the functions NGOs have inside existing funding frameworks and to 
understand how projects in reality create new and translated forms of behaviour. In 
other words, translation explores one particular way in which Europeanisation unfolds 
on the ground and resonates strongly with the sociological institutionalist approach. 
 It is indeed important to consider these issues in the context of the broader 
processes of policymaking of which EU funding to civil society is a part. The notion of 
translation offers a persuasive critique of policy transfer literature, and in particular of 
the Europeanisation literature that sees European integration as a rational and linear 
process (Lendvai and Stubbs 2009). In a classic model of European integration 
“goodness of fit” is regarded as the starting point for a process of domestic structural 
change that leads to an improved fit, thus achieving greater integration (Risse et al. 
2001). Furthermore, this point of view connects with the rational project approach that 
has been adopted in the funding programmes that support these change processes. In 
their raw form, the interests championed by Turkish NGOs may be contradictory to the 
aims of EU civil society funding. Conceptualising the acts of NGOs as translation 
highlights the process of finding a way of reconciling their various contradictory 
interests with the aims of donor-funded projects. These actions bridge the potential 
disconnect between policy documents that prescribe solutions and the reality on the 
ground. Lewis and Mosse offer three examples of the types of tools NGOs make use of 
in translating interests: research, workshops and reports (2006 p. 164). In addition, 
examples in this chapter illustrate how projects and project implementation offer more 
space for translation to take place. 
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Viewing NGOs as brokers offers an insight to how actors find a way to make 
the system work for them. “Brokerage” can be understood to mean “social actors 
situated at the interface of two socio-cultural universes, and endowed with the capacity 
to establish links among themselves, be they symbolic, economic, material or political” 
(Sardan 1999 p. 37). These “intermediaries” (Lendvai and Stubbs 2009) connect and 
facilitate the relationships between the actors that come together in the funded project 
interface. They are “entrepreneurial agents” (Lewis and Mosse 2006 p. 13) who carve 
out a role for themselves from within the processes that surround project funding. 
Viewing these actors as brokers locates their role in the broader cultural and political 
context. Broker does not refer to a new role generated purely out of the opportunities 
made available by project funding. Instead, they make use of already existing 
entrepreneurial instincts that have been developed as a survival mechanism in a 
context where weak state and weak institutions leave actors unable to depend on 
formal processes. In the case of Turkey, the logic of brokerage operates through a 
reinterpretation of existing practices in ways that suit the new possibilities brought 
about by the presence of the EU. The concepts of brokers and translators help us to 
delve deeper into the ways in which Turkish NGOs operate in the mid-terrain between 
local realities and the policy environment created by EU funding. 
Explaining NGO behaviour in the Turkish context requires two additional 
categories to fully account for NGO actions – navigators and antagonists. Brokering 
and translation focus on actions of NGOs as intermediaries that are positioned in 
between two sets of actors and find ways to reconcile the divergent views between 
them. The roles as navigators and antagonists approach the issue from a different 
angle, focusing on the strategies that help NGOs reconcile their own work with donor 
demands. Navigators identify innovative ways to narrow the gap between the current 
portfolio of skills they can offer and what is required by successful applications for EU 
projects. Antagonists’ roles are marked by their refusal to engage. The EU-NGO 
relationship is therefore not only marked by possibilities for reinterpretation and 
choice – as outlined by the first three roles – but also by normative disagreements that 
make working together difficult. Yet these kinds of responses are not wholly negative 
for the NGOs. The decision not to engage is not a simple case of disagreement but 
remains a positive or generative act for the NGO, as NGOs that employ such strategies 




7.3 EU funding for projects in Turkey 
The development project can be likened to a complex machine. When the machine 
works efficiently, the internal complexity of the machine is not of concern (Latour 
1999). Similarly, in rating the success of a development project the focus has remained 
more on the quantifiable, often meaning financial, inputs and outputs of projects. The 
bureaucratic accountability for how money has been spent has become the priority 
focus for assessment. Arguably, the actual mechanics of the processes that lead to 
success remain “opaque and obscure” (Lewis and Mosse 2006 p. 15).  
Recent efforts by the donor community to reform the global structures for 
providing aid have reinforced the mechanisms for focusing on pre-defined outcomes 
and bureaucratic accountability mechanisms. The “Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness” is a case in point. Adopted in March 2005 and reiterated by the “Accra 
Agenda for Action” in 2008, the declaration set forth five broad principles. The first 
three – ownership, alignment and harmonisation – called for recipient countries to be 
able to decide on the content of the aid agenda, alignment of national development 
strategies with aid programmes, and coordination of donor efforts that avoids 
duplication in the demands donors make on local governments. The last two – 
managing for results and mutual accountability – ask for aid to be managed in ways 
that focus on desired results, as well as in ways that ensure donors and recipient 
countries are mutually accountable to each other for the results of aid (Foresti et al. 
2006; DFID 2009; OECD 2008). The impact of the latter two principles in particular is 
felt directly at the level of NGOs, expressed through the emphasis within development 
projects on results-orientation and on accountability through bureaucratic measures. 
Developments in a similar direction are also visible in the Turkish context.  
 The EU pre-accession process introduced a new layer of management in the 
NGO enterprise. The bureaucrats working in the CFCU are the “engineers” that look 
after Latour’s metaphorical machine, and embrace a role that focuses on project inputs 
and outputs. The CFCU acts as the middleman between EU institutions and Turkish 
NGOs. It was set up as part of the EU pre-accession process to oversee all of EU 
financial support towards Turkey’s accession process and remains the organisation that 
is at the heart of project funding, tasked with tendering, evaluating, contracting, 
accounting, payments and reporting. In other words, the CFCU is responsible for 
overseeing the completion of the entire project cycle (CFCU 2009). Given its role as a 
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middleman, it is important to pay attention to the apparent disconnect that exists 
between how the CFCU and NGOs operate. 
 One of the key concerns for the CFCU is accountability.99 It is essentially a 
Turkish organisation that has been given responsibility to look after EU money, and 
for this reason the CFCU takes its role as an accountant very seriously. Interviews with 
CFCU staff also highlighted the rigorous guidelines that govern what the CFCU can 
and cannot do: 
 
Accountability is a big issue for us. We do our work for the EU 
Delegation. This brings to us additional needs to scrutinise more. We 
need to be more rigorous and more detailed because we look after 
someone else’s money.100 
 
The guidelines require, for example, that all projects tendered with a value of €10,000 
or more are accompanied by a logical framework and concept note documents. The 
budgets that come with project proposals have specific rules about how the grant 
money should be allocated under the different areas of the project, such as human 
resource costs and administrative costs. During ongoing projects, the CFCU holds 
frequent meetings with the NGOs involved, to ensure that accounts are kept in good 
order and agree to release money for the next phase of the project only once the 
accounts for the previous phase have been checked and approved. The CFCU speaks 
highly of much improved “commitment ratios” for NGOs. This term refers to the 
percentage of the total funding made available by the EU that is successfully invested 
in projects. The CFCU puts this improvement down to a change in policy: projects that 
fail to live up to budget requirements are no longer failed at the outset, but offered 
assistance by the CFCU in order to balance their budgets according to the rules. The 
CFCU is also required to report biannually to the European Commission on its 
activities. It is these accountability processes that take centre stage in the role the 
CFCU assumes in its relationship with NGOs. Such issues dominate daily project 
management. As long as the project unfolds as the project proposal anticipated, in 
accordance with the proposed logical framework and the financial spending plan, it is 
expected to make a positive contribution and regarded as a success. The concerns for 
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 The information in this section is based on interviews conducted with two representatives of the 
CFCU in Ankara, 26 June 2008 and 27 June 2008. [B3 and B4] 
100
 Interview with a representative of the CFCU, Ankara, 25 June 2008. [B3] 
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accountability point upwards, toward the EU, leaving NGOs to battle with 
requirements that have little practical resonance with how they operate. 
NGOs make up only a small part of the CFCU’s mandate. In fact, a majority of 
the CFCU work involves overseeing the financial contracts of EU funding to ministries 
and other public bodies, and the work done with NGOs follows similar guidelines for 
accounting and reporting. The procedures do not allow flexibility for the fact that 
many NGOs are often run on a volunteer basis, with staff that work part-time and lack 
the capacity to deal effectively with the accounting aspect of project management. The 
NGOs find it therefore very demanding to comply with the requirements and feel that 
the way in which the CFCU operates reflects an unawareness of the way in which 
NGOs carry out their work, and as a result the CFCU engagement hinders rather than 
helps the NGOs. 
There were of course similar measures in place before the CFCU became 
operational, but the official start of the accession process and the creation of the CFCU 
has further formalised and bureaucratised the operationalisation of NGO funding. 
Returning to the idea of projects as an interface, a linkage between two lifeworlds 
(Long 2001), the introduction of the CFCU into the relationship has made the linkage 
between the logic of EU funding and NGO work increasingly tenuous. The attitudes 
and interests that come face-to-face in the project interface are more incongruent. The 
widening gap in turn augments the space for interpretation through various forms of 
brokerage and translation. The next section peers inside the “black box of the project” 
in order to better understand the choices that NGOs make and the strategies they adapt 
when faced with the idea of EU project funding.  
 
7.4 NGOs at the project interface 
The aforementioned bureaucratic demands related to NGO project management solicit 
a variety of reactions from Turkish civil society actors. The concern with measurable 
outcomes that dominate the EU funding agenda is something NGOs view, and 
therefore react to, in a variety of ways. They either embrace this agenda, manipulate it 
to their own advantage, or deem it as a method of control that needs to be resisted, or 
even actively undermined. As they do so, these organisations embrace, appropriate or 
reject the project mentality that EU funding introduces. These reactions arise from the 
fact that there is a disconnect, a gap, in the social interface that projects constitute. Out 
of this disconnect arise opportunities for local actors to generate new ways of 
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conducting their work, new ways of bridging the discrepancies that exist between the 
EU policy logic and what actually happens. It allows one to widen the scope of study 
beyond the linear relationship between inputs and outputs of a project and to 
appreciate the much broader range of outcomes that need to be considered and how 
these come about. The disconnect also leads to questions over the appropriateness of 
project-based support as a means of bringing about change. In Turkey’s case, projects 
are more concerned with the bureaucratic needs of the accession process than with the 
needs of civil society. Next, these issues are addressed by looking at the roles NGOs 
take as translators, brokers, navigators and antagonists. 
 
NGOs as translators 
The characteristics of a translator are crystallised in the operations of the Civil Society 
Development Centre (CSDC). Its role has rather literally been to translate the EU-
driven ideas about civil society funding to suit Turkish reality. As Chapter Six already 
described in some detail, the centre itself was initially set up as an EU project. The 
original motivation in setting up the CSDC was to build a halfway house between local 
NGOs and the European Union funding programmes. To this end the centre has run its 
own project application programme and been responsible for selecting which projects 
it wishes to fund. Staffed by Turkish civil society activists with long experience of 
working in the field, the CSDC offers advise and support on project management and, 
in so doing, opens the door for less capable NGOs to access funding. Through its 
operations the CSDC works towards a locally relevant vision of the EU funding 
agenda. The centre has embraced the way in which the EU operationalises its civil 
society funding, whilst at the same time working to reinterpret the purpose of its 
activities and role so that it fits in better with local needs. It is a prime example of a 
local actor as translator, an organisation that has taken up the ideas and actions 
introduced by EU funding and then renegotiated these further so as to effort to reshape 
their meaning in a way that is more contextually relevant. 
The outcomes of the first two CSDC Advisory Board meetings, held in 
September 2005 and April 2006, offer an insight to how such reinterpretation takes 
place. The meetings were organised with a view to solicit opinions about the course 
that the CSDC was following. Over 80 NGOs participated in both meetings, and two 
documents outlining the outcomes have been published on the CSDC website (CSDC 
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2005, 2006).101 In the first meeting, the agenda focused on the theme of “problems for 
NGOs in Turkey”. The second meeting focused on the activities the centre engages in 
(for example, training and other NGO support activities, such as grants) and how these 
could be improved. In terms of civil society development, these notes reveal a desire 
for civil society to find a more united, collective voice. The participants lament the 
fragmented relationships and communication that exist between NGOs, and the 
subsequent lack of common objectives and inability to speak with one voice. This is 
seen as a necessary development in order for civil society to become a more capable 
and influential voice in society. In brainstorming how the CSDC could contribute to 
resolving these issues the following suggestions were made by the participants: 
branching of CSDC, organising workshops that allow NGOs to come together, 
organising meetings around common agendas (such as EU-related issues), helping 
NGOs to establish a communication strategy, publishing a book on best practices for 
NGOs as well as a director-leader handbook, and providing training on internal 
communications and lobbying to help NGOs participate in relevant EU platforms. 
The notes from the two meetings describe how local actors are interpreting 
local needs in ways that can realistically be addressed through the framework offered 
by EU civil society funding. The meetings were an exercise in matching the concerns 
of the local civil society actors with possible solutions from within the EU funding 
framework. This is evident from the style of approach, where the solutions that are 
proposed – expansion of CSDC, organising meetings or training sessions and 
development of publications – are all practices that are usually introduced by donor 
policy (there are today four regional branches of the CSDC). The meetings could 
therefore be described as translation exercises where local interests were reinterpreted 
to suit the EU-led agenda for civil society development. 
How the Advisory Board conceptualised the problems and needs of Turkish 
civil society offers further evidence of translation. The problems were identified on the 
basis of a particular idea of what civil society means, an idea which resonates strongly 
with the European concept of civil society. For example, identifying the lack of a 
collective voice as a problem, and aspiring for civil society to gain greater influence by 
developing a united voice closely correlates with the liberal view of civil society 
promoted by the EU (and discussed in more detail in Chapters Two and Three). Lack 
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of volunteerism and local participation, as well as competition between NGOs, were 
among the other problems that also resonate with the Western ideas about civil society. 
Similarly, the very concept behind the CSDC originates from a similar understanding 
of civil society. It may be unreasonable to expect the members of the Advisory Board 
to engage in problematising the role of the CSDC as a civil society actor. Yet the fact 
that the CSDC is accepted as an idea by local actors suggests that an act of translation 
has already occurred. 
These discussions and the indication they give of the broader role of the CSDC 
serve as a good example of how civil society actors in Turkey engage in reconciling 
EU ideas for civil society development with the Turkish reality. The CSDC thus plays 
a translating role as a middle man between EU efforts to fund civil society, and the 
NGOs on the ground that undertake the work through projects. It offers examples of 
how the policy design – training, workshops, publications and above all projects – 
through which donors operationalise their vision for civil society, is translated to better 
suit a local context. The actions here show that EU policy and reality of Turkish civil 
society do resonate with each other, and the processes of Europeanising Turkish civil 
society is also driven by an internal motivation. Given this role, the practices in which 
the CSDC engages as an organisation characterise the trend towards Europeanisation 
of Turkish civil society. 
 
NGOs as brokers 
In their engagement with project funding, Turkish NGOs have displayed an ability to 
create new roles for themselves and not simply follow the normative guidelines that 
the EU rules for civil society funding prescribe. These brokering roles are produced by 
the new situation in which NGOs find themselves as they respond to changing 
circumstances and hope to bridge the gap that exists between the organisation and 
access to EU funding. Such a point of view allows us to see the entrepreneurial 
character of NGOs and elaborates on the variety of possible responses through which 
civil society can shape the outcomes of EU involvement. This section outlines one of 
the unexpected ways in which NGOs have reacted to the increasing availability of 
project funding. In so doing, it suggests that the impact of EU funding is more wide-
reaching and complex than anticipated, leading to uncertain and uncontrollable results. 
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 In response to the rise of project funding, an industry of consultancies acting as 
brokers has also emerged. Some regard these as simply a support network that less 
capable NGOs can rely on, levelling the playing field: 
 
[English] language is not a problem, project preparation is not a problem. 
There are consultancies that can help with these kinds of capacity 
issues.102  
 
However, for others the existence of these organisations comes as an undesirable side-
effect of the funding framework: 
 
We have issued a warning [advertisement], to warn against consultancies 
that call themselves ‘CFCU accredited consultancy’. Such affiliations do 
not exist, it’s a misuse of CFCU’s name. The consultancies make them 
up in order to find NGOs that need help.103 
 
These consultancies also bridge the gap between themselves and civil society by 
employing civil society experts in their ranks, making these organisations an 
interesting hybrid between a private company and an NGO, as far as their personnel 
goes: 
 
We [EU Delegation] started to have many cases where consulting firms 
or private businesses were registered as non-profits, and in that case we 
were bound to accept them in our call for proposals. […] I mean it was so 
strange because we also look at the proven track record of organisations 
on working in that field, I mean we don’t give funding to new companies 
that all of a sudden spring up. But they were able to recruit to their 
companies figures from civil society who had been committed to one 
particular field for so many years, and all of a sudden you look and see 
that this person is now in this company.104  
 
These consultancies have had a significant impact on the way in which EU funding has 
unfolded in Turkey. The director of the CSDC had an encounter with a consultancy 
that is worth recalling here. He received a phone call enquiring about upcoming grant 
programmes for NGOs. As the caller was working for a consultancy, the director 
explained that only NGOs were eligible to apply. The caller said he knew this, and 
                                                 
102
 Interview with Dr. Şentürk Uzun, the Head of the Department of Associations, Ankara, 08 August 




 Interview with a senior EU civil servant, EU Delegation in Turkey, Ankara, 03 April 2007. [B5] 
Chapter 7 
 205 
their role was to design projects for NGOs – they had so far created 48 projects, four of 
which had been sent to the CSDC:  
 
I checked our database, and saw that proposals they submitted before had 
been accepted. Twice. I looked in the computer, and saw the logical 
frameworks in these proposals were the same, they only changed the 
cover page! When I went to visit one of these NGOs, I asked “So you 
will soon start a project. What kind of preparations have you made?”. He 
said “oh, I don’t actually yet know what kind of project we are going to 
make. The consultancy made the application, we just said that we will 
cooperate with them.105 
 
The NGO had simply agreed to pay the consultancy a fee of ten per cent of the value 
of the award. The project budget has no such allocation available, yet the NGO thought 
they could find a way to spend the money in this way. Here we can observer two 
separate acts of mediation. One is the role played by the consultancy as a broker. It 
identifies the gap between the EU project culture and the local NGO culture and offers 
its services as a way to bridge this gap. The second is by the NGO that recognises its 
own lack of capacity to apply for EU funding yet is able to identify a path that will 
gain it access to EU funds. The consultancies perform a role as agents that use their 
instincts to reinterpret NGO practices to make best use of the new circumstances.  
 
NGOs as navigators 
The term “navigator” refers to the ability of NGOs to identify opportunities to access 
donor funds, utilising the funding process to their own ends and finding ways to make 
the funding framework work for them. Navigator NGOs display the same 
entrepreneurial spirit as broker NGOs, but aim it at different outcomes. Whilst brokers 
act as the go-betweens that bridge the donor reality with local reality, navigators use 
entrepreneurial skills to take advantage of the opportunities donor funding generates, 
and do so for their own ends. In this sense their actions are opportunistic – the NGOs 
find ways to navigate through the differences that exist between their current state of 
affairs and accessing funds. The observations made in this regard by the director of the 
CSDC resonate strongly with this interpretation: 
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The NGOs see the amount of the grant, and become fixated on this. They 
first put together a list of activities, then realise they have to create more 
activities to reach the amount of the grant. Then they discover a mission 
that fits these activities, and an appropriate main goal. So they approach 
this process the wrong way around.106 
 
The behaviour described in the above quote is one example of how NGOs 
navigate the gap that exists between their operations and what is required by EU 
funding.  
An Istanbul-based human rights organisation interviewed during fieldwork 
demonstrates how NGOs can make EU funding work for them. They have set up a 
separate association, used for their official work, such as applying for donor 
funding.107 A friend of the director working for the EU delegation in Ankara suggested 
that the organisation apply for a grant. The application proposed to create a new 
“Centre for the Freedom of Expression”, and, given that the application was 
successful, €66,000 was spent on this project by the EU in a subsequent 12-month 
period. In their own publication, the EU delegation to Turkey referred to the project as 
an example of a successful project (European Commission 2007c). The way in which 
the director of the NGO described the effect of this project on the organisation was 
interesting, for he said there was no change in their daily operations: 
  
We called it the Centre for the Freedom of Expression, but at the end of 
the day we continued doing the same work as before. There was no 
change.108 
 
In order to convince the EU delegation to grant the funding, they had to describe the 
purpose of the funds as creating a new centre for human rights. This way the project 
had a concrete end result, which appealed to the funders. However, as far as the daily 
work of the NGO was concerned, nothing changed. The NGO had found a way to 
package their work so that it granted access to EU funding without compromising its 
own interests. Additionally, the director of the NGO cited a long list of other foreign 
donors from whom they had received money. Some years ago the director had visited 
the United States in order to receive an award from the Human Rights Watch. This trip 
had been most useful, he said because it opened new avenues for fundraising for them. 









The actions exemplify how NGOs find ways to navigate a path towards a situation 
where it is able to benefit from NGO funding, even where its initial circumstances may 
not have been favourable for such an outcome, and identify new opportunities for 
funding. The daily activities of the NGO did not change but were rather re-packaged in 
the form of a new centre, demonstrating skills at reinterpreting their own work in ways 
that make it relevant to the funding agenda of donors. 
 A women’s NGO in Diyarbakir that was established by the local municipality 
is another organisation that exhibits these entrepreneurial navigation skills. In the 
1990s, vast numbers of internally displaced people from the southeast of Turkey109 
gravitated to Diyarbakir, and women previously accustomed to life in villages have 
faced difficulties in becoming economically productive in an urban environment. The 
NGO helps immigrant women to become economically active again.  
 
We have lots of migrants in Diyarbakir, and their problems were 
becoming very visible. This is why our NGO was set up. We were set up 
by the Diyarbakir municipality. We were founded in 2001. Even though 
we are institutionally part of the municipality, we do have 
independence.110  
 
In effect, the municipality has “branched out” by setting up a bespoke women’s NGO. 
This NGO acts as the partner organisation in an EU-funded project aiming to integrate 
internally displaced people. In fact, one aim of the EU project is to bring together 
municipal and NGO actors in order to establish closer links between local government 
and civil society (these relationships were discussed in more detail in Chapter Five). It 
is the only partner NGO involved in the project. The funding supports the construction 
of a new complex where vocational training as well as support services for the 
disabled, women and children will be housed. The NGO acknowledges its close 
relationship with the municipality. This partnership is likely to remain in place for a 
relatively long time, for the NGO is cognizant of the problems of long-term funding 
and anticipates that the municipality will also be the source of future funding. This 
example again illustrates how local actors identify the gaps between their current 
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method of operations and what is required in order to access EU funding. It is an 
example of how NGOs are able to carve out new roles for themselves, defining new 
limits for how EU funding can be approached. 
 Such “invented” NGOs could in fact form a separate , fifth category in this 
analysis. However, whilst inventing an NGO purely to gain access to project funding is 
admittedly a rather radical and unique solution, at the same time it can be regarded as 
another example of the ability of local actors to identify innovative ways through 
which to be offered funding, even when they should not qualify for it. For this reason 
invented NGOs remain here as an example of the entrepreneurial spirit that NGOs 
exhibit when they are looking for ways to access EU funding, justifying its 
categorisation as a subset of “navigators”. Nevertheless the implications of such 
invented NGOs warrant a brief discussion here. It raises questions about what exactly 
can be achieved with the help of external funding, and what we can extrapolate from 
the numerical strength of the NGO sector in terms of development of civil society as 
an active force in Turkish society and politics. This example certainly questions the 
link often made between NGO funding and democratisation, something that was 
explored in Chapter Three in relation to EU policy. Furthermore, we need to ask who 
the beneficiaries of such an NGO are and what position does such organisation hold in 
the local community? The assumptions underlining EU policy explored in Chapter 
Three expect NGOs to gain their legitimacy from the communities their represent, and 
this is also the logic behind the perceived democratising effect of NGOs. Yet, at the 
same time the invented NGO, given its close relationship with the municipality, may 
possess many of the administrative and bureaucratic skills relevant to completing EU 
projects that may be important to successfully achieve project outcomes.  
 
NGOs as antagonists 
When faced with the possibility of applying for EU project funding, some NGOs 
pursue an entirely different type of strategy. So far, the discussion has focused on ways 
in which NGOs engage in the processes that the EU has in place, either by embracing 
and translating, by brokering or by navigating the system so that it makes sense in the 
local context. In addition, it is also worth exploring the resistance that NGOs display 
towards the EU. This is a form of extreme brokering that is distinct from the forms 
discussed above in that the strategies are premised on disengagement with the EU.  
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Take for example one republican women’s NGO interviewed in Ankara. This 
NGO takes a stance against EU funding. It does so on the basis that external funding 
poses a challenge to the independence of civil society. Institutions such as the EU have 
a particular agenda that they wish to implement in Turkey, and NGOs are being asked 
to help with the implementation. The funding is therefore viewed as not being neutral; 
there is deemed to be an agenda behind it that goes beyond merely funding and spills 
over into attempts to control NGO behaviour.  
 
We have no funding from the EU, and we don’t want to apply. We 
survive with members’ contributions. We totally respect our friends who 
are using EU funds, but we don’t accept funds because we believe there 
is a hidden agenda behind this.111 
 
Politically the NGO can be described as conservatively secular, at least to the extent 
that it opposes the proposals to allow the wearing of the headscarf in universities and 
other public spaces, and the NGO participated actively in the demonstration in the 
spring of 2007 (these demonstrations were discussed in some detail in Chapter Four). 
This is not to say that the are not progressive, for the NGO was also at the forefront of 
pushing through the groundbreaking reforms regarding Turkish Penal and Civil Codes 
that described in Chapter Five. As the above quotation shows, the NGO respects all 
work done by NGOs that do receive foreign funding, and they can see the positive 
results, yet they themselves refuse foreign funding on the grounds that it comes with a 
hidden agenda. This attitude reinforces a broader set of issues that relate to scepticism 
and weariness towards the EU accession process. The refusal to accept EU funding 
contributes to the organisational identity of this NGO. The act of antagonism is 
therefore a generative act, it produces a positive outcome for the NGO. The resistance 
to EU funding is viewed as a source of integrity, as a visible sign of keeping true to the 
values they uphold as an organisation. 
A Muslim human rights organisation takes a similar stance on the issue of 
foreign funding. There is no strict overarching policy for the whole organisation 
whereby EU funding is refused. The organisation consists of over 20 branches that are 
located all around Turkey, where each branch can take its own approach to the use of 
external funds. The branch interviewed in Diyarbakir had adopted a policy of not 
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applying or accepting any foreign funding. The reasons given for this decision were 
the following:  
 
Independence, this is a precondition of being an NGO. Domestic funds 
from government or from other groups within the country give you the 
label of being the back garden of another organisation. This issue is taken 
very seriously in Turkey. In my own view, we should take the source of 
funding very seriously, but unless they intervene with the process apart 
from giving the money, then there is no problem. But this is not a 
majority view within our branch, and we don’t accept outside funding.112 
 
Accepting funds from outside would taint the reputation of the NGO, and politicise it 
in an undesirable way. Given its geopolitical location in the Kurdish heartland, the 
organisation felt it extremely important to display political neutrality in their work and 
to show that they were concerned with the issue of human rights only. Acceptance of 
EU funding would have allowed others to politicise their work and to argue that their 
work was not about defence of human rights but also about, for example, the politics 
of Kurdish and/or Muslim issues in Turkey. Hence, both organisations – the women’s 
NGO from the previous example and the Muslim human rights NGO – reject funding 
because of political reasons, although the motivations to do so were very different. In 
the latter case the underlying strategic reason for refusing to apply for funding and for 
marketing itself as an organisation that is independent of the EU helps the NGO to 
construct an image of itself as a neutral, depoliticised organisation. In this regard, the 
antagonistic stance on EU funding is helpful. 
Finally, a small GLBT (gay, lesbian, bisexual and transsexual) organisation 
based in Istanbul expressed a similar, antagonistic strategy towards EU funding. The 
reasons for this were two-fold.113 First, the NGO remained uncertain over how the 
government and the justice system viewed their activities. At the time of the interview, 
there was a widely publicised court case where an Istanbul municipality was trying to 
close down a GLBT NGO on the grounds that their actions were “against morality”. 
These accusations echoed a similar, unsuccessful court case that some years ago had 
been brought against another GLBT NGO based in Ankara. Given this unfortunate 
lack of clarity on the legality of their activities, they were hesitant to work on donor-
funded projects. Additionally, the NGO was very clear that it did not want to become 
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an organisation that was purely focused on completing projects. This would contradict 
its status and identity as a grassroots organisation that was run on a volunteer basis. In 
effect the NGO was run by its members, for its members. Projects would divert 
attention away from these principles and towards external priorities introduced by the 
project. Where the NGO had a plan for some new work it wished to undertake, it 
would try to raise the necessary funds by organising a fundraising event, not by 
applying for external funds. As a volunteer for the NGO commented: 
 
The thing is that we are a grassroots organisation. We don’t want to 
become an organisation that is all about completing projects, and we try 
to avoid this as much as possible. […] We don’t want to depend 
financially on projects. […] We don’t want to think ‘oh, there’s an HIV 
project, let’s do it!’.114 
 
Resistance to EU funding is not absolute, for under the right circumstances they would 
consider EU funding, yet this represented a risk. There was a concern that projects 
would take over the agenda by requiring a shift away from the grassroots focus and 
from the ad-hoc way in which the NGO wanted to approach their work. 
 The antagonistic responses to EU funding can be found across a wide spectrum 
of NGOs. In various areas of civil society – from Kemalist and Islamist to GLBT 
NGOs, large and small – the antagonistic attitudes towards EU-funded projects surface 
in several different degrees of intensity. In each case, the antagonistic reaction offers 
something positive to the NGO. It can be a way of establishing a clearer sense of 
organisational purpose and objectives and help to bolster organisational identity by 
defining what the NGO is not. In this sense, this behaviour can be understood as 
protecting the independence of the NGO. For some, this antagonistic behaviour forms 
part of a broader suspicion and weariness towards the Europeanisation project in 
Turkey. For others, it is a way of reaffirming the reasons for the NGO’s existence; it is 
focused on particular issues, and the lure of project funding must not direct away from 
these issues. 
 






Table 5: A summary of the four categories for NGO roles 
 
It is challenging to offer an accurate assessment of the relative significance of 
each of these categories in the context of Turkish civil society and within the particular 
group of NGOs researched here. It is important to note that no NGO may fit perfectly 
– and solely – within one of the four roles described here. In other words, the same 
women’s NGO may at one time function as a broker between a rural women’s NGO 
and the EU, whilst behaving like a navigator at a later date. Having said this, at least 
among those NGOs that were interviewed as part of this research project, navigator-
like behaviour was most prevalent. Even where NGOs did not admit to being 
navigators themselves, anecdotally almost every respondent referred to at least one 
example of another NGO that behaved in this way. This finding should not be 
surprising, considering the weak traditions of giving in Turkey discussed in Chapter 
Six, and the fact that NGOs are largely a recent phenomenon that have come to exist in 
an environment where external funding is a large motivating factor behind NGO 
activities. Additionally, the role of a translator or a broker requires a degree of 




NGOs seek to find ways to reconcile 
the ideas behind donor funded projects 
in locally meaningful ways. 
 
They do so by reinterpreting the 
solutions offered by EU policy on the 
basis of their own interests and 
understanding. 
Navigator: 
NGOs exhibit a similar entrepreneurial 
spirit as ‘brokers’ but utilise it in 
outcomes aimed at the NGO itself. 
 
They do so by identifying 
opportunities within the EU funding 
framework and finding innovative 
ways to gain access to this funding. 
Broker: 
NGOs act as entrepreneurial agents 
that facilitate links between donors and 
local actors. 
 
They do so by identifying the gaps that 
exist between EU projects and local 
NGOs and offering to bridge this gap.  
Antagonist: 
NGOs refuse to accept EU funding, or 
any other donor funding. 
 
 
They do so not only by avoiding EU 
funding, but doing so publicly in order 





This chapter argues that as NGOs make decisions about how to negotiate a path 
through the contradictions that exist between their daily practices and the requirements 
of the EU funding process, they generate new strategies that aim to reconcile the 
current position of the NGO with the prospect of funding opportunities. The strategies 
fall under two types. The first relates to the roles NGOs have as intermediaries, 
drawing on the model of NGOs as brokers and translators offered by David Lewis and 
David Mosse (2006). The second type focuses in on the direct relationship between 
NGOs and EU funding, explaining how NGOs position themselves in relation to the 
funding opportunities, as navigators and antagonists. Whilst some find ways to 
navigate closer to EU funds by reframing their activities in opportunistic ways that 
grant them access, other NGOs find it beneficial to position themselves sternly against 
external funding. These categories are not intended to be complete or exclusive but to 
offer direction in further analysing the domain of unanticipated consequences of EU 
funding. 
The observations made in this chapter resonate strongly with the sociological 
institutionalist perspective to Europeanisation that was discussed in Chapter Two. 
Donors that fund project-based interventions tend to see projects through a rational 
lens, favouring them because they are time-bound, technical interventions that lend 
themselves to the development of quantifiable outcomes and performance indicators. 
The actor-oriented perspective questions the rational assumptions that drive the above 
conception, pointing, for example, to the complex social processes of internalisation 
that need to take place before projects become meaningful to local actors. It resonates 
with the sociological argument that places its focus on the local values and norms as 
key factors explaining local responses to externally derived goals. The rational and 
actor-oriented discussion of the project aims to add a layer of analysis to the theoretical 
approach developed in earlier in the thesis. 
The strategies NGOs adopt may be in part based on rational calculations, but a 
crucial part of the equation hinges on the decisions NGOs make on the basis of their 
perception of the social context. The decisions NGOs make vis-à-vis EU funding are 
reflective of broader questions than simple utility-maximising calculus of rational 
choice institutionalism. The four NGO roles outlined in this chapter offer an insight 
into the processes through which EU policy becomes socialised, a brief look at the way 
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NGOs internalise the EU rules and norms in a variety of ways and how this process in 
turn leads EU policy to reach multiple outcomes rather than a single one. 
The role of the CFCU reinforces the discrepancies between the donor world 
and the NGO world. Given the processes through which the CFCU assessed NGO 
performance, and the requirements that are placed on NGOs, it is likely that the two 
lifeworlds of EU funding and NGOs are likely to remain disconnected. It seems that 
this disconnect has only widened after the CFCU assumed its role at the centre of the 
EU-NGO funding relationship. This trend therefore suggests that the pre-accession 
process, by sustaining and widening the EU-NGO gap, creates further incentives and 
reasons for NGOs to engage in the roles of translators, brokers, navigators and 
antagonists. 
 The chapter demonstrates the multidimensionality of donor-NGO relations. 
Whilst actor-oriented networks highlight the inadvertent consequences of donor-
funded projects, any analysis within the actor-oriented framework is tightly focused on 
the social interface that a project creates. By illustrating the various roles NGOs 
engage in, and particularly the various motivations that underlie these roles, the 
discussion has attempted to push beyond that which takes place around projects 
themselves and highlight the multidimensionality and unpredictability of the impact 
that EU funding can have on Turkish civil society. The impact of EU funding spills 
over from the contained project sphere, and points to the difficulties in predicting the 
outcome of donor policy. The unintended side-effects suggest that policy interventions, 
such as democracy promotion through NGO funding, cannot be thought of as simply 
executing a plan of action that has expected outcomes. To gain a better understanding 
of the true impact of EU pre-accession policy it is necessary to look more holistically 
at how NGOs engage with and react to EU policy, and how they embrace, adapt or 
resist this policy depending on their own interests. 
The consequences of social action are rarely restricted to the specific policy 
area for which they were intended. We should remain wary of project aims that are 
based on a simple execution of a pre-defined plan with expected outcomes. The 
intermediary actors that operate at the junction where the donor world-view links up 
with the Turkish world-view are but one example of the myriad actors that contribute 
to the unexpected and nuanced outcomes of donor funding. This invites one to 
question whether the outcomes of EU-funded projects have actually been different 
from what was planned. The evidence from this chapter suggests that if the project 
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outcomes are premised on NGO projects reaching particular end results (as the 
evidence from Chapter Three suggests), then, given how the EU funding to civil 
society is unfolding, any specific outcomes are unlikely to materialise. Where the 
policy aspirations are not congruent with the NGOs’ own goals, the organisations are 







The EU accession negotiations, by their very nature, crystallise around processes of 
change. These processes ask Turkey to accept a set of rules and norms that require 
wide-ranging internal adaptations, and which largely determine the official role that 
civil society funding plays in the accession context. In other words, the EU rationale 
for civil society funding links to a perception of NGOs as potential agents of domestic 
change. The research asked how EU policy on civil society expects NGOs to deliver 
change, and identified a conceptual frame for describing these expectations in 
democratisation and Europeanisation. The EU therefore anticipates that Turkish civil 
society can contribute to the accession process by further democratising and 
Europeanising Turkey. 
 The research reflected on the suitability of the EU policy approach in the 
Turkish context. It did so through a combination of a literature review, a policy 
document analysis, and a series of interviews with government, EU and NGO actors. 
Chapter Two first set out the normative logic behind EU policy, followed by a detailed 
discussion of EU civil society policy in Chapter Three. Chapter Four elaborated on the 
development of Turkish civil society and paved the way towards understanding how 
EU civil society policy may unfold in the Turkish context. The three empirical 
chapters that followed (Chapters Five, Six and Seven) were brought together by the 
common aim of wishing to understand how appropriate the EU policy approach has 
been. This aim was pursued by reflecting on the EU policy in the domestic political 
context of Turkey, and by charting the experiences of the actors involved in the policy 
process. The three areas under investigation were: the character of the relationships 
that advocacy NGOs are able to foster around them; how external civil society funding 
in Turkey corresponds with the actual needs of civil society and how funding shapes 
attitudes and responses among NGOs; and charting the varied and uncertain impact 
that EU projects have on Turkish NGOs. The findings suggested that the overall 
impact of EU funding extends beyond the scope of what is regarded as democratisation 
or Europeanisation, and the normative expectations of EU civil society policy. The 
research questioned the appropriateness of the EU approach in terms of the aims the 
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EU has set for its policy intervention, and the means through which the EU has set out 
to realise these aims. 
 This notion of appropriateness was also addressed by the research questions, 
with the main research question for this thesis asking “why, in the context of EU civil 
society funding in Turkey, are processes of Europeanisation unpredictable in their 
outcomes?” This was supported by sub-questions that helped to focus the research 
further: “what are the frameworks of support that are present in EU civil society 
assistance?”; “how does the Turkish political context mediate the impact of EU 
funding on NGOs?” and “how do NGOs react when faced with choices about how to 
engage with EU funding policy?” These questions pointed to a number of tools with 
which to investigate how EU policy, embedded in the ideas of democratisation and 
Europeanisation, plays out in the context of Turkish civil society. 
 
8.1 Summarising the research findings 
 
Chapter Two established the theoretical foundation of the thesis, then outlined societal 
change as a central idea that has informed the way in which Western societies have 
come to understand the role and purpose of civil society. Thinkers such as Ferguson, 
Hegel and de Tocqueville strove to make sense of the new kinds of social relations that 
were presented to them by a modernising and industrialising world. The concept of 
civil society was interwoven with a changing society, with both the emergence of 
modern commercial relations and the evolution of modern state-society relations. Such 
ideas continue to inform thinking on civil society, with democratisation and 
sustainable economic development emerging as key motivations for engaging with 
civil society in Western donor circles, as well as within the EU. In the European policy 
lexicon in particular, the notion of a third sector brings together both the democratic 
and economic benefits of civil society and wraps the argument in the idea that civil 
society contributes to change and to a societal forward motion. The chapter found that 
the relevance of such concepts in the Turkish context is well worth reviewing because 
the third sector approach presents an overly positive and uniform view of the way civil 
society is likely to relate to change. Taking direction from the ideas of Hegel, who 
both spoke of the contestational and contingent nature of civil society, and from 
Gramsci, who referred to hegemonic and counterhegemonic struggles within civil 
society, the chapter argued that a more ambivalent view on the relationships between 
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civil society and change processes may well be prudent in the case of Turkey. Any 
overall picture of civil society activity is likely to be confused and multidirectional, 
reflecting the countless opinions and positions that various actors express, in turn 
alluding to the need for a contextually grounded understanding of civil society. 
Chapter Three carried the discussion forward to the EU policy on civil society 
and explored how the aims of democratisation and Europeanisation become expressed 
in this policy. The chapter put forward two broad findings. First, a discursive shift 
away from democratisation and towards Europeanisation was identified. By 2003 the 
policy discussions on the role of civil society had become intricately linked with the 
process of EU enlargement and the accession process. EU policy has approached civil 
society not only as an element of liberal democracy with an essential role in the 
expression of human rights and citizenship, but also utilised it in a parallel discourse of 
what it takes for accession countries to become Europeanised more broadly. Second, 
the chapter suggested that the belief in the ability of civil society to contribute to the 
democratisation and Europeanisation processes depends on particular assumptions 
about NGO behaviour. One such assumption views NGOs from a universal 
perspective, whereby they are deemed to operate in similar ways in different contexts. 
Another assumption views NGOs from an instrumental perspective, seeing 
organisations as neutral vehicles to be used for the delivery of policies and to perform 
particular functions. Moreover, the chapter alluded to similar observations with regard 
to EU civil society policy both in the Mediterranean region and in Turkey, further 
confirming the instrumental and universal nature of EU policy. In the Mediterranean, 
EU policy has focused primarily on human rights and democracy. However, in Turkey 
since the start of the accession negotiations, there has been a more decisive shift away 
from policies that support civil society in direct democratisation efforts, towards softer 
and less confrontational policies of Europeanisation (adopting the acquis 
communautaire of the EU). 
 Chapter Four, the bridge to the empirical chapters that follow, provided the 
contextual flesh around the theoretical and policy discussions by considering the 
history and development of civil society in Turkey. The processes of Westernisation 
and modernisation that were set in motion in the 1920s and 1930s, together with 
aspirations for a modern, Western nation state, provided an important impetus for the 
present day processes of Europeanisation. On the one hand, Europeanisation has 
generated the context – an enabling environment – within which NGOs are able to 
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carry out their work. On the other hand, NGOs are an integral part of the 
Europeanisation process. The particular way in which Westernisation and 
modernisation turned out in Turkey also present limitations to the way in which 
Europeanisation can now unfold. The aspirations for reform, for example, are 
complicated by the domestic political context, where the secular and Islamic camps in 
particular are engaged in a hegemonic struggle over the political direction of the 
country. The essential nature of the debate that surrounds this issue, together with the 
fact that NGOs tend to take sides in this essentialist debate, contribute to the 
fragmented political discourse as well as to fragmentation within civil society. The 
policies that are part of the EU accession process become inevitably entangled in these 
debates, the chapter argued, complicating the processes of societal Europeanisation in 
particular. 
  Chapter Five, the first of the three empirical chapters, explored the impact of 
EU funding on the relationships that Turkish advocacy NGOs are able to establish with 
governmental actors as well as with other NGOs. NGO advocacy, being largely about 
aspirations for change, resonates strongly with the change processes related to EU 
accession. The impact of EU accession has been most profound at the level of legal 
changes that have significantly bolstered NGO efforts at advocacy. However, where 
the EU has financed projects aiming to improve relations between advocacy NGOs and 
municipal governments, these have had limited success, highlighting the need for such 
relationships to develop organically from within. Developing them with the help of 
external funding is unlikely to yield the results that were expected. Relationships 
between advocacy NGOs are often beleaguered by political or ideological debates and 
tensions, which get in the way of working together or focusing on the issues in a way 
that is productive and could contribute positively to the policy agenda. The chapter 
thus suggested that the Turkish context imposes limitations to the ability of NGOs to 
collaborate in ways that would be directly relevant to the effectiveness of government 
policy. This in turn has cast a question mark over EU policies that envisage such roles 
for NGOs. 
 Chapter Six queried the appropriateness of EU funding by looking at how 
appropriate it has been in relation to domestic avenues for funding and how it has 
shaped NGO responses to external funding. The domestic funding environment is 
rather unfavourable for advocacy NGOs, which tend not to be supported through 
domestic philanthropic endeavours. In this sense EU funding offers a good fit, as it has 
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tended to channel its support to those NGOs that would not otherwise have many 
domestic opportunities available to them. Since the start of the EU accession 
negotiations, the mechanics of the funding process have been Europeanised, 
introducing further bureaucratic complexity. Two domestic institutions, the Central 
Finance and Contracts Unit (CFCU) and the Civil Society Development Centre 
(CSDC) have effectively been tasked with moulding the funded NGOs into vehicles 
for delivering EU policy goals. Two issues internal to NGOs emerged as determinants 
of NGO participation in EU-funded projects. Firstly, NGOs felt that only those 
organisations with a certain internal organisational capacity were able to successfully 
bid for projects. Secondly, NGOs made decisions on whether to apply for EU funding 
on the basis of where the NGO perceived the legitimacy of their operations to come 
from. Some groups made explicit choices not to apply for funding, as they believe that 
EU funding labels them as less genuine or organic as a Turkish NGO. These 
inadvertent selection processes bifurcate civil society into “haves and have nots”, or 
the “want and want-nots”. The chapter concluded that these developments imposed 
limits as to how far-reaching and ambitious EU aims of building civil society through 
project funding can be. 
 Chapter Seven carried on the discussion with regard to the choices that NGOs 
make. The debate was harnessed by a focus on the notion of the “project”. The project 
interface through which EU funding is channelled to NGOs is not a closed box where 
actions can be controlled by the performance criteria assigned to the project. The 
chapter suggested that the incongruence between the policy expectations and everyday 
practices among NGOs mean that organisations generate a variety of means to 
negotiate through these differences in ways that are beneficial to them. These 
strategies were labelled as “brokers”, “translators”, “navigators” and “antagonists”. 
Such actions allude to the unanticipated consequences that are generated by the EU 
policy process. It is therefore less certain that EU civil society funding will achieve 
any specific policy aims it sets out. The outcomes are likely to be more fuzzy, varied 
and uncertain. 
 The research also pointed to certain differences in how the findings related to 
the different regional sites where interviews were conducted. Whilst findings from 
Ankara and Istanbul yielded similar results, the experiences of interviewees from 
Diyarbakir were somewhat different. In Diyarbakir NGO actors exhibited a more open 
attitude towards cooperation with other organisations – arguably because all the NGOs 
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deal with the consequences of the years of unrest the region has experienced: there is a 
shared feeling that everyone is in the same boat. The interviewees also felt that EU 
funding had a stronger impact in the southeast of Turkey. As a region it is much poorer 
than the other two research sites, which in turn has meant that smaller amounts of EU 
financial assistance are able to make more of a difference in people’s lives. Such 
differences between the research sites suggested that regions are an important variable 
to consider. However, it was not within the scope of this research project to do so, as 
more comparative work to substantiate any findings would have been required. 
 The account of NGO behaviour that is put forward in this thesis is not one that 
is strictly limited to Turkey. During the previous rounds of EU enlargement, and 
indeed among older EU member states, NGOs have exhibited similar tendencies to 
come up with creative ways in which to resist the demands for change that EU civil 
society funding places on them. However, the thesis does suggest that there is a 
particular Turkish narrative for explaining why NGOs behave the way they do, and 
that this narrative forms an important part of an analysis of Turkish civil society. 
 
Addressing the key themes of the research 
The unpredictability of the Europeanisation processes, a theme underlying the main 
research question, was approached from an angle that explored the disconnect between 
the EU policy framework and NGO behaviour. This disconnect was investigated from 
a number of points of view. Chapters Two and Three emphasised liberal individualism 
among donors and policymakers as a partial explanation. The Western tradition of 
thought in relation to civil society contains a strong tendency to draw links between the 
existence of a vibrant civil society, processes of democratisation and improved policy 
efficiency. In other words, civil society is seen as a source of “good”. In the recent 
European experience, these ideas have been wrapped around the concept of the third 
sector, which in the EU policy context forms a two-pronged approach that explores the 
potential of civil society to improve policy efficiency as well as to bolster the 
democratic credentials of the EU. This approach also permeates initiatives that deal 
with civil society in the EU enlargement context: the rationale for engaging with 
NGOs in Turkey is linked to democratisation and improved dialogue between EU 
countries and Turkey. The thesis argued that the transposition of civil society-related 
policies from the EU domestic context to the enlargement context suggest a universal 
understanding of what is meant by civil society and NGOs. Furthermore, as both of 
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these goals, democratisation and improved dialogue, are deemed to be core conditions 
for Turkey’s EU accession, the role envisaged for NGOs is instrumental in nature. 
Following this line of argument, the chapters suggested that NGO work is valued for 
the contribution it makes to the broader processes of democratisation and 
Europeanisation. As later chapters illustrated in detail, the conceptualisation of policy 
combined with its operationalisation through intermediaries such as the CFCU, have 
resulted in a framework that does not reach the NGO community as effectively as 
possible. 
 Chapters Four to Seven together put forward the case that the Turkish socio-
cultural and historical context, together with the behaviour of NGOs that is embedded 
in this context, have made it difficult to realise the goals set by EU policy. The 
essentialised character of NGO activity that follows on from the historical 
development of civil society in Turkey means that NGOs are reluctant to cooperate 
and work together. NGOs tend to be sensitive to polarisation along the lines of politics 
or identity (secular-religious cleavages being explored in some detail in the thesis). 
Given that this politically charged context is often intermingled with passionate 
nationalist and secular tendencies, EU funding (along with other external 
interventions) is rejected on the grounds that it constitutes an agenda for trying to 
surreptitiously influence domestic policy and politics. Additionally, NGOs that do not 
to subscribe to such scepticism often felt that EU funding is either unfair in terms of 
accessibility, remaining unreachable to many organisations, or contains monitoring 
criteria that are far too complicated. These kinds of attitudes among NGO activists 
contribute to the unpredictability of EU policy because the policy assumes engagement 
with, and embracement of, what it represents. Yet many, perhaps a majority of NGOs, 
refuse to accept EU policy at face value and manoeuvre in ways that reconcile their 
own goals with those of EU. Chapter Seven demonstrated that NGOs engage in (at 
least) four different types of activities (translators, brokers, navigators and antagonists) 
that enable them to either manage policy outcomes, or resist policy influence 
altogether. The opportunities for these activities emerge, the chapter argued, precisely 
because a gap is present between the policy aspirations of EU and the reality on the 
ground. This agency that NGOs exhibit in their activities was identified as a key 
explanatory factor for the presence of unpredictability in the processes of 






This section focuses on the implications of the research: first examining the theoretical 
implications, followed by a commentary on the policy implications. From a theoretical 
point of view, the thesis offers insights into civil society theory and its application in 
the Turkish case, as well as on how best to conceptualise Europeanisation in relation to 
EU civil society policy in Turkey. The policy implications of this research project 
focus on the impact of the policy process on social actors, namely looking at the 
repercussions EU funding policy has had on NGOs. In addition the research has 
explored the agency possessed by the said actors to carve a space within the policy 
process to act independently. 
 
Theory 
The theoretical implications fall into two broad areas. The first attends to the nature of 
civil society in Turkey and the insights this offers to any theoretical discussion 
regarding civil society. The second area of consideration relates to the processes of 
Europeanisation and democratisation and how these are best conceptualised in the 
context of EU civil society policy in Turkey. In addressing these issues, the thesis 
brought together literature from civil society studies and European studies, using this 
linkage to explain how Europeanisation and democratisation is likely to unfold in the 
context of EU civil society funding. 
 The historical development and the present-day dynamics of civil society 
activity in Turkey support an interpretation that agrees with a Hegelian description of 
civil society as a site of struggle and contest, where particular interests are in constant 
competition with other particular interests, to be contained by a set of universal 
interests that are able to constrain what is regarded as acceptable behaviour. The state 
in Turkey remains active in defining what interests can be regarded as universal. 
Whilst Hegel regarded the state as the “ultimate arbiter” in societal disputes, there are 
grounds for questioning the democratic legitimacy of such actions. One way to look at 
these democratic limitations is through the hegemonic struggles that are constantly 
being played out between different political or ideological perspectives within civil 
society. To evoke a Gramscian analysis, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic voices 
challenge each other’s legitimacy in a public debate. This is largely conducted through 
an essentialised debate, where the voices are engaged in a uncompromising mission to 
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“convert” the other to see the wrongs of their way. Some observers describe the 
different positions as “empty signifiers” and argue that the underlying battle is simply 
about power rather than engaging in a legitimate political debate115, yet this still 
remains a useful way of depicting civil society relations in Turkey as it attests to their 
contestational nature. It is not merely different particular interests that are jostling for 
position, but rather different versions of the universal interests that are battling for the 
heart of the state.  
The Turkish experience also suggests that the contestational nature of civil 
society relations can, to some extent, be managed by rights-based approaches that 
anchor activism in the universal discourse of rights. The rights-based debates offer an 
alternate discourse that can challenge the essentialist nature of the secular-Islamic 
debate in particular. It is here that common ground – even if only for limited periods at 
a time – has been found between differing ideological groups represented within 
Turkish civil society. The Islamic discourse on civil society and the secular approach 
find shared ground in accepting the primacy of human rights as a common 
denominator of public debate. It would seem that rights-based discourses offer an 
opportunity to bring secular and Islamic NGOs together around common issues, even 
where such collaborative events remain volatile and uncertain in their outcomes. The 
fact that this is possible has certainly been demonstrated by the women’s movement. 
EU involvement has contributed to the process of building an enabling environment 
within which these types of relationships are made possible. Whilst this observation 
supports the EU agenda of Europeanisation, it is also important to recognise the 
limitations such approaches present in the Turkish case. 
The incongruence between EU policy and the behaviour of civil society on the 
ground can be also approached from a theoretical perspective. EU policy is heavily 
influenced by a third sector perspective of civil society, which is essentially a political 
economy approach that emphasises the efficiency gains and increased effectiveness 
greater civil society involvement can bring. This, however, is a rather technical 
approach that pays less attention to the political and ideological content of civil 
society. The incentives that are built into EU policy measures to induce certain type of 
behaviour may be side-stepped by a desire to engage in a particular type of political or 
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ideological activism. Neither does this approach fully appreciate how local actors 
interpret EU policy on civil society and how their responses are shaped by their own 
interests and the domestic political context.  
The framework of sociological institutionalism proposes a way to understand 
this incongruence and to make sense of the way in which civil society responses to EU 
civil society policy manifest themselves. It is by appreciating the influence of the 
social context in which NGOs operate and the informal rules and norms that govern 
their behaviour that we can understand how EU civil society policy becomes socialised 
by NGOs and becomes meaningful in the local context. 
 The perspective of sociological institutionalism also has implications when 
considering what kind of Europeanisation is achievable. In Chapter Three, 
Europeanisation was categorised in its political, policy and societal forms. It would 
seem, on the basis of this research, that in the Europeanisation process Turkey is 
currently undergoing, the impact of EU civil society policy in the short term is likely to 
be limited to the political and policy forms. It is possible for external agents to engage 
in the formal, structural change processes. Societal change processes, however, are 
much more difficult to influence. This does not mean that a policy intervention, such 
as the one under investigation here, has no impact. Rather, it shows that the impact is 
likely to be ambivalent and context-dependent, making it very difficult to pursue a 
short-term policy agenda with specified outcomes.  
 
Policy 
The research speaks to the complexity of policy processes as change processes and 
describes the difficulties policy interventions face in this regard. Policy can be an 
effective way to induce change. For example in Chapter Three, the role of policy 
documentation and document language was characterised as transformative, in the 
sense that the assumptions and aspirations evident in policy interventions encapsulate a 
certain mode of behaviour that shape actors’ understanding of the role they are to play. 
Policymaking that takes the policy content as the sole impetus for change takes its cue 
from rational choice institutionalism, applying “strategic calculus” in assuming that 
actors form preferences through rational calculation. In this way EU policy takes its 
agenda-setting power as a sufficient carrot to encourage Turkish NGOs to act in a 
certain way that is conducive to democratisation and Europeanisation.  
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Policy that induces change, however, is likely to be met with uncertainty. 
These tensions arise in particular from the discrepancies between the everyday 
practices of NGOs on the ground and the policy expectations. This is evident in an 
example referred to in Chapter Five, where an EU-funded programme to improve 
relations between government and civil society actors results in a series of relatively 
unsuccessful pilot projects. Similarly, in Chapter Six the account of NGO reactions to 
the introduction of the CFCU as the central administrative body were on the whole 
very negative and suspicious. In each example, what is at issue is the incongruence 
between what is proposed and the current state of affairs, together with the tense 
response this creates among NGOs. This asks questions about the accuracy of those 
assumptions that perceive of NGOs as agents of change. 
The incongruence alone, however, is not the sole explanation for the 
uncertainty. The NGO reactions are embedded in the domestic political context and the 
meaning of EU policy is based on local interpretations. For one, the policy process 
lacks a consultative aspect. There may be reasonable justifications for not engaging in 
consultations, given the tendency of such processes to take a relatively long time. 
However, on the basis of these research findings, the lack of consultation correlates 
with a lack of ownership among the recipient NGOs. It may well be that in instances 
where the policy intervention cuts across national or cultural boundaries, such 
consultative processes are particularly important. This could ease the tensions that 
currently surround EU funding, especially where NGOs feel that the EU is imposing 
an external agenda upon them.  
The above observations are connected with the means through which funding is 
made available – projects. The emphasis on projects as the primary means for the 
distribution of funds, in particular the monitoring mechanisms that accompany project 
funding, can compound the feeling among recipients that the EU aims to control civil 
society in Turkey. Each of the three empirical chapters offers insights into how civil 
society actors perceive this to be the case and how this contributes to the level of 
tension between the EU and civil society. Quantifiable indicators of project success are 
largely reliant on accounting data, focusing on what the funding has been spent on. 
Whilst this is clearly important in ensuring that funds have been spent appropriately, 
such measures are less able to speak about how NGOs realise the delivery of projects. 
In other words, the emphasis is on the “what” at the expense of the “how”. Although 
such an assessment is not an entirely fair account of how project success is measured, 
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management of such perceptions is an issue that has an impact on how readily a given 
policy intervention is accepted by the agents used to deliver that policy. Without 
managing these perceptions, EU policies in Turkey may have limited success in that 
they deliver policy Europeanisation and not societal Europeanisation. 
As indicated by the above discussion, there is indeed evidence that EU civil 
society policy is able to induce certain types of changes. Yet, any such impact is rather 
ambivalent and uncertain in nature. Funding has shaped civil society in a certain 
direction, creating winners and losers on the bases of organisational ability and 
orientation; by offering encouragement to certain types of organisations, the policy has 
amounted to a transformative process. At the same time, policy that induces change 
also generates uncertain outcomes. EU policies have a sense of being imposed from 
above, a feeling that is amplified by the use of rigidly conceptualised projects as the 
means of delivering the policy. There is an additional dimension to this process that 
needs to be taken into account. The incongruence between policy aspirations and 
means of policy delivery on the one hand and the current state of affairs on the other 
hand leads to strategies of resistance and deviance on the part of local actors. 
 These strategies manifest themselves in various forms and are not readily 
controlled by the policy process. In explaining policy outcomes Chapter Seven referred 
to the broker and translator framework in order to explain how NGOs generate locally 
meaningful outcomes from externally controlled policy processes. Additionally, the 
chapter elaborated on this model by highlighting NGO roles as navigators and 
antagonists in order to illustrate their resourcefulness in making the project framework 
create positive outcomes in ways that were not anticipated by the policymakers. 
Exploration of these strategies is helpful in identifying certain limits to the ability of 
EU policy to import a set of external norms that subsequently shape local actors’ 
perceptions of the role they are to play. In particular, it is important to engage with the 
multiplicity of reactions that any given policy intervention will generate among the 
recipient actors. Furthermore, it is also important to appreciate the impact policy has 
outside the confines of the policy process. This seems to be of crucial relevance in 
situations where policy crosses cultural and national boundaries.  
 The thesis has highlighted the uncertainty and ambiguity that is evident in the 
outcomes of EU funding, but where exactly does this leave us in terms of moving 
forward? Has the EU either adopted “wrong” aims, or “wrong” policies to achieve the 
said aims? In the context of the EU pre-accession process that Turkey has embarked 
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on, this does not seem a plausible argument to make. Certain steps need to be taken for 
Turkey to continue its journey towards an eventual membership, and the nature of civil 
society funding is one aspect of that process. However, what exactly is achievable 
through this funding should perhaps be given some further thought. Processes of 
Europeanisation or democratisation are not simple behavioural traits that can be 
adopted over night. They are long-term processes that evolve incrementally and will 
inevitably look different in each country context. In order to ensure that the NGOs are 
fully involved and share the policy aims, they should be included in the decision-
making processes that form a part of the annual review of policy priorities. The 
practice of participating in the decision-making process may in fact be as 
Europeanising or democratising as the projects that follow. 
 If the EU continues to present itself as a benevolent but inflexible bureaucratic 
behemoth, in the eyes of the NGOs it may not differ so much from the state which 
traditions it is trying to change. It may therefore be more prudent to focus on 
processes, rather than short-term outcomes. Whether a given project lives up to the 
stated aims word by word may be less important than ensuring the aims are arrived at 
through a participatory process in the first place. By including NGOs at all stages of 
the decision-making, they are likely gain a much stronger sense of ownership over the 
policies and projects that they are asked to act upon. This may mean that the EU will 
have to compromise on some of its aims in order to facilitate a genuine dialogue, but 
given the current state to uncertainty in terms of policy outcomes, this would almost 
certainly not be a regressive step in terms of actual (as opposed to stated) outcomes. 
 
8.3 Further research 
The thesis has argued that change processes such as those involved in Europeanisation 
are context-dependent. In this regard there are further areas that could be investigated. 
Such investigations could in turn help to better understand the opportunities and 
limitations EU funding for civil society can offer.  
 One such dimension is found in the differences that exist between eastern and 
western Turkey. Centre-periphery relations have for a long time been considered a key 
to explaining Turkish politics (Mardin 1973) and it seems there are interesting grounds 
for exploring the differences in how EU funding has been received in eastern and 
western Turkey. The eastern and south-eastern regions have received a significant 
amount of funding (see figure 4 in Chapter Six), making this an interesting arena to 
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test further the hypothesis that domestic political developments guide the way in which 
EU funding policies play out in practice. The political situation in the Kurdish areas 
(Çelik 2005; Yavuz 1999) is likely to create a different environment where EU policies 
are received differently from the experiences in, for example, Ankara and Istanbul. 
 Another fruitful avenue for further research would be to investigate, in more 
detail, the operation of the current programme of civil society funding that is delivered 
under the Civil Society Dialogue programme. It was not possible to conduct research 
on projects within this programme as part of the research for this thesis because the 
projects were carried out after fieldwork had been completed in 2008-9. As this thesis 
has suggested, such an approach may be better suited to influence societal 
Europeanisation in particular. In this regard, it would be interesting to learn whether 
this decisive shift in how funding was delivered has also influenced they way it has 
been received by NGOs and to explore whether projects carried out under the theme of 
dialogue have been internalised differently by civil society actors.
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Appendix: Topic Guide 
 




- When was the organisation founded? 
- Why was the organisation founded in the first place? Have the aims changed in any 
way and if so, why? 
- Can you describe the work your organisation undertakes in more detail? (projects, 
issues, outcomes) 
-   Does the work have an explicitly political aspect? 
- Are there other NGOs working in this area? (follow up when discussing NGO 
relationships) 
- Is your NGO a member of any umbrella group or a network and why have you opted 




-   How is the organisation funded? 
-   What would you are some of the strengths/weaknesses of your current funding 
situation? 
-   Would you consider funding from:  
 - Companies, individuals, government, EU, other external funders 
 - Why yes/no 
- Overall, for your organisation, can you find sufficient funding from domestic 
sources to fully develop the ideas/aspirations you have as an organisation? 
-   Are there any sources of funding that are inappropriate for NGOs? 
 
3 External funding (EU):  
 
- What were the main reasons behind the decision to apply for external funding? 
- Who made this decision? 
- Was there any internal discussion on whether the application should be 
made?   
- Can you comment on your experience of the process (application process, managing 
project, financial management). 
- Who would say was more in control of the way in which the project unfolded – 
donor or NGO? (ask for examples of how this control came about) 
- Can you describe any other positive/negative experiences that related to the process? 
- Would you apply again – why yes/no? 
 
Relations with other NGOs: 
 
- Do you collaborate with other NGOs? YES 
- Which ones and why? How important are these relations? 
- Are all of these organisation in the same city, or also in other cities? 
- What are the reasons for collaboration? (work on same issues, political 
opportunity window,  work together on a project? 
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- In your experience, how long do such relationships last. Are they more 
often long term or short term? 
- Do relations with other NGOs help you to achieve your aims as an 
organisation? 
 
- Do you collaborate with other NGOs? NO 
- Why no collaboration? 
- What is your view on collaborations that you see between other NGOs – 
are these effective? 
 
Relations with government: 
 
- Does your organisation have experience of working with governmental actors? 
- Central government 
- Local (municipal) government 
 
- YES 
- How important are these relations to your organisation? 
- What are the reasons for collaboration? (delivery of services, political 
issues, funded projects) 
- Can you identify any differences between the relations with different levels 
of gov’t? 




- Is this a deliberate decision/policy by the organisation? 
- Are there circumstances in which you would consider relations with 
government 
- What is your view on organisations that do collaborate with governmental 
actors 
  
Impact of EU:  
 
- In what ways has the EU accession process had an impact on civil society? (funding, 
environment) 
 
- Has the impact been overall positive or overall negative? Can you give examples?  
 
- In what ways has the EU accession process had an impact on your organisation. 
(direct or indirect) 
 
- Experiences of project funding:  
- Details of projects (duration, amount, purpose and how many) 
- Experiences with CSDC or CFCU? If yes, what kind? 
- Has EU at any point consulted your organisation or other about the content 
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